



PPPs

Public Private Partnerships in Education

Analyzing PPPs as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education in Uganda



Bo-Joe Brans



PPPs - Public Private Partnerships in education

Analyzing PPPs as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education in Uganda

Bo-Joe Brans

Bojoe.Brans@gmail.com

MSc International Development Studies
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Universiteit van Amsterdam
September 2011

Supervisor: Dr. A. Verger
Second reader: Dr. H. Kosar-Altinyelken

Cover: Forum for Education NGOs demonstration in Kampala, Uganda (FENU 2010)

ABSTRACT - Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are an increasingly promoted policy tool for development in education sectors of developing countries. Nevertheless the PPPs are a much debated topic because of their uncertain impact on the education field. In this research I analyzed the stakeholders' perceptions on the impact of the recently implemented PPPs policy on the education field as part of Universal Secondary Education in Uganda. By using a Critical Discourse Analysis I found first of all that there are strong discursive differences on the impact of the translated PPPs policy on the education problems in Uganda, and secondly that the conditions for translation policy are only partly met. As a consequence, the case of Uganda is in line with critics in the global debate on PPPs, who argue that the actual 'partnership' arrangement is highly ambiguous and that it therefore can be seen as a form of privatization.

Contents

List of Figures	8
Abbreviations	9
1. Introduction	10
1.1 Why PPPs in Uganda?	12
1.2 Research objective	13
2. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in education	16
2.1 Defining PPPs.....	16
2.2 Theoretical contestation of PPPs; a new ‘win-win’ situation or a form of privatization?	17
2.3 PPPs for education: the programmatic idea	18
2.3.1 Education Problems	19
2.3.2 Policy tools	20
2.3.3 The translation of programmatic idea.....	24
3. Methodology	29
3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).....	29
3.1.1 Fairclough’s CDA.....	30
3.1.1.1 Textual Analysis	31
3.1.2 Relation Theory and Methodology to research question	33
3.2 Methods.....	34
3.2.1 Document analysis	34
3.2.2 Observations.....	35
3.2.3 Interviews	36
3.3 Units of Analysis.....	36
3.3.1 Government Actors	37
3.3.2 The Education Development Partners.....	37
3.3.3 The Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).....	39
3.4 Scope and limitation of the thesis.....	39
3.4.1 Sampling difficulties: Private Actors and ‘the real stakeholders’	40
3.4.2 Time perspective	41
3.5 Ethical considerations and data analysis procedure	42
3.6 Data Analysis.....	42
4. Data Analysis (I): The politics of PPPs in Uganda	43
4.1 Government of Uganda and PPPs.....	43
4.1.1 The National Development Plan (NDP).....	43
4.1.2 The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP)	44
4.1.3 PPPs as part of USE	44

4.1.4	The PPPs arrangement	45
4.1.5	Kind of PPP.....	47
4.1.6	Policy environment	48
4.2	The role of the other stakeholders	50
4.2.1	The World Bank in Uganda.....	50
4.2.1.1	Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET) loans	50
4.2.1.2	Pro PPPs Situational Analysis.....	51
4.2.1.3	International Finance Corporation in Uganda	52
4.2.1.4	WB's current position	53
4.2.2	The role of the (other) Education Development Partners	53
4.2.3	The role of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)	54
5.	Data analysis (II): Education Problems	56
5.1	Government Actors Discourse	56
5.1.1	Privatization	56
5.1.2	Access	57
5.1.3	Quality.....	57
5.1.3.1	Quality in PPP schools	57
5.1.4	Efficiency	59
5.1.5	The Equity Situation	59
5.1.6	Role of the state under PPPs	59
5.2	The Education Development Partners' Discourse.....	61
5.2.1	Privatization	61
5.2.2	Creating Access	62
5.2.3	Quality.....	62
5.2.3.1	Quality in PPP schools	62
5.2.4	Efficiency	64
5.2.5	The Equity Situation	64
5.2.6	Role of the state.....	65
5.3	Civil Society Actors Discourse	66
5.3.1	Privatization	66
5.3.2	Access	67
5.3.3	Quality.....	68
5.3.3.1	Quality in PPP schools	68
5.3.4	Efficiency	68
5.3.5	The Equity Situation	70
5.3.6	Role of the state.....	71
5.4	Concluding remarks Data Analysis II	73
6.	Data Analysis (III) Conditions for translation.....	75

6.1	Enabling conditions.....	75
6.1.1	Influential promoters.....	75
6.1.2	Discursive promotion	76
6.1.3	Resonation.....	78
6.2	Flaws and hindering factors	80
6.2.1	Symbolic policy; flaw of implementation.....	80
6.2.2	Unfamiliar education paradigm.....	81
6.2.3	Not a true partnership.....	83
6.3	Concluding remarks.....	86
7.	Conclusions	88
7.1	Results of study.....	88
7.2	Significance of study.....	89
7.2.1	Privatization.....	89
7.2.2	No true partnership.....	90
7.3	Recommendations for Discussion	91
7.3.1	Deconstructing ‘partnership’	91
7.3.2	Involvement stakeholders	92
7.4	My approach and further research	94
8	Literature	96
9.	Appendices	104

Acknowledgements

Research of such scope and nature would not have been possible without the contributions of a number of people whom I wish to warmly acknowledge here.

In particular I would like to thank my supervisor Toni Verger. His work and guidance have been a great inspiration and encouragement. As well, I want to thank Toni for getting me in touch with the appropriate people at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which helped me eventually to 'open doors' in Uganda and gave me the valuable experience of participating in the UNESCO-IIEP Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) in Paris.

As I had to enter the environs of high level officials (where normally a student would not be welcome), I want to thank Tim Kos of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Kampala and most of all Frank Ssenabulya for helping me evade enormous queues and weeks of waiting for permission to contact all the Commissioners of the Ministry of Education in Uganda.

Also, I could not have written this thesis without the support of people in my personal life. Mostly I would like to thank my parents and Ena for their ever present support. As well I would like to thank my brothers and sister and dear friends, lamentably there is no space to mention everyone personally. Special mention goes to Rik Jan Brinkman and Jeffrey Bolhuis for giving me valuable feedback.

I wish to save my final acknowledgement for the Schuurman Schimmel and Van Outeren Foundation. I was honoured to be awarded a scholarship from them. Without this support my studies in Uganda would not have been possible.

Thank you.

List of Figures

Figure 1	Financing and provision of services in public-private partnerships	20
Figure 2a	Ideal case conceptualization programmatic idea	24
Figure 2b	Conceptual framework ‘impact PPPs programmatic idea’	25
Figure 3	Methodology of this research	30
Figure 4	Conceptualization impact of PPPs program in Uganda	31
Figure 5	Hindering conditions weighed against enabling conditions	84
Figure 6	Findings of this study	86
Figure 7	Parents suffer from high school fees	121

List of Boxes

Box 1	Consequences of privatization of education	15
Box 2	Equity and Quality in international agreements	18
Box 3	Varying degree of quality private school	56
Box 4	Efficiency-policy effects teachers	68
Box 5a	Alternative to current PPPs, by the Ugandan National Teacher Union	70
Box 5b	Alternative to current PPPs, by the Forum of Education NGOs Uganda	70

List of Tables

Table 1	Discursive representation PPPs in official documents	44
Table 2	Official positions and activities stakeholders	53
Table 3	Discursive representations of the PPPs impact	71

Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
CRC	Children's Rights Convention
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EDP	Education Development Partner
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
FENU	Forum of Education NGOs Uganda
IDA	International Development Association
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDP	National Development Plan
PAD-UPPET	Project Appraisal Document for UPPET
PPP	Public- Private Partnership
PLE	Primary Leaving Exam
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPPET	Universal Post Primary Education and Training
USE	Universal Secondary Education
UNATU	Ugandan National Teacher Union
WB	World Bank

1. Introduction

“Is education about giving each child, each young person, the opportunity to develop his or her full potential as a person and as a member of society? Or is education to be a service sold to clients, who are considered from a young age to be consumers and target for marketing?”

Education International 2009

“In Africa, a region in which the challenge to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is dire, a dynamic private sector has expanded the access to and quality of education through a variety of public-private partnerships (...)The new private providers are aiming to offer a more conducive learning environment than the public schools provide”

World Bank 2009

Consider these statements above. They both deal with the topic of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in education. In fact, these quotes represent the core views on the partnerships with private providers in education, as put forth in the main documents of both the World Bank and Education International on PPPs. The World Bank (WB) is clearly promoting PPPs by only naming advantages while Education International (EI) is far more sceptical towards PPPs and uses an anti-private education metaphor. These arguments belong to a global debate about the role of Public-Private Partnerships in education. Although these global institutions use considerably different language to express their standpoints on the emergence of the private sector in education, public-private interactions in education have emerged in many countries since the 1990s, and they are likely to develop much further in the near future (E.I. 2009). There is little doubt that the various types of PPPs have begun to redefine the roles of the public and private sectors (OECD 2008). While the promoters see the PPPs as the wave of the future, others do not draw the same conclusions.

The promoters of PPPs from national governments and international agencies, both donors and financiers wish to increase the coverage of education to ensure that all children go to school, especially in developing countries. The need to ensure Education For All (EFA) and the challenge of the Millennium Development Goals has resulted in growing support for partnerships as an instrument to increase the current provision of education during the first decade of the twenty first century. (Fennel 2010: 3). The framework of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) has been regarded by international financial institutions such as the World Bank as a possible way to ensure this objective by bolstering demand-driven provision as well as more cost-effective supply of education (World Bank 2009, Tooley and Dixon 2005).

However, the PPPs are still much debated. Other international agencies, such as Education International, Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation have been less enthusiastic in their support for PPPs as a means of increasing the access to and quality of equitable education available to underprivileged communities (Genevois 2008). Critics of the PPPs point to the discrepancies between the theory propounding partnerships as a third world panacea and their consequences in actuality (Miraftab 2004: 89).

Nevertheless PPPs are widespread in all parts of the world and they have a significant impact on the quality of education, its accessibility and on the working conditions of teachers and education employees. PPPs are transnational and their policies and the practices they encompass in one country can easily be applied in another (EI 2008: 109). Influential international organisations such as the World Bank, Regional development banks and donor countries have become enthusiastic supporters and manifests themselves as global carriers of the PPPs programs for more access and other education resources, by pushing global policies in to national politics (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010). What is striking however, as the existence of the debate shows, is that implications of national adoption of the PPPs are not conclusive, even its advocates are unsure of its impact (Patrinos et al 2009). Therefore the focus of this research is on the **impact** of a case where PPPs are newly adopted; in the secondary education field in Uganda, and to analyze in which manner this debate is conducted nationally.

1.1 Why PPPs in Uganda?

Under the growing pressure to meet the EFA goals the Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) has recently, since 2007, adopted the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a policy solution for Universal Secondary Education (USE). Uganda is the first country to have adopted Universal Secondary Education (Chapman 2009: 77).

For several reasons the PPPs are promoted in the context of Ugandan secondary education. First of all, Uganda's population dynamics pose a challenge to development. It has the third highest total fertility rate in the world (6.7 births per woman). Population has doubled since 1988; and the median age is just above 15 years. Uganda is one of the few countries where the number of young-age dependents exceeds the number of working age individuals (by 10 percent; WB 2010 IDA, Country Assistance Strategy Uganda). Education enrolment at the secondary level remains low. In 2007, the GER for secondary education was only 25.2 percent (girls 22.4 percent, boys 27.9 percent). Such high population growth is putting enormous pressure on the education system to meet the growing demand for access. This is reinforced by the growing amount of students completing the free Universal Primary Education cycle, which is already firmly in place since 1997.

While the demand for secondary education was already a problem, considering its start in 1997, action in form of a strong political pronouncement was only made in times of elections in 2006. As David Chapman notes, the convergence of rising parental demand together with national presidential elections, in which the incumbent President recognized that a promise of 'free' education could draw votes, lead to the pronouncement of Universal Secondary Education (Chapman 2009: 78).

Nevertheless, there were financial problems in following up on the government's pronouncement. According to the World Bank in Uganda, during times of this pronouncement the Government of Uganda (GoU) was highly financially constrained for resources in education. The share of the governmental budget for education dropped to 17.5 percent in 2007, with 65 percent allocated to primary education and 23 percent to secondary education. Furthermore, in the face of budgetary pressure to expand investments in other sectors, there was a great competition for resources to finance the transition to mass secondary education. It was at this time that Public-Private Partnerships came up as part of the Universal Secondary Education pronouncement: "to improve efficiency, strengthen partnerships with private sector, improve targeting of resources to schools that are in particular need of support and mobilize external resources" (WB 2009: PAD-UPPET: 2). This has led to a focus on the role that non-state providers can play in extending education access and improving its quality. While non-

state providers can help to fill a gap by extending access to those excluded from state provision, unplanned growth in both for-profit and not for-profit gives rise to a debate on partnerships with regard to profit-motivated private provision and the quality of such provision, its cost, and the implications that this has for choices for the poor (see Rose 2009).

Nevertheless in Uganda the Universal Secondary Education program is represented as an undisputed program and its promoters only emphasize the benefits of this program in official discourse. Is this because there is no dissent in the Uganda education field, or is it because the plan is faultless, or is the discursive power of the promoter's argumentations engulfing all critique? Although Uganda is highly aid dependent, Political power in Uganda has largely remained concentrated in the hands of President Museveni, who has ruled since 1986. When it comes to civil society in Uganda, many observers note that since 2005 the space for advocacy has been gradually narrowed, because of President Museveni's attempt to maintain political power in the context of the movement to a multiparty democracy (Mundy and Stalker 2010: 7). Therefore the question can be raised whether debate around such a highly contentious topic of PPPs, is possible in Uganda and whether critique from national education stakeholders is even allowed when the most powerful actor in the Ugandan education field, the government is promoting the PPPs.

1.2 Research objective

Therefore, besides looking at the impact of PPPs, the purpose of this research is to give 'voice' to stakeholders that are outside the direct policy promotion (e.g. civil society organisations) that have a compromised space for advocacy.

In Uganda this approach is especially appropriate for two other reasons. First of all the PPPs in Uganda are a new kind of PPP experiment of 'global policies in national politics'. Uganda is one of the first examples that experiments with 'free' private schools for secondary education instead of the more common low-fee private schools PPPs in developing countries (see UNESCO 2009)

Secondly, despite active global policy debates there has been very limited documentation of the experiences of state-non-state relationships in practice (Rose 2010: 475), as well in Uganda; academic studies and statistical data regarding the implemented PPPs are scarce as this concerns a relatively recently implemented programme.

The overarching question I will try to answer in this research is: *What is the impact of the PPPs program in the Ugandan education field?* The sub-questions that derive from this main question are:

- 1 *How has the PPP programmatic idea been translated in the Ugandan field of education?*
- 2 *How do the stakeholders perceive the PPPs affect or improve education problems in Uganda?*
- 3 *To what extent are the conditions for translation of the PPPs programmatic idea in Uganda met?*

To answer these questions I have structured this thesis in two main sections; first I will describe the ‘academic’ tools of theory and methodology with which I approached this research. In the second part I will describe the outcome of the analysis of the data that was collected in Uganda and answer the sub-questions in the data-analysis chapters.

The first section will begin with chapter 2, describing the definitions of PPPs in education and their *global* theoretical contestation. I will describe the PPPs programmatic idea for education and the theoretical conditions that aid the translation of a policy program in national policy environments. In chapter 3 I will describe the methodology of this research of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for attaining the tools to analyze in which way discourse is used by the different stakeholders to suit their interests in the PPPs debate in Uganda. In this way I try to expose power relation in the Ugandan education field and give an indication what the role of discourse in the discussion is. In the realm of international debate, PPPs can be both a powerful policy tool and a language game of policy makers (Hodge and Greve 2010). In chapter 4, I will introduce the units of analysis: the main education stakeholders in the Ugandan education field.

The second section describes the analysis of the data collected in Uganda. In three ‘data-analysis’ chapters answer will be given to the three sub questions. The translation and politics of PPPs in Uganda will be described in chapter 5. In this chapter I will answer the first sub-question, by describing the type of PPPs that are promoted in Uganda and by whom.

In chapter 6, I will answer the second sub question by describing the effect of the implemented PPPs on the education problems in Uganda. Here, I discovered that there are different discourses on the impact of PPPs. This is why I will give an answer to the sub

question from three different discursive perspectives. I will hereby also give a ‘voice’ to Civil Society Actors.

In chapter 7, I will give answer the third sub question by describing to which degree the conditions are met that make the PPPs program in Uganda resonate in the education context.

2. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in education

2.1 Defining PPPs

PPPs are a much contested concept. It is not only hard to define the concept, since it can take many forms, but the opinions differ whether they are a wishful development. Proponents and critics of PPPs agree on a loose concept of PPPs, namely a public and private interaction to deliver a service. Yet providing a clear definition turns out to be challenging. The term is a sort of an ‘umbrella notion’ covering a broad range of agreements between public institutions and the private sector, aimed at operating public infrastructures or delivering public services (Education International 2009).

Partnerships in education may differ depending on the actors who are involved or the type of partnership. The private sector is not homogeneous and covers a variety of non-state actors including businesses, NGOs, charities and faith based organizations. These different players are likely to have distinct approaches to education provision emerging from their own histories as well as their economic motivations (Fennell, 2007). The term “partnership” associated with other terms such as ‘multi-stakeholder’ and ‘public-private’ can be used to mean a pure contractual arrangement, a loose agreement among different parties to work together, a highly structured and governed-set up, or it can merely indicate an attitude of reciprocity in development programmes between donors and recipients (Draxler, 2008). Moreover, the phenomenon is not static, but changes over time.

The most common Public- Private Partnerships in the literature on education are contracting models (LaRocque 2006; Patrinos et al. 2009). According to LaRocque (2006: 3), “contracting involves a government agency entering into an agreement with a private provider to procure a service, or a bundle of education services, in exchange for regular payments”. A slight variation of this is Patrinos et al.’s (2009: 9) definition from the World Bank as “the process whereby a government procures education or education-related services of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific provider”.

2.2 Theoretical contestation of PPPs; a new ‘win-win’ situation or a form of privatization?

The PPPs are put forth by its promoters as a win-win situation, which advocates a partnership of communities and the private sector, mediated by the public sector (Miraftab 2004: 89). The rise of PPPs started in the industrialized countries, and is now being promoted in developing countries by aid agencies as well as international institutions such as the World Bank and OECD (EI 2009: 14). The fact that PPPs are a major mechanism for introducing the private sector into public services in especially sensitive services like education (and also in healthcare etc.) is legitimized by promoters by arguing that an amount of risk has been transferred from the public to the private sector, and that more ‘value for money’ is created via more efficient education provision. As the World Bank notes: “These [PPP] contracts contain rewards and sanctions for non-performance and include situations in which the private sector shares the financial risk in the delivery of public services” (2009: 1).

However, in practice things can work out differently. As Education International critically adds, in the case of education it is always the government who holds the ultimate responsibility for the provision of public services, and that makes the statement of ‘risk distribution’ questionable (E.I. 2009: 15). This has important implications for the role of the state in comparison with the private sector as a provider of public services, including that of education systems. As the authors of the Education International report *Hidden Privatisation*, Ball and Youdell (2007) analyze, PPPs are a form of ‘exogenous privatisation’, a term to describe forms of privatization involving the opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis and using the private sector to design, manage or deliver aspects of public education, with the effects as described in box 1.

Box 1 Consequences of privatization for education by Ball and Youdell (2007)

“[forms of hidden privatization] carry ethical dangers and many examples of opportunistic and tactical behaviours are already apparent in schools and among parents within such systems (...) Privatisation tendencies change how teachers are prepared; the nature of and access to ongoing professional development; the terms and conditions of teachers’ contracts and pay; the nature of teachers’ day-to-day activities and the way they experience their working lives. The ‘flexibilisation’ of teachers work is a key component of most versions of privatisation, threatening to alter both the perception of teachers within society and the quality of students’ experience in schools. Privatisation also challenges the capacities of Education Unions to bargain collectively on behalf of their members, secure favourable, single agreements” (2007: 8-9).

Hall et al (2003: 2) argue that PPPs are neither a legally nor a technically exact phrase, but rather a replacement for the older Thatcherite use of the word 'privatisation'. According to Hall the vast majority of PPPs are not partnerships in any legal sense, but simply contractual relationships where the role of the 'partnership' rhetoric is simply to hide the unpopularity of privatisation behind a term that implies equality, and therefore evokes a friendly glow. According to Sheil (2002) there are dangers in this policy marketing rhetoric that go beyond just fooling "poor old dumb Joe Public" [the public]. The danger is that the terminology will also fool the governments themselves, thereby interfering with the necessarily objective and unprejudiced evaluation of whether or not the proposed privatisations are socially beneficial (Sheil 2002).

Thus on the one hand the PPPs are promoted as a 'win-win' situation of powerful governance schemes while on the other hand others are claiming that PPPs mainly serve rhetorical purposes, hiding privatization.

Before examining in which manner the PPPs debate is conducted - whether it is in the Ugandan context leaning more towards privatization or a win-win situation - a closer look into the conceptual meaning of the PPPs programmatic idea in education is necessary. Therefore in the next chapter the 'theoretical tools' to approach the PPPs in Uganda will be described.

2.3 PPPs for education: the programmatic idea

As a centre of focus for dealing with this contested concept of PPPs, I will use the political analysis perspective on *PPPs for education as a programmatic idea*. Programmatic ideas are precise causal (i.e. cognitive) ideas that facilitate policy making among elites by specifying how to solve particular policy problems. Policy programs are often the dependent variables for political sociologists and political scientists and are centrally located in the foreground of policy debate (Campbell 2002: 28). Programmatic ideas are used to devise concrete solutions to policy problems. The technical and professional ideas specify cause-and-effect relationships and prescribe a precise course of policy action and are presented in policy briefs, position papers, advisory memos to policy makers and congressional testimony (Campbell

1998: 386). As will be developed below, the PPPs policy in Uganda is an example of a policy solution claiming to address certain education problems.

Verger and VanderKaaij describe three dimension of the programmatic idea in education; first the *problems* PPPs aim to address in the educational field, second the main *policy tools* they prescribe and third, the way they reconfigure *the relation between the state and education* (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010: 4-6). These three conceptual dimensions of the programmatic idea in education Uganda will be developed in this thesis. First I will elaborate on the conceptualization of these three dimensions.

2.3.1 Education Problems

As previously introduced in the opening statement of this thesis, PPPs are seen by their promoters to ‘do things better’ than the public sector by providing solutions to *education problems*, such as access and quality. PPPs claim to provide access to good quality education for all, especially for poor children who live in remote, underserved communities and for children of minority populations (Patrinos et al 2009: ix). The *education problems* the PPP promoters in theory are arguing to address are mainly *access* and *quality* while at the same time they are introducing an *equitable* form of access. They are therefore usefully linked to the challenges associated with the Millennium Development Goals and the EFA action framework (see box 2 on how equity and quality of education is pursued in several international agreements). Furthermore, theorist of PPPs claim that one advantage of PPPs is that they can be a more cost-effective means to provide education than the traditional public sector (Ibid: 5). In a context in which education expansion has been translated in to lower levels of learning, PPPs for education are opposite expected by its promoters to boost the quality and *effectiveness at the school* level (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010: 5). In addition, PPP promoters at the World Bank consider partnerships that have been well implemented as a means to bring the private sector’s skills and resources into the education sector and thus to increase efficiency and innovation in the delivery of education (Patrinos et al 2009: 4).

Box 2 Equity and Quality in international agreements

(1) Everyone has the right to education. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). While the commitment to free compulsory elementary education was reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), quality in education was addressed specifically at the Jomtien World Summit on EFA in 1999: “quality is a prerequisite for achieving the fundamental goal of equity and expanding access alone would be insufficient for education to contribute fully to the development of the individual and society” (UNESCO, 2005: 29). In 1995 came the ten commitments of the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development and in 2000 the UN’s eight MDGs, which included Achieving Universal Primary Education. The Dakar Framework for Action¹ adopted in the same year (2000) affirmed that quality was _at the heart of education – and was a fundamental determinant of enrolment, retention and achievement (UNESCO, 2005: 29). One international document which makes an important normative statement in terms of the aims of education is the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (E.I. 2009: 29-30)

2.3.2 Policy tools

The effect on the education problems is determined by the kind of *policy tools* the PPPs construct. According to PPP theorists, the *policy tools* of PPPs contain contracts. Governments contract out private providers to supply a specified service of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price for a specific period of time. These contracts contain rewards and sanctions for non-performance and include situations in which the private sector shares the financial risk in the delivery of public services (Patrinos et al 2009). Therefore, as the main promoters from the World Bank argue, the PPPs are not the same as privatization:

For policymakers, contracting is a middle ground between government delivery and outright privatization and does not attract as much controversy and criticisms as privatization. Contracting can also enable governments to target initiatives towards particular groups in society or to achieve specific outcomes. In addition, it is a way to bring the private sector’s skills and resources into the education sector (...) and to increase efficiency and innovation in the delivery of education. Contracting can do all of this while allowing governments to keep schools accountable (Patrinos et al 2009: 4).

A number of governments contract with the private sector to provide some of the services involved in producing education, such as teacher training, management, or curriculum design. Other governments contract with a private organization to manage and operate a public school¹. Still other contracts require private organizations to provide education to a specific group of students by means of a subsidy, a contract, or a voucher. In the most common type of PPP, the

^{1 1} As is the case with charter and concession schools (see Patrinos et al. 2009)

government provides subsidies to existing private schools or funds student places. The extent to which countries are using PPPs ranges from those in which education is provided only by the public sector to those in which it is largely publicly funded and privately provided (ibid 2009: 2). One way to categorize the types of PPPs is to separate financing from provision (figure 1).

Figure 1: Financing and provision of services in public-private partnerships (Source: Patrinos et al 2009: 3)

		Provision	
		Private	Public
Finance	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private schools • Private universities • Home schooling • Tutoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • User fees • Student loans
	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vouchers • Contract schools • Charter schools • Contracting out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public schools • Public universities

Several types of contracts are possible, depending on the specific services provided. The contracts vary in their degree of complexity. The services provided can range from the construction, management, or maintenance of infrastructure (often referred to as a private finance initiative) to the provision of education services and operations, such as certain subsidy arrangements to private schools, targeted voucher project to “reduce inequity” or education service contracts including quality output specifications. The latter, as an example of ‘contracting out’ in the lower left cell of figure 1, is most comparable to the Ugandan PPPs, as will be described below. This type of contract is implied to bring in accountability and *risk-sharing* between governments and private providers in the provision of education (Ibid 20-21). Risk sharing is seen to be a crucial policy tool of PPPs, according to the OECD; if there is not risk sharing, there cannot be a PPP (OECD 2008). This determines that both the private and the public sector need to face risks, principally capital risks, when working together under partnership frameworks. However, the literature specialized in PPPs for education barely develops how this principle should be translated into concrete procedures and rules; it is an important part of the ‘policy tools dimension’ of the PPPs programmatic idea. According to the main promoters, like the OECD, risk sharing is the main ingredient for PPPs to work. On the private sector side, the risk resides in the possible penalty private providers are likely to receive in case they do not achieve the results fixed in the contract, but the capital risk is undetermined (Patrinos et al 2009). However commentators point to the fact that government remains ultimately responsible, in the case of essential public services, such as education.

Therefore PPPs for education are defined in such a way that most of the capital investment risk resides on the public sector side (EI 2009).

Apart from sharing risk, PPP contracts are seen as beneficial because they can be more flexible than most public sector arrangements. Generally, the public sector has less autonomy in hiring teachers and organizing schools than the private sector does. Therefore flexibility in teacher contracting is one of the primary motivations for PPPs (Patrinos et al 2009: 4). Part of this is the capacity to manage, hire and fire teachers more directly as well as more accountable and responsive to community and family demands (IFC 2001).

Besides the most present ‘contracting’ policy tool of PPPs others also theorize a new and more complex policy tool; whether there is *mutual learning* in these more complex arrangements is important. This means that the parties involved in partnerships will adopt values, norms and perspectives of the counterparts (Linder 1999). I also looked for this concept in the Ugandan PPPs.

Finally, the third part of the PPPs programmatic idea is that PPPs create a radical *reconfiguration of the role of the state in education* by implying that the state should move away from direct education provision and focus on the planning, funding, regulation and evaluation of the education system (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010; Srivastava 2010). This is promoted by PPP theorists, as mentioned in the previous section, because the state by nature lacks effectiveness for costs and quality of education provision and the accurate incentives to operate education services (Patrinos et al 2009). However the promoters of PPPs argue, PPPs do not signify pure privatization of education systems; but they proclaim the state in a new position of being the regulator and main funder, i.e. the state must remain involved for the partnership to work, because if poorly handled, contracting can even reduce the already low levels of government accountability and control (Kingdon 2007).

Therefore good design cannot ensure the success of a PPP in education as it must also be implemented effectively and efficiently. As Patrinos et al. describe, to ensure this; governments should choose their private partners by means of a transparent, competitive, and multi-stage selection process. Second, they should assign the roles of purchaser and provider of education services to different entities within the education administrative agencies. Third, they must ascertain that the private agency in question has sufficient capacity for the task at hand. Also, government education institutions must develop their own capacity, establish quality assurance mechanisms, develop appropriate performance measures for contractors,

and devise incentives to achieve performance targets as well as sanctions for non-performance (Patrinos et al 2009: 6).

Strikingly the theorizers of PPPs, although mentioning transparency, rigorous implementation and quality assurance in their PPP promoting documents, they mostly emphasize how and why to implement PPPs (Patrinos et al 2009; LaRocque 2006, 2007, 2008; IFC 2001). In other words, promotion of PPPs is placed in higher importance than such aspects that ‘do not make it clear privatization’. I found a similar process when analyzing promotion of the role of the state under the PPPs in Uganda, as will be described below.

2.3.3 The translation of programmatic idea

Aside from reviewing the extent in which the PPPs programmatic idea is present in Uganda’s PPPs policy, I also investigated if this translates and resonates well in the Ugandan policy environment. This conceptualization describes the conditions that assist (local) policymakers to advance and adopt the programme. I will use this conceptualization to investigate to what extent the conditions for translation of the PPPs programmatic idea in Uganda are met in the recently adopted PPPs program. This conceptual approach will be used in the context of Uganda to determine the hospitable political and institutional environment (Walsh 2000), to be able to consequentially forecast successful implementation.

Programmatic ideas expressed in the simplest and strongest terms are the ones that policy makers are most likely to embrace, in part because they will be the ones that policy makers most easily understand (Campbell 1998). In other words, the most successful programs provide the clearest road maps out of troublesome or uncertain policy situations (Goldstein & Keohane 1993). Programmatic ideas often appeal to policy makers because they provide a clear and concise course of action and not necessarily because economists agree on their theoretical rigour or empirical validity (Campbell 1998: 387). Mostly therefore, clear policy programs provide powerful weapons in public policy struggles (Blyth 1998). Of course, determining objectively and empirically which programs are simplest or clearest can be a difficult matter. For this reason, as described below in the methodology chapter, I have investigated in which way the policy makers in the Ugandan education field perceive and experience the PPPs program as *coherent* and *convincing*².

² I asked how convincing the program was, aiming at the clarity and consistency of the simple solution the PPPs program in Uganda portends to provide.

A second condition is *familiarity*, which aids the translation of certain programmatic ideas so that they can be re-contextualized productively in specific contexts. Especially when programmatic ideas fit the dominant paradigm they appear natural and familiar and, as a result, they are more likely to appeal to policy makers, than alternatives that do not (Hall 1991). This relates to the condition of *resonation*. Resonation points to the effect where broader contextual policy resonates with public sentiment and the prevailing policy paradigm in society, at the time of its formulation. Both the normative and causal framing is important. This is for instance highly common in party politics where parties strive for recognition of policy programs through resonation of their ideas within the wider audience in society (Campbell 2004: 393). As described in the introduction this can be a crucial factor for the PPPs program's translation within the context of the current policy situation in Uganda.


A fourth condition I call *influential promoters*. This concept points to which powerful organizations are promoters of the programme. Often policy discourse maintains its credibility through its resources to and reliability of the organizations backing them. (Campbell 2004). An important related point is whether the programme meets support or resistance of constituencies and stakeholders, such as teacher unions. This makes a policy program politically feasible in the sense that it does not mobilize high levels of opposition from groups in society (Rose, 1993: 44-45). This is one of the reasons why stakeholders' perceptions are a large part of my research, as I will explain in the part below on 'units of analyses'.

The last condition is *broader contextual factors*, that affect to which extent policy programs are selected in a certain context. The reception and adoption of a programmatic idea, may differ in different contexts and historical moments due to a range of external factors, such as global forces, historical factors and institutional features. (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010: 9). For instance, the failure of existing policies to reach the targets of Education for All prompts decision makers to implement different policies in accordance with a new programmatic idea, that addresses the main problems (such as the above mentioned education problems PPPs portend to address), privileging new ideas over former types of solutions (Walsh 2000).

For explanatory purposes, the conceptualization of the ideal situation where the PPPs programmatic idea is translated in the Ugandan field of education is illustrated in figure 2a. This figure shows how the programmatic idea, if the conditions for translation are met, tackles


certain *education problems*, creates the right *policy tools* and *reconfigures the role of the state* suitably.

Figure 2a ideal case conceptualization programmatic idea (source: own work)



While figure 2a explains the above described theoretical framework in a theoretical 'ideal' situation, in what way does this link to the impact in the education field? The causal relation between the PPPs program and the impact on the Ugandan field of education is visualized in figure 2b.

Figure 2b Conceptual framework ‘impact PPPs programmatic idea’ (source: own work)



The designed PPPs program will determine in which way there are tools designed to deal with certain education problems in the education field. Is the program perceived to have an effect on all of these problems, a combination of them, just one or none at all? And to what degree? This is a main part of the impact of the PPPs in the education field. Besides that, in which way the program resonates to the right policy conditions will determine to what degree the policy environment is receptive to the program. Is there a hospitable political and institutional environment, or are only some conditions for translation met? While the effect on the education problems is more directly about the effect on students, parents and teachers, the impact on the policy environment is more directly about the governing actors relate to each other. Two concepts that are between brackets in this figure that will be dealt with in the data analysis are ‘privatization’ and ‘recontextualization of the role of the state’. Both concepts could be argued to be effected by both the tools and the conditions for translation. Nevertheless I will describe these concepts in relation to the PPPs in Uganda in the second data chapter on the effect on the education problems.

For determining the impact of the PPPs program in Uganda I analyzed the stakeholders' perceptions as described in the methodology-chapter.

3 Methodology

In this thesis, the stakeholders' perceptions are the central data source. To not only literally adopt their perceptions I have broadened my analysis to investigate the role of **language** in the representation of the reality of the education field. In this way I want to uncover certain power relations. For instance by ascertaining why some meanings become privileged or taken for granted and other become marginalized. The methodology that emphasizes language as a power resource that is related to ideology and socio-cultural change is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In this chapter I will explain this methodology and how I will apply CDA approach, as described by Norman Fairclough, for this research. First I will begin by introducing the underlying epistemology.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

“(Discourse) is the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (Foucault 1984)

Analysts of discourse, at the level of epistemology, take on a constructionist position. In this stance the emphasis is placed on the versions of reality, propounded by members of the social setting that is being investigated, and on the fashioning of that reality through their renditions of it. More specifically, the constructionist emphasis entails a recognition that discourse entails a selection from many viable renditions and that in the process a particular depiction of reality is constructed (Bryman 2008: 500).

Critical Discourse Analysis is a variant that is not strictly based on the constructionist approach to discourse; CDA practitioners are more receptive than discourse analysts to the epistemology of critical realism, which propagates the idea of a pre-existing material reality that constraints individual agency. CDA draws in particular on the theories and approaches of Foucault (e.g. 1984), who sought to uncover the representational properties of discourse as a vehicle for the exercise of power through the construction of disciplinary practices, such as individual subjectivity and the operation of rules and procedures, which enabled the construction of disciplinary practices which in turn enabled the construction of the self-disciplining subject (Bryman 2008: 508). Therefore, a critical realist approach to discourse

analysis involves not only analysing the discourse per se but also its relationship to non-discursive elements. This notion of discourse is defined by Philips and Hardy (2002:3) as :

“We define discourse as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception that brings an object in to being...In other words, social reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give meaning. As discourse analysts, then, our task is to explore the relationship between discourse and reality”.

CDA is therefore an approach that not only involves the analysis of the discourse per se but also the relationship to non-discursive elements. In organisational context, CDA practitioners seek to trace how discourses are constructed and maintained in relation to certain phenomena (Fairclough 2004). I will undertake a same kind of approach in this research for the phenomena of PPPs in Uganda, based on the CDA approach as described by Norman Fairclough (2003, 2004, 2005).

3.1.1 Fairclough's CDA

Fairclough argues, from his critical realist approach that discourses are different perspectives on the world and that they are associated with the different relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world. Discourses constitute part of the resources which people deploy in relating to one another, distinguishing themselves from one another, cooperating, competing, dominating and seeking to change the ways in which they relate to one another (Fairclough 2003: 124). The different discourses show, aside from the relations to each other, the social relations of the actors belonging to these discourses in the policy environment, which is indicated by how effective a discourse translates into non-discursive aspects of social life (Ibid: 126), such as the WB promoting the PPPs as a problem solving tool in different countries. These discourses are articulated together and set up dialogical or polemical relations between their ‘own’ discourses and the discourses of others. The different discourses entail different policy priorities while representing some particular part of the world and representing it from a particular perspective. These discourses draw on “naturalized pre constructions (...) that are ignored as such and which can function as unconscious instruments of construction’ in which people continuously generate ‘visions’ of the world” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

To analyse these discourses, according to Fairclough, is to ascertain which elements of events are included in the representation of those events and which are excluded, and which of the elements that are included are given the greatest prominence or salience (Fairclough 2003: 136), for instance what education problems do the PPPs address in certain discourse.

Therefore Fairclough does not look at what is the ‘truth’ but what part is represented of an event. I have endeavoured the same in this research, by bringing various representations of the different actors of the ‘PPPs impact’ to light. For this reason my approach can be seen as a practical implementation of Fairclough’s approach to discourse. If I would look only at one representation of the PPPs impact, for instance that of the government, I would not notice that there are alternative ways or there might be inadequateness in one approach. Therefore in this research I investigated in what way there are several discourses regarding the same topic, that of the impact of PPPs in secondary education in Uganda. In other words, I will not give one side of the ‘story’ but depict different representations of the PPPs impact. While giving a rigorous picture of the PPPs impact, this simultaneously provides the tools for exploring the relation between these representations and the positions of the actors expressing them. Consequentially, what will be described below is that there are three discourses that can be categorized based on their social positions and communal discourse; a government discourse, an international organisations discourse³ and a civil society discourse. I do recognize that these discourses are often mixed or hybrid in themselves (such as the case with international organisation, but also between different civil society organisations. Nevertheless In order to look deeper in to discursive differences, I will focus mostly on the communal characteristics and its polemical dialogical relation to the other discourses.


3.1.1.1 Textual Analysis

To ‘measure’ how discourses are constructed and maintained entails a detailed linguistic analysis of texts. For the bounded scope of my research I only looked at one part of linguistic analysis, that is, the textual analysis of the main *arguments* and *assumptions* in the narratives of the education stakeholders. This approach, of ‘textual’ indicators of discourse is based on Norman Fairclough’s CDA approach, as described in his book *ANALYZING DISCOURSE* (2003). As Fairclough states, assumptions create certain *arguments* that are discourse specific (Fairclough 2003: 55-56) and have the intention, especially in the case of officials promoting their policy, to make their own text as ‘undialogical’ and therefore not intertextualizing for instance with different ‘voices’, or using these voices to make their own argument stronger (Wodak 2000). This is a way in which the policy promoters make their own stories more

³ This will be the Education Development Partners discourse as described below.

credible in the Ugandan education field, *assuming* in many cases that there are no counterarguments or alternatives. Describing such assumptions, exposes in which way certain discourses are taken up in policy and how others do not have a voice in the policy debate. For this reason I analyzed the different discourses on the same topic of PPPs in Uganda, because this then makes the assumptions visible. In this way I move from the critical realist epistemology to the textual analysis of assumptions (see abstraction of process in figure 3).

Figure 3 Methodology of this research (source: own work).




The outcome of this analysis, the PPPs discourses, can address both ‘hegemonical’ and ‘recontextualization’ issues in the education field in Uganda.

By looking at these discourses with different assumptions and representation I will be able to compare these to ‘hegemony’, which concerns itself with the question how particular discourses become hegemonic in particular organizations and on ‘how discourse figures within the strategies pursued by groups of social agents to change organizations in particular direction’ (Fairclough 2005: 933)

Next to addressing the issue of hegemony the focus on the PPPs discourses can address the *recontextualization* of the PPP discourse. Recontextualization is about involving identification of the principles through which ‘external’ discourses are internalized within particular organizations (Fairclough 2005: 933), such as the PPPs programmatic idea in the

discourses of the stakeholders in the Ugandan education context. This is where the CDA methodology links to the above mentioned theoretical framework. Due to the fact that the persuasiveness of ideas is in many analyses assumed rather than analytically partitioned and empirically demonstrated, according to Campbell. Therefore if we are concerned with understanding how ideas themselves affect policy making, then a more fruitful approach is to focus on the nature of political discourse, as the structure of political discourse and language determines how policy ideas are communicated and translated into practice (Campbell 2002: 31-32). Therefore the main focus of this thesis is on the development of this discursive promotion and how the promoters of PPPs in Uganda transfer their discourse via *arguments and assumptions* in to the policy environment. Moreover, in my analysis of the ‘conditions’ in the Ugandan policy environment I will pay attention to the construction of certain assumptions and arguments that shape the PPPs promoting discourse, by investigating how the programmatic idea of PPPs is re-contextualized or ‘translated’ in to the national policy of Uganda.

Figure 4 Conceptualization impact of PPPs program in Uganda (source: own work)



3.1.2 Relation Theory and Methodology to research question

Figure 4 outlines what the role of the analysis of discourse is in relation to the theory of the programmatic idea containing certain *tools* to tackle *education problems* and certain policy

conditions to translate the programme in to the Uganda *policy environment*. As described in the theoretical framework above, the PPP tools are designed to have an impact on education problems, for instance by providing more effectiveness in school level management and/or creating more access and quality. This is part of the impact of the PPPs program in the education field. When it comes to certain conditions of the PPPs program, such as ‘convincingness’ and ‘familiarity’, they have an impact on the policy environment.

The causal relations between ‘tools’ and ‘education problems’ and ‘conditions’ and ‘policy environment’ are not positivistically measured in this research, e.g. through applying natural scientific methods⁴. I have ‘measured’ this causality in a qualitative manner by looking at what discourse states about this relation, thereby concentrating more on how the actors relate to each other from a CDA approach and describing the circumstances at play when such a PPP program is recontextualized in to a national policy environment.

In this way, as part of the ‘qualitative’ measured impact, in the first data the social positions towards the PPPs program are analyzed by introducing the ‘politics of the PPPs program’ to indicate both what kind of PPPs are implemented and how the stakeholders relate to each other. Secondly, in the second data chapter the relationship between the PPPs program and the education problems it addresses are explained, by looking at different discourses of this relation. In the last data chapter I will look at how the role of discourse is embedded by analyzing how the PPPs program is translated in to the Ugandan policy environment, describing both its conducive as hindering conditions.

3.2 Methods

Three types of research methods have been used for this study: collection of documents, observations and interviews.

3.2.1 Document analysis

For the collection of documents I have looked at all the possible policy reports, organisational documents and academic articles that mention the PPPs program and Universal Secondary Education. Mostly the promoters of PPPs in Uganda mention the PPPs, such as the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) in their sectoral reports, while the World Bank mentions it in its project appraisal documents and consultancy reports. Academic articles and statistical

⁴ This would bring me in to problems that in general many qualitative research projects have of external validity, that tries to ‘generalize’ the impact on the whole education field as perceived by my small sample (LeCompte and Goetz 1982)

reports that directly analyse the impact of the PPPs in education not available⁵. There are ‘headcount’ reports and ‘examinary results’ but they do not analyse detailed school level processes. Most information about the reality of the impact of the implemented PPPs came from the stakeholders’ perceptions through interviews.

3.2.2 Observations

Instead of solely relying on second-hand accounts, researchers can look directly at what is taking place. Such opportunities have the potential to yield more valid or authentic data than would otherwise be the case with mediated or inferential methods (Cohen et al., 2007). Furthermore, as what people do may differ from what they say they do, observations provide a reality check (Robson, 2002). I used this method for two reasons, first to get a better illustrated image of ‘what is talked about’, i.e. the implemented PPPs. I visited some of the schools that implemented the Universal Secondary Education program and I spoke to the head teachers as a reality check. I also closely followed the news via several media (internet, newspaper) and spoke with students and parents. Nevertheless these were unstructured events and purely for the purpose of acquiring background information. Because, as explained above, this research is not about measuring the impact of the PPPs in the schools but how this is discursively received among the stakeholders to analyze its effect on the education field.

The second reason for observations is to provide a ‘reality check’ of what the stakeholders are saying ‘off the record’. Personal opinions sometimes differ from what stakeholders, belonging to certain organisations, need to express as the voice of the organisation. This became relevant for my research because my theory hypothesized that PPPs could potentially be used as a rhetorical instrument, for instance hiding certain interests. Therefore I purposely looked for such information during informal meetings. However, due to ethical issues that arise from a lack of informed consent and to a certain extent the invasion of privacy, such information is not included in this written thesis. This information however did aid me to ask certain questions ‘on the record’.

⁵ As noticed from extensive visits to the library of the Education Department from Makerere University (largest university in Uganda) and from close contact with the ‘education statistics department’ from the Government.

3.2.3 Interviews

Interviews are a particularly flexible and powerful tool for probing into complex and deep issues, and understanding individual actor's perspectives, understandings, and interpretations of events and processes. The interview guide approach yields the preferred type of interview for this study (Patton 1990). I used this approach to interview education stakeholders. This method links best to the discourse analysis, because in the interviews I could inquire complex discursive positions of the stakeholders. Because the primary goal is to grasp the 'impact' of the PPPs, I asked all the education stakeholders the same questions, i.e. I carried out semi-structured interviews, using an interview guide, with questions regarding both the impact on education problems in Uganda as well as on the policy environment (see Appendix A for the interview guide). From the result acquired during the research process I quickly learned that there are different discourses, grouped according to similar assumptions/arguments and social positions.

I chose to mainly interview the stakeholders because stakeholder analysis can be used to generate knowledge about the relevant actors so as to understand their behaviour, intentions, interrelation, agendas, interests and the influence or resources they have brought – or could bring in- to bear on decision-making processes. This information can then be used to understand the policy context and assess the feasibility of future policy directions (Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000). In the section on 'units of analysis' below I will describe which stakeholders I sampled.

3.3 Units of Analysis

For this research I have interviewed the main policy-makers and representatives, which are highly positioned within their organizations. Because of their wide experience in the education field and positions as national education policy-makers, I assessed these respondents' perceptions, as expressed in their interviews, as valid sources for measuring the impact of the PPPs on the education field. The respondents came from four different sectors; I interviewed government actors, international organisations, civil society actors and private sector actors (see Appendix D for complete list of interviewees and reference titles). I chose this sample of organisations based on advice and help from several people that have been

active in the Ugandan education sector for several years⁶. In this section I will introduce the organisations of the interviewed stakeholders.

3.3.1 Government Actors

The government actors I interviewed are four commissioners of the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES); the Commissioner of Secondary Schools (government aided schools), the Commissioner of Private schools, the Commissioner of Education Planning and Policy Analysis, and the Commissioner of Technical and Vocational Education and Training⁷. I sampled this group because these are the departments involved under the PPPs program. The commissioners are the highest policy officials of these departments.⁸ I did not interview local government stakeholders because the PPPs in Uganda are coordinated at national level and are not (yet) decentralized.

3.3.2 The Education Development Partners

The international organisations I interviewed are part of the Education Development Partners (EDPs) group⁹. Without going in to their discursive positions in this part I will briefly describe the social positions of these organisations in the education field.

The EDPs group came into being in the late 90's and were initially called the Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG). In 2009 the group changed its name to the Education Development Partners (EDPs) to "reflect a shift in priority focus" (UNATCOM 2009: 43). Their main capacity is to give financial and technical support to Government efforts to develop the education sector (FENU 2010:8), instead of a mainly financial focus. The EDPs regularly meet and coordinate their policies. There is a division of labour in which they work on their own projects. They are aware of the main activities of the other partners and they move in the same policy environments. I interviewed (representatives of) the EDPs

⁶ Such as Tim Kos; the education officer of the Dutch Embassy, Frank Ssenabulya; the head of the statistics department of the Ministry of Education and Sports of Uganda and; Teopista Birungi Mayonja General Secretary of The Uganda National Teachers Association (UNATU)

⁷ Other departments at the Ministry of Education and Sports are; Pre-Primary and Primary Education, Finance and Administration, Higher Education and Teacher Education.

⁸ My 'gatekeeper' for getting in contact with such high officials was the head of the statistics department Dr. F. Ssenabulya. He became a personal friend after working with together during the last UNESCO-IIEP 'SACMEQ' conference ([the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality](#)) on July 2010.

⁹ The Education officer of the Dutch Embassy, Tim Kos, helped me determining the sample of who of the EDPs I should interview that are the most involved with PPPs or experienced in the education field.

because Uganda is an aid dependent country and because, as described above, PPPs are seen to become part of a core policy program for international organisations and development agencies dealing with education affairs, such as the World Bank, regional development banks, and donor countries (Verger and VanderKaaij 2010:1).

Throughout this thesis the (discursive) positions of the EDPs will be described when it comes to the impact of the PPPs on the education field. To understand the positions of these stakeholders in the education field there must be looked at their main activities. To extensively enumerate the activities of all the EDPs would go beyond the extent of the purpose of this thesis; as well as not being relevant since most of the EDPs do not have direct policy involved in PPPs in secondary education. Therefore I will only briefly describe the main division of labour between the EDP members that were part of my interviews, giving more attention to those more active in secondary education. A complete list of the sample of members of the EDPs that I interviewed, are shown in Appendix E.

World Bank

The WB is one of the most important organisations to study for my research since the World Bank is considered as one of the main agencies interested in exporting the PPPs solutions to the developing world (Miraftab 2004). The World Bank is the most active EDP in Uganda when it comes to the PPPs. The World Bank is financially backing the government's overarching program for PPPs, the Universal Post Primary Education and Training program (UPPET)¹⁰. In the first data analysis chapter below, the WBs political role when it comes to the PPPs policy will be described.

(Other) EDPs

Most of the other EDPs are working in the Primary sector and/or in the (Business) Technical and Vocational Education (BTVET) sector. The EDPs that are relatively most active in Secondary Education, are the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and to lesser extent Irish Aid (See list of the main activities of the EDPs in Appendix B). Therefore, since the focus of this research is only on the PPPs in secondary education, these organisations play a more important part in my analysis. Some of

¹⁰The WB's intervention in Uganda is part of their 'Africa Action Plan' (2005 in: PAD-UPPET 2009: 6). Central in this plan is the search for effectiveness and to 'identify best practices' that in the case of the UPPET program can 'inform implementation', in other words; supranational involvement in national education contexts. The WB has a history of aid projects in Uganda for education, including the Education Sector Adjustment Credit in support of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and continuing support for the education SWAP through a series of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) (Ibid: 6-7).

the activities in the BTVET sector overlap with those in secondary education since there are schools offering both. The term ‘post-primary’ stands for both secondary education and BTVET together.

Although these organisations are active in the secondary education sector to a varying extent, the officials and education experts did show great involvement and experience in the education field. Therefore, in the interviews, they expressed useful opinions on the impact of the PPPs program for my data analysis.

3.3.3 The Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

One of the objectives of this research is giving ‘voice’ to civil society actors in Uganda since trends in the last 5 years also seem to suggest that the hitherto inclusive nature of the policy process, especially at national level, is becoming exclusive to government and its external ‘partners’ (Uganda National NGO Forum (*UNNGOF*), *Strategic Plan* 2008: 20).

Although excluded from the policy process, the Ugandan civil society encompasses a broad range of organizations, including community-based groups, professional associations, labour unions, think tanks, non-government organizations, faith-based organizations, traditional/cultural organizations, human rights groups, farmers’ groups, self-help groups, environmental groups, and women’s organizations (Mundy and Stalker 2010: 6). Few of those, except for the faith-based organizations and Ugandan National Teacher Union (UNATU), are national-level civil society organizations in Uganda with a large constituency base from which to draw financing or political capital (Friedman and Robinson 2006).

Therefore I interviewed the Ugandan National Teacher Union (UNATU) and two other ‘relatively’ strong NGOs that are nationally active; the Forum of Education NGOs Uganda (FENU) and Action Aid Uganda (See their main activities in Appendix C). Regarding the issue of a lack of knowledge and skills among CSO members I interviewed the heads of the organisations. They showed to be very involved and aware of the PPPs in secondary education.

3.4 Scope and limitation of the thesis

3.4.1 Sampling difficulties: Private Actors and ‘the real stakeholders’

I did not include stakeholders from the private sector in my analysis since it was too hard to select a sample. Talking about the private sector actors, one of my respondents told me: “Who is the private sector? Nobody really knows” (Interview VIII, 2011). The private schools in Uganda form a differentiated field of education providers; which ranges from both rural and urban based to religious based, NGO, community, purely for profit schools or a mix of two or more of these. The quality, fees, sizes and entry conditions all vary greatly. Although the private sector is widely dispersed, in terms of both shapes and size and despite the blurring of boundaries between different providers, distinctions can be made on the basis of whether profits are primarily used to further support development activities of the organisation (as with community private schools), or are distributed to owners and shareholders (as with ‘for profit’ private providers, Rose 2010: 475).

One relevant development in the Uganda private education sector worth mentioning, is that with the advent of UPE in the early 1990s, for-profit institutions proliferated at an astounding rate, and this sub-sector is continuing to grow to this day (Jacob et al 2008: 877).

There is however not one clear private sector education body that is representative of all these private schools, aside from some diverse representative bodies, such as the associations for private school head teachers, private school proprietors and a number of PPP schools¹¹.

With a private sector that is variable and lacking clear representation, it was not possible for this research project to extract a representative sample. Therefore the private sector actors will not be added to the analysis of this research¹². Nevertheless I highly

¹¹ I am aware that there are various representative bodies for the private sector and those organizations. The WB promotes these institutions, such as the Uganda Private Educational Institutions Association (UPEIA) which is a loose federation of private secondary schools, remains informal and has few resources and little capacity to play a significant role in raising the sector (LaRocque 2007). Also none of the stakeholders mentioned these organizations as playing a relevant role. Therefore I recommend these actors for further research. The private schools associations for secondary education are less organized such as in the BTVET sector, with the organization UGAPRIVI. I did not explore these associations much further than what other stakeholders told me about them. Going in to this field of actors would have extended the scope of my master thesis. As well these actors do not work together with the EDPs (most of the EDPs even do not know of these associations) nor were they mentioned by the interviewed CSOs. For my thesis, I could not interview them all or interview just some of them. This would be unrepresentative. Besides that, the above mentioned types of private schools lack representative organizations and have very differentiated interests. For instance, a small struggling private school somewhere in a rural area has totally different needs and incentives to join a PPP agreement than an elite private school that receives ten times the amount of school fee.

¹² I interviewed two organizations from the private sector; the Private Education Development Network (PEDN) and the MARA foundation, to get a broader picture of ‘what happens at the private sector side’, realizing that I was merely exploring their discourse without making a rigorous analysis of ‘private sector discourse’, this would be unrepresentative and extend the scope of my thesis

recommend this sector for further research, precisely because of the diverse nature and because they provide schooling for almost half of all students that are in secondary education.

‘The real stakeholders’

Another sampling difficulty is that I was not able to interview ‘the real stakeholder’. In the Ugandan education sector, the ‘real stakeholders’, are seen to be the teachers, the students and parents. I firmly take the standpoint that these are the most important stakeholders. However for this research I directly analyze the perceptions of ‘the decision makers’. This research is based on a political analysis perspective on the discourse and policy processes at a national level. Therefore analyzing their discourse would go beyond the scope of my master thesis. I did not expand the research to this sector. Nevertheless this would be the number one advice for further research.

3.4.2 Time perspective

In the bounded scope of my master thesis I try to pursue a form of what is called ‘process tracing’, that means the use of detailed analyses of policy documents, debates, and histories to determine, for instance, how policy makers define problems and crises depending on their normative and cognitive presuppositions (Rochefort & Cobb 1994), or the degree to which new policy ideas are blended with these presuppositions to facilitate policy change in different policy-making contexts (Kjaer & Pedersen 2001). I recognize that the scope of this research is too restricted to trace ‘histories’. This is an especially difficult process when it comes to ideas. Retrospective interviews are inadequate data sources because individuals tend to forget, and organizations rarely record, the details of past interactions and formation of ideas (Boxenbaum and Battilana 2005). Therefore my primary sources are based on the situation now, that of a growing PPPs program in secondary education that has already been implemented. Nevertheless with the situation rapidly changing, some of the perceptions or documents could be out of date.

3.5 Ethical considerations and data analysis procedure

Except for the described ‘of the record’ observations that were used to ask questions ‘on the record’, informed consent was always sought. For this purpose I extensively explained the nature, scope and purpose of this study and the right to refuse, withdraw and take out arguments afterwards, before starting every interview. I also carried a permission letter from the University of Amsterdam (however it was never necessary to show this).

To ensure confidentiality I will not name or mention the names of any respondents in this thesis, nevertheless most of them will be easy to identify because of their positions within their organisations. I only mention names when permission was clearly asked.

3.6 Data Analysis

In total I have 21 recorded interviews with the main education stakeholders and 6 unrecorded interviews with teachers and head teachers of secondary schools. The 21 recorded interviews are all transcribed and the transcriptions consist of approximately 700 pages. The length of the interviews varied from a minimum of 30 minutes to a maximum of 3 hours. The responses in this data were coded with the aid of specialised computer software (ATLAT.ti: software designed to analyse qualitative data). These codes were put in ‘code families’ for the different chapters. Each family was read and compared systematically, focussing on recurring and general arguments and comparing these to the stakeholders expressing them. In this way, besides answering the sub-questions, discourses were also analyzed.

4. Data Analysis (I): The politics of PPPs in Uganda

This chapter answers the question “*How has the PPP programmatic idea been translated in the Ugandan field of education?*” What meaning has been given to the PPPs concept in the Ugandan education context will be described by the PPPs policy and the roles of the stakeholders.

4.1 Government of Uganda and PPPs

The government’s official policy towards PPPs in education is described in several sector reports and education sector meetings. They all refer to the Ugandan National Development Plan (NDP) as the base for the approach towards PPPs in Uganda.

4.1.1 The National Development Plan (NDP)

In this foundational document the private sector is claimed to ‘remain the engine of growth and development’. PPPs are described as an important tool for mobilizing the private sector as ‘an engine’ for development and create a ‘business approach’ to improve public service delivery (National Development Plan 2010/2011 – 2014/2015). With the President as the head of the NDP this plan is powerfully distributed across the sector and other stakeholders are pressured to align with this strategy ¹³.

The use of PPP as a development tool is validated, according to the NDP report, because it has proven to be helpful in other countries. As stated in the NDP, this international experience suggests that co-operation between the public and private sectors in the form of public-private partnerships (PPP) can be a powerful incentive for improving the quality and efficiency of public services, and a means of financing public infrastructure (NDP 2010: 63).

¹³ “I call upon all Ugandans to embrace the principles stated in the NDP and apply them in the development and implementation of national programs and projects. While respective Government sectors will align their policies and strategies with the NDP, I urge the private sector, civil society and academia to work together with Government and to align their development efforts towards achieving the NDP objective in the countries Vision.” (Museveni in National Development Plan 2010/2011 – 2014/2015). The countries ‘Vision’ Museveni refers to is what on the cover of the NDP is called “a transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years” (NDP 2010). The part PPPs should play, needs to be actively promoted and encouraged to reach the country’s ‘Vision’

Although the NDP is very broad and covers all sectors, from agriculture to health, this position towards PPPs is also applied to the education sector and therefore represents the foundation of the government actors' position towards PPPs in education.

4.1.2 The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP)

The policy reports of the education sector are, as stated in the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 'an extension of the NDP for a system relevant to Uganda's national development goals' (MoE&S revised Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2015). Therefore, the Ministry's Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP), serves as the "narrative that elaborates on the strategies" to reach the NDP (Ibid: 29).

Looking deeper in to this narrative, the ESSP report explains that it focuses on creating an efficient and effective education sector, in order to address the goals of the NDP. As it conveys, because the government is dealing with a limited resource envelope, the ESSP focuses on "overcoming those constraints that keep the system from functioning at an optimal level and direct resources to those aspects that are critical" (ibid: 28). This is where PPPs become a part in this narrative. The PPPs are seen as a tool to address the objective of an effective and efficient education sector, which is, according to the government actors, *resource constrained*.. Therefore the official strategy of the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) is "to formalize, build and enhance public-private partnerships in service delivery". (ESSP 2008: 17).

The kind of PPP that the MoES is promoting is the PPP arrangement that is part of the Universal Secondary Education (USE) program.

4.1.3 PPPs as part of USE

The overarching program of the PPPs in Uganda – the Universal Secondary Education plan, was adopted after promises were made by President Museveni during the elections in 2006 to provide free secondary education. After this pronouncement the Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET) was launched in February 2007 by the government of Uganda. USE is a component of UPPET and covers lower secondary education (senior one to senior four). There is also a component of Technical, Vocational Education and Training (TVET). The main reason for the creation of the USE program is to address the large inflows of student from primary level i.e. to create access to secondary education:

“UPPET therefore is the equitable provision of quality post-primary education and training to all Ugandan students who have successfully completed primary leaving examination” (Ministry of Education and Sports: USE/UPPET FAQ 2010).

The Government of Uganda and its Ministry of Education and Sports are the main initiator of the UPPET program and they are therefore officially the main initiator of PPPs under the USE program. Nevertheless, as we will see below, the World Bank also played a role in initiating and formulating the program.

4.1.4 The PPPs arrangement

Under USE, the PPPs stand for the arrangement of private schools with government where students can study in a private school implementing USE as long they have the ‘minimum qualifications’ from their Primary Leaving Exam (PLE). This is a 4 to 28 test-score (4 is the maximum result; 1 for all four courses in Primary). These USE private schools are called PPP-schools. ‘Implementing USE’ means that the PPP-schools receive a capitation grant from the Government for each enrolled student when they sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Education and Sports (more information on the MOU is given in the next chapter). The government schools under USE are called ‘government aided schools’. In contrary to the PPP schools, the government aided schools have teachers from which the wage is paid by government and receive instruction materials. The capitation grant to the government aided schools is therefore lower. Nevertheless some PPP promoters argue that the total subsidy for government schools is relatively much higher, pointing to the ‘cost effectiveness of the PPP schools (LaRocque 2007: 19).

The capitation grant is nationally determined at a fixed price. According to the latest Head Count Report this is 47000 Ugandan Shillings (approximately 23 USD) per student, per term for private schools and 41000 Ugandan Shillings (around 20 USD) per student for government schools (USE/UPPET Head Count Report, October 2009: 7).

The Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) highlights that the Ministry’s main roles vis-à-vis these private schools and institutions are, first, to encourage their development and sustainability and, second, to protect the consumer of education services by setting standards and monitoring all schools, public and private, for compliance. To encourage this development and sustainability and monitoring the ESSP described a 12 point enumeration of how the Ministry will collaborate with private schools. These points vary from the straightforward policy of sending bursaries to private schools under Universal Secondary Education (USE) to more abstract goals as ‘ensuring access to affordable long-term financing’

and ‘strengthen monitoring’ (see Appendix F MoE&S revised Education Sector Strategic Plan 2008-2019: 17). As will be described in the next chapters, these abstract goals, as ‘strengthening monitoring’ are questioned by the other stakeholders in the education field, pointing at the lack of clear implementation of these policies in practice. Nevertheless the first goal, of encouraging their development has clearly been reached, as is visible in the relative growth of these private USE schools compared to the public ones; The USE enrolment now constitutes 60% of the total secondary enrolments. Out of this, around 310.000 eligible students are in the government aided schools, while 140.000 students are in private schools under USE (MoES: UPPET & USE FAQs: 2010). The ratio of government and PPP schools under USE in the 2009 headcount was around 803 government schools to 550 PPP schools. However these numbers are rapidly increasing. The latest numbers, published in Uganda’s newspaper *New Vision*, showed 902 schools are Government-aided and 739 are privately owned under the public private partnership (New Vision, June 22nd, 2011). Evidently, the growth of the number of schools and the students in private schools under USE is relatively faster (from 550 to 739 in relation with growth in government-aided USE schools of 803 to 902), which implies that the private schools will play a bigger role in the coming years.

So far, the free cycle in USE is for the first three years of secondary schooling; the O-level. This is likely to be expanded to the two following years of A-level since President Museveni made new electoral promises this year (2011). This will mean that there will be even more pressure on PPP-schools and PPP arrangements to grow in numbers. How the government discursively represents the PPPs in their official documents can be seen in table 1.

Table 1 Discursive representation PPPs in official documents

Discursive represented in:	Role Document	Role of PPPs in document	Represented benefits
NDP	Foundational Document, cross sectoral	Engine for development and mobilization private sector	Quality and efficiency in public services
ESSP	Extension/narrative	Formalizing PPPs arrangement	For efficient and effective education sector

UPPET documents	Clarifying UPPET policy (containing USE)	PPPs as part of USE	For equitable provision of quality post-primary education
-----------------	--	---------------------	---

4.1.5 Kind of PPP

The kind of PPP arrangement that nowadays exist under USE in Uganda, is the one that is the most discussed and well known in the Ugandan secondary education field. As government actors point out, it is the only kind of PPP for secondary education¹⁴.

This PPP arrangement has three distinctive characteristics compared to more well-known PPPs such as subsidies and vouchers. First of all it is not a subsidy because the grant is based on a fixed price. Additional payment, so-called ‘top-up’ by the parents is illegal, even when unit cost parameters at the school level might be higher. Secondly, the PPPs in Uganda are not a voucher, where the learner is given money by the government to seek education wherever they want. Thirdly, because the students are not supposed to pay fees, the PPPs in Uganda are not a form of low fee private schools that are appearing in other developing countries as described in the 2009 Education for All Global Monitoring Report (see UNESCO 2009).

The PPPs arrangement in Uganda entails that money is paid by government to the school, and that the student does not have to pay an additional fee, as long as they pass within the limitation between 4 to 28 aggregate (if their grades are above 28 they can still join the PPP school, but they will have to pay the school fee). In the international WB reports this Ugandan PPP is conceptualized as ‘contracting out’ or ‘the purchasing of private education services’ (Patrinos et al. 2009: 21; LaRocque 2008: 20). As La Rocque describes, the PPPs in Uganda are a form of contracting out the education of students, who are not served by public and government-aided schools, in exchange for a fixed per student fee, with the aim to boost enrolment at secondary level for Universal Secondary Education. Each party’s responsibilities are specified in a memorandum of understanding that requires private schools to provide the

¹⁴ There is also the PPPs arrangement with BTVET, but in a much narrower conception and on a much smaller scale.

authorities with performance data on a range of agreed indicators and also to submit progress reports, as well as to be subject to periodic reviews and assessments of academic performance (LaRocque 2008). As seen in figure 1 this is the lower left cell of ‘private provision’ and ‘public funding’. The contract that is signed is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which is an agreement of basic standards and expectations of service delivery (an example of such an MOU can be seen in Appendix G). As we will see in the next chapter on the role of the state, these expectations and ‘indicators’ are criticized by the stakeholders for not being followed up or sanctioned by the government, creating incentives for private providers to abuse their position. This point will be developed further below

The government actors call this the ‘PPP arrangement’ because they have no other policy for education they call PPPs (this does not mean other stakeholders in the education field do not describe other PPPs existing in education).

Besides ‘arranging’ more places and therefore better access for students in private schools, one other central aspect of this Ugandan PPP is the management at school level. The PPP school proprietors, mostly head teachers, are expected to be managers of the schools to ensure more effective school level management. They manage the received capitation grants for the students and have to find a way to manage the school with the aid of the grant. The idea behind this is that managers of private schools can be more effective and create more value for money than public schools, because for instance they do not have to pay the same salaries to teachers as public schools and they are able to fire them more easily when they are absent. In the context of Uganda, where teacher absenteeism is one of the biggest education problems, this is proposed as a useful way of pressuring teachers to show up for work (interview XIX, 2011).

4.1.6 Policy environment

The policy environments where the PPPs are discussed are characterized by non-transparency, lack of dissension and decreasing space for civil society engagement.

Department of Private Schools

The main policy environment in which the PPPs are discussed is within the recently constructed (in 2008) department of private schools from the Ministry of Education and Sports, lead by the Commissioner of Private schools.

The main responsibility of the Commissioner of Private schools, as he explained, is engaging with private partners through seminars and workshop for ‘partnering’. When they partner there sign the MOU. Once every term they meet with these partnered schools via their associations; such as the head teachers association. It is in these meetings that the private actors can express feedback to the annual guidelines “that the government might not have seen” (Interview II, 2011). Who exactly the private actors are and on which issues they influence the government is not made clear¹⁵. It is in this non-transparent policy area that the PPP arrangement is mostly discussed.

Education Sector Consultative Meetings and Review

The other most well-know meetings where the PPPs are discussed, are the bi-monthly Education Sector Consultative Meetings and the annual Education Sector Review. The former is attended by high officials of the MoES and the EDP members. Here the donors and government agree on the undertakings for that year as well as on the budget and mid-term framework. This meeting complies and interacts with the National Development Plan priorities. The EDPs claimed that in these meetings, it is mainly the Ministry and World Bank that are promoting the PPPs. For the other members it is not a topic of priority and they undersign the policy statements and strategies where the PPPs are mentioned, without much dissension.

The Education Sector Review is the only policy environment where the CSOs are involved in any discussion on PPPs. It is annual, with a wide number of participants; international organisations, national and local government officials and civil society representation. In this meeting the CSOs claimed there seems to be a power imbalance. First of all, due to an abridged number of CSOs in these meetings there is a decreasing space for engagement in comparison with other attending organizations. Some of the respondents argued that the practice of these meetings show that the CSO’s ‘voices’ are reduced relatively, to for instance compared to those of the World Bank. As one of the respondents noted:

“In the whole of that meeting, in that review, you could find that about 10% of the issues (relatively many considering there are hundreds of other stakeholders, reg.) and those who

¹⁵ One of the government actors even told me he has ‘phone contact’ with some heads of the private associations to see if they are ok with the annual review and budgeting. Thereby not identifying who are the actors and what are their desires.

were talking could be from the World Bank. And when they talk, they are listened to, everybody sits and listens. (...)Then civil society limps, struggles to get this kind of issues that have raising on because it could be easily be trashed of” (Interview XIX, 2011).

The only way the CSOs can make good use of these kind of policy spaces, is when they for instance can deliver research to ‘buy in’ a donor member to represent a particular opinion at those meetings. Another way for the CSOs to draw attention to the different topics is via direct contact; by invitation of the Ministry officials or the donor agencies to listen to their issues or by directly attending certain meetings within the ministry to present some of the issues. However in my interviews, none of the CSOs said to have had this kind of deliberation when it came to the topic of the present PPPs policy.

4.2 The role of the other stakeholders

Up to this point the PPPs in Uganda have only been discussed by describing the government’s role and the policy environment that has been created by the government, the role of the other stakeholders will be described in the following section.

4.2.1 The World Bank in Uganda

The World Bank is aiding the development of PPPs directly through their UPPET loans and indirectly by promoting the development of private school in situational analyses of WB consultants and through the WB’s associated organisation, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

4.2.1.1 Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET) loans

The World Bank’s official position is to promote PPPs under the UPPET program, for which they give assistance. The plan for assistance was followed up by the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) because of the political pronouncement of the last election, made by Museveni, promising free universal secondary education in 2006 (Interview V, 2011). This APL is part of the ‘Post Primary Education and Training Adaptable Program Lending Project’. The WB will give three loans, divided over three stages ending in December 2018, cumulating to an amount of US\$ 375 million. The WB calls this policy their ‘International Development Association (IDA)’ involvement in Uganda. As stated in the WB’s Project Appraisal Document for UPPET (PAD-UPPET) the project is designed to assist the Government in meeting their challenges, to create access (as stated in the MoE&S ESSP 2008, such as the

large inflow of students caused by UPE) and to provide broader support to its reform agenda through “targeted resources, technical assistance and continued policy dialogue” (2009:6).

In their official documents and statements the WB does not directly promote a specific type of PPP; they merely address potential benefits without designing and pushing for a certain PPP. The only part on PPPs in the Project Appraisal Document for UPPET states: “particularly in Uganda where there is major private involvement in education, public-private partnerships have many potential benefits for the delivery of post primary education, particularly in areas where there are no Government schools” (PAD-UPPET 2009:13).

Although the WB does not promote the PPPs extensively in these official documents, in my research I have found that the WB has been a strong promoter of private education and initiator of the PPPs programmatic idea in an indirect way. All the interviewed stakeholders described that the WB is promoting the PPPs in various policy environments, as described above and secondly because of the WBs situational analyses by WB related consultants that influence the government of Uganda (Interview V, 2011).

As the WB education specialist in Uganda explained, the government asked the WB for assistance after the president’s pronouncement of ‘free secondary education’, i.e. USE. She set forth that as a result of this request the WB performed a ‘the situational analysis’ and came up with the PPP idea. As she states: “That is when the Public-Private Partnership came up as another reform area that the government would consider” (Interview V, 2011).

4.2.1.2 Pro PPPs Situational Analysis

Part of this situational analysis has been a document by a well-known consultant of the World Bank and promoter of PPPs in education: Norman LaRocque (2007). In his study prepared for the GoU he argues for expansion of PPPs to the private ‘for profit’ sector in secondary education. He argued that the government’s initially designed UPPET policy focussed too much on strengthening the public sector because there was more attention given to the government aided schools and because the government initially preferred partnering with community private schools instead of all the other private schools in the sector, e.g. for-profit schools. According to LaRocque, this created the significant risk that “will lead to the substitution of public for private provision in the secondary school sector and the relative, if not absolute, decline in the size of the private secondary sector – mirroring the experience of countries such as the Philippines” (2007: 2). LaRocque argued that there is no evidence that

this shift to government schools will lead to either a higher quality of education or a more efficient delivery than would be available in the private sector. Therefore LaRocque strongly argued for expansion of the PPPs to the whole private sector. As he states there is no necessary reason to favour community providers over ‘private’ providers if the programme incorporates good quality assurance and accountability mechanisms. And, according to LaRocque, restricting ‘private’ schools’ access would unduly limit the potential for new investment and innovative delivery in secondary schooling in Uganda (ibid: 19)¹⁶.

This is one of the strong recommendations by LaRocque that has been followed up by the government, as the government expanded their initial PPPs arrangement under USE with community private schools to all private schools. While it is hard to trace back which ideas were most influential in times of adoption of the PPPs program (as described above in section 3.4.2 on time perspective), i.e. whether the WB ideas influenced the government to change policy, **it is evident that the government opened up its USE policy to all private schools in times of WB involvement.**

4.2.1.3 International Finance Corporation in Uganda

Another indirect way how the WB stimulates development of private provision of education is via the involvement of the financial partner International Finance Corporation (IFC) to develop a finance facility and technical assistance programme for private secondary schools. The IFC, a related organization to the WB Group, is currently undertaking several projects under their Africa Schools Uganda Program together with AfDB, a 2 year project which started in September 2010¹⁷. This program aims to strengthen private schools by providing advisory services to private institutions and loans to help schools improve their operations. The program will initially work with IFC investee banks Diamond Trust Bank, DFCU and Bank of Africa. The IFC is expecting other banks to join the program. At the moment they are financing 200 schools and are delivering ‘in-depth advisory services’ to 500 schools but

¹⁶As LaRocque argues, there are many examples of significant for-profit providers which find innovative ways of meeting the educational needs of relatively poor communities. These include Edison Schools in the United States, Educor in South Africa and The Educators in Pakistan (2007: 19).

¹⁷It is a 5 million dollar project and is part of the larger Africa Schools Program that started in Ghana (2005), Kenya (2007) and Rwanda (2008). The total program comprises a US\$50 million investment facility to be “wholesaled” to commercial banks to expand their lending to the private schools sector across Africa (IFC 2011).

are expecting to expand their operation greatly in the coming 2 years of their program (IFC 2011)¹⁸.

With the IFC expanding its activities and the PPPs arrangement expanded to all private schools the WB is one of the main initiators and promoters of the currently formed PPP policy. This was reaffirmed by the Ugandan WB specialist that I interviewed. These changes in government policy and openness for the WB ideas show the WB's influence is evident in the Uganda secondary education field. Most stakeholders (including government and WB) stated the WB and government work 'hand in hand'.

4.2.1.4 WB's current position

While it seems clear the WB and government are working closely together when it comes to the PPPs policy, which is especially evident in times of forming the PPPs policy, the question is whether they are content with the current situation of the government's implementation of the program. As will be described in the next chapter, the WB described doubts about the way that the PPPs schools are run now. That is why the WB is currently undertaking a large-scale impact evaluation report¹⁹.

4.2.2 The role of the (other) Education Development Partners

The PPPs policy is mainly a government concept, which is set up 'hand in hand' with the WB. The EDPs main interest and policy activity has been in financial and technical support to the primary education sub sector. This is why the EDPs lack an extensive collective position towards PPPs in secondary education. They officially undersigned the MoES's ESSP document (MoE&S revised Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2015) and their concise official position on PPPs is that the public private partnership agenda is a significant contributor to the sector, as embedded in the ESSP, and therefore they are an official promoter

¹⁸Their advisory services include three core components: Business Development Services, Capacity building and Financial Institution Training. The training on the education development areas is delivered in consultation with the Ministry of Education to adhere to their existing ministry regulations. Additionally, the program will work with the Private Schools Association and the Private Sector Foundation to address regulatory issues affecting the sector and to strengthen these associations (IFC Africa Schools Uganda Program 2010).

¹⁹After several delays, the first base line report on the outcomes is expected later this year. The results of this report are expected in 2012.

of its policy (MoES & EDPs, Fast Track Initiative Appraisal Report: Updated Education Sector Strategic Plan 2010-2015).

The EDPs extent of knowledge of the existing type of PPPs, as described above by the government and WB, is dependent on their activities within the secondary education sector. All the EDPs respondents are aware of the USE program and the bursaries given to private schools. Nevertheless, among the EDPs there are different perceptions of what PPPs are. They take a broader view of the concept than what it is used for in the mostly narrow policy application of the USE policy. The EDPs for instance describe various types of collaborations between ‘private’ and ‘public’ partners, such as faith based private schools that receive teachers paid by government or old government schools that are managed by faith based school boards. Another understanding of PPPs by several EDPs is that PPPs are NGO’s and International Organizations - both donors and large companies that support schools in various ways. Nevertheless, the EDPs that are mostly involved in secondary education do not take up different conceptual understandings of PPPs and describe the USE kind of PPP as the most important PPP.

4.2.3 The role of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

What became evident from the stakeholders inclusion in the policy environments, that discuss PPPs in the Ugandan secondary education field, is that the CSOs lack a ‘voice’. This is either because they are externally excluded by other parties, in these policy environments, or because they fail internally to create a strong alternative voice, i.e. they lack policy advocacy rigour. As the UNATU report describes, effective participation and utilization of the policy space by civil society has been partly constrained by a number of factors, including a limited degree of knowledge and skills required in policy analysis, limitations in consensus building, packaging of policy messages and scientific research. UNATU states that this has resulted into inadequate policy influencing characterized by “politics of presence” rather than “politics of influence”. Therefore UNATU argues that one of the major challenges facing future involvement of CSOs is building capacity for understanding policy making processes and coalescing at local and international levels around development issues. (UNATU Five Year Strategic Plan 2008-2012:11). In other words the CSOs in general lack both ‘knowledge and skills’ required in policy analysis and they have ‘policy advocacy issues’.

The CSOs are campaigning for increased public education financing for all Ugandans. The main threats for achieving this, as the Forum for Education NGOs in Uganda described in

their strategic plan is the “over commercialization of education”, “mass ignorance of policy and peoples’ rights” and “the conflicting external donor agenda with the home based agenda” (FENU Strategic Plan 2010-2014: 5).

Although this sounds like a powerful CSO voice it is compromised in finding its way in to the policy discussion. Therefore CSO actors fail to position themselves strongly in the education field (Mundy and Stalker 2010).

Concluding this chapter, the official positions of the stakeholders are briefly recapitulated in table 2.

Table 2. Official positions and activities stakeholders

Actor	Position towards PPPs	Activity towards PPPs	Remarks
Government	Promote PPPs for efficient education sector and creating equitable access	USE/UPPET program with; Capitation grants and Memorandum of Understanding	Desire to expand USE towards A-level coming years
World Bank	Assistance to secondary education Promote use of private sector via PPPs	Program Loan for UPPET Initiator at times of adoption At the moment, support through “targeted resources, technical assistance and policy dialogue”	Impact evaluation report will come out in 2012; potential influence for policy
Education Development Partners	Underwrote ESSP; support position of the Government of Uganda	Lack communal activities towards PPPs Division of labour EDPs. EDPs active in secondary; WB, AfDB and JICA; rest in BTVET and/or Primary education	EDPs attention to BTVET sub-sector is increasing
CSOs	Rights Based Approach; Promote public education	Unknown policy advocacy activities towards PPPs	CSOs’ policy influence is constrained

5. Data analysis (II): Education Problems

The previous chapter mainly approached the PPPs programmatic idea from a *policy tool* perspective, describing the main type of PPP in Uganda and the political roles of the education stakeholders. This chapter will approach the PPPs idea from the *education problems*, that the program portends to be a policy solution for. As described above (in section 2.1) the education problems that the PPPs are perceived to have an effect on, by its promoters, are *access, quality, equity* and in the mean time changing *the role of the state*. Therefore, this chapter answers the second sub question “*How do the stakeholders perceive that the PPPs will affect or improve education problems in Uganda?*”

Based on discursive communal characteristics this chapter will give answer to this question by describing the perceptions in three narratives of the grouped stakeholders; *Government Actors, EDPs* and *the CSOs*. From these representations I will argue there is a discursive difference in the way the impact of the PPPs program is perceived depending on which discourse is ‘in power’. Each of the three different discourses are introduced by describing in which way they represent the impact of the PPPs on *privatization*.

5.1 Government Actors Discourse

Since the government actors are in the social position of being the main executers of the PPPs policy as part of USE, their discourse is self-evidently characterized by its positive representation of the effect of PPPs on the several education problems.

5.1.1 Privatization

The government actors argue that their policy of using private schools under the USE program is a type of privatization. The government actors legitimate this policy by pointing to the fact that by partnering they are now making use of the private sector in secondary education, which is almost as big as the public sector²⁰, thereby creating more access to education legitimates.

Except for benefit for access to education, the government actors also underline in their narrative that privatization is legitimized because private schools are argued to bring in a

²⁰There are almost just as many secondary students in private schools as in public schools; there are around 4000 private schools versus 1000 public schools. The public schools have much more enrollment which makes the public/private ratio of all secondary students almost 50/50, half of all the students are in private schools.

form of quality of education. The public actors argue that a comparable quality advantage of private schools versus public schools exists *in theory*, and therefore wish to partner with them. *In practice* however this argument runs in to trouble when it is used in the context of the schools that take part in the PPPs program, as will be described below.

What is evident is that the government actors do not shy away in naming their policy a form of privatization because of the perceived benefits. This is in contrast to PPPs critics that argue PPPs are used as a camouflage, hiding privatization interests. As for instance with the WB, that, because of its ambiguous relationship with the private sector, needs to hide privatization discourse as a development strategy (as described by Ball and Youdell 2007: 2).

5.1.2 Access

The biggest advantage the government actors underline is that PPPs can improve education problems in Uganda because of the creation of access. The PPPs are seen to fill the gap of the growing demand for secondary students. The goal is to create access where government schools are overloaded or are not present, which is mostly in remote areas.

5.1.3 Quality

The government actors reason quality will be provided because it has been demonstrated that private providers in urban areas are doing very well in terms of quality and outputs, and they so assume that partnering with private schools ‘conceptually’ should lead to quality benefits. However many other stakeholders can point out from their field experience that ‘in practice’ this works completely different. To analyze the impact of the PPPs on quality education I therefore looked at the perceptions on quality at the level where the PPP arrangement is already implemented in practice; the private schools under the PPPs arrangement.

5.1.3.1 Quality in PPP schools

In contrast to the official documents, in the interviews the government actors acknowledged some of the problems with quality in private schools. They agree that in reality Uganda’s secondary education sector, private schools are not necessarily of higher quality (see also box 3).

Box 3 Varying degree of quality private schools

According to Jacob et al 2008: “in many countries, people often associate private with greater prestige, but this is not necessarily the case in Uganda. There are at least four reasons that some private schools may not attain the reputational status of prestigious government schools. First, teachers do not necessarily meet certification requirements. In many private schools, teachers tend to be under qualified or not qualified. Second, the majority of teachers is under qualified and relies on one or two stellar teachers to attract students to their school. Third, in poorer rural regions of the country, some private teachers and staff go unpaid for months. And finally, the quality of instructional materials used in private schools does not typically differ from materials found in public schools; materials come from the same publishers. However, private schools with high fee requirements may enjoy the advantage of being able to pay for newer materials or materials in more adequate quantity for their students. Those public and private schools enjoying the highest level of popular prestige invariably have modern facilities (computers, science laboratories and equipment, vocational machinery, electricity, running water, and so on), current texts, and excellent teachers and administration. Unfortunately, the opposite is also true when considering the poor-quality end of the prestige continuum” (Jacob et al 2008: 874).

As the government actors acknowledge, many of the PPP schools are of poor quality. They lack classrooms, laboratories, libraries and they underpay their staff. Other common problems that the government actors noticed in these schools are for instance that funds are diverted from schools for private gain or that the schools find ways to extract more money from the parents even though they are officially not allowed to ask fees or other financing from parents, if the schools are receiving the capitation grant. A well known creative way for extracting money is to change the school uniforms²¹. Another problem the government actors are suspicious about is that some of the private schools cheat with grades to be competitive.

Concluding the government actors’ position towards the quality of education provided by the PPP policy is that they are well aware of the quality problems. Nevertheless they do not see them as indicators to change the path of the PPP model, as long as the private schools are still willing to join with the capitation grant that is given. Quality issues will not stop them from broadening the PPPs policy program, their main argument being that ‘the private institutions take up the capacity where government has not been able to get in’. In other words the benefits for access outweigh the quality issues.

²¹This is an effective way to extract money from student/parents because students will be socially obliged to buy these or they will be left open to be ridicule.

5.1.4 Efficiency

What happened to the argument of more efficiency, as mentioned in the several policy documents promoting the USE? Notably, the government actors hardly mentioned, the efficiency gains of the PPPs program, in the interviews. This points to the fact that the efficiency gains in practice, at the school level, are doubted to exist. This is striking considering the fact that in the ESSP's narrative, the main reason for promoting PPPs is due to its contribution to an 'efficient and effective education sector'. The kind of benefits for efficiency that the government actors perceive to exist is only that of macro level efficiency of the national budget and not for more effective ways of managing a school at micro-level.

5.1.5 The Equity Situation

As well, the Government Actors do not expand on the issue of equity, except for the 'universal' in Universal Secondary Education, which implies free equitable access for all. They see equity as something self evident because the overarching 'universality' implies all students will be able to apply for free secondary education. Like the PPPs arrangement that provides free access to education. Nevertheless they acknowledge that due to insufficient capacity and resources they will not be able to reach everybody and that they are not able to monitor if equity is assured, for instance by checking if schools are not asking for extra money. Therefore the government actors rhetorically promote the PPPs as bringing more equity but know that in reality they cannot assure this.

5.1.6 Role of the state under PPPs

With these education problems in mind, what do the government actors then see as their role under PPPs, and does this imply a reconfiguration of the role of the state for education? The government actors argue that the role of the state with the coming of PPPs is expanded since they can now reach more students by including (the students from) the private schools under the partnership arrangement while maintaining direct provision in the public schools. However in practice, as the other stakeholders argue below, one of the consequences is that the state is moving away from focussing on direct provision of education.

Evident is that the government actors argue that the role of the state towards the PPP schools has been reconfigured. In this policy arrangement, instead of a direct provider of

education, the main governance responsibilities of the government are; the *funding, regulation, assessment and policy guidance*.

The government actors see their main task as the *funding* of private schools. They argue providing a ‘realistic’ unit cost for a child to be sustained in a private school is their priority however due to budget constraints they “cannot engage in enlarging the interventions with the private providers” (Interview III, 2011). They therefore explicitly expressed the will to engage with development partners to aid the private providers. Since most of them are engaged in the BTVET sector, the commissioner of secondary schools (not including BTVET) stated that: “Hopefully in time it will come over here” (Interview III, 2011).

Next to funding, *regulation* is part of the government’s programmatic idea of the role of the state under PPPs. The regulation of the state consists of two main procedures for monitoring the quality of education. First of all, the government actors argue quality will be addressed by regular inspection (twice a year), by the directorate of education standards that provides the “basic requirements and minimum standards which every school, whether government or private, must adhere to” (Interview III, 2011) ²². Secondly, the government actors argue incentives for quality are expected the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU is used as a guideline defining the partnership between the government and the private proprietor (see Appendix G). The government actors describe that the private partners are expected to follow the rules set out in this document. It describes the expectations of the private and public partner. But how these expectations are followed up or monitored is not clear or even absent in the government actors’ discourse.

Another part of the role of the state for the PPPs policy is that of *assessment and examination*, performed by the Ugandan National Examinations Board (UNEB) once every year (with the ‘end of the year examinations’). One of the goals of The Ministry, as stated in the ESSP, is to strengthen the UNEB capacity (ESSP 2007: 53). The main responsibilities of UNEB are examination practices such as the registration of candidates, test development, administration and conduct of examinations, grading etc. Because all private schools have to follow the same curriculum and legal framework as public schools, UNEB is also in the PPP schools. They form an important source of feedback for the government on school level realities. In UNEB’s last performance report they expressed that more problems occur in the PPP schools than in government aided schools. It stated that many of the PPP schools lack

²²I have not explored which standards are checked at the schools. It is not mentioned in one of the Government’s policy papers or interviews I analyzed for this thesis.

teachers and laboratory equipment. Besides that, their students have not been exposed to practical science teaching, as reflected by their performance in practical science examinations (UNEB 2010).

A final aspect of the role of the state in the PPPs policy is that the commissioner of private secondary education division explained that his department is responsible for *policy guidance* and overseeing the performance of these schools by “liaising” with the school owners. This is done by for instance writing sector letters for guidance to the school proprietors and head teacher on how to govern their schools, and by coordinating ‘policy dialogue and exchanging ideas’ with stakeholders ranging from teachers, proprietors of schools to the students themselves. The private schools department guides the private schools to achieve a certain level of quality by ‘enforcing’ policy. For instance to ensure that there are laboratories and that there are qualified teachers (Interview II, 2011). The commissioner of private schools views his contact with the private school associations as a kind of quality assurance mechanism. Though the influence of the commissioner should not be underestimated, the sustainability of this manner of quality assurance could be seen as questionable²³ because the commissioner did not explain the standard procedures for monitoring the quality of education. As he stated: “We do not have the capabilities to monitor at school level, **we do not go there**” (Interview II, 2011).

5.2 The Education Development Partners’ Discourse

The EDPs endeavour another discourse on PPPs because they are in a different social position. They are limited active in the PPPs policy and therefore do not have to legitimize the PPP as the government does. Nevertheless, they are in the position of officially recognizing communally the government’s USE policy. This is why the EDPs do not dismiss the PPPs policy but argue for more standards and better implementation.

5.2.1 Privatization

The EDPs do not directly name the PPPs policy as a form of privatization because there is a form of government involvement. In general, the EDPs perceive ‘privatization’ for education as a negative development, but they see PPPs as a legitimated way of making use of the

²³Nevertheless further research should be needed to assess this

private sector, if proper standards, i.e. the role of the state, are well implemented. Therefore, the EDPs emphasize the fact that when the private sector is included, more standards are needed from the Ministry. The respondent from JICA even argued that EDPs need to persuade the ministry of this (Interview XI, 2011).

In the interviews, the WB slightly differs in position from the other EDPs. The WB specialist put more emphasis on the benefits of the use of the private sector under the PPPs arrangement of USE. The same can be noted, as described above, about the situational analysis of the consultant LaRocque (2007). In this way, as Ball and Youdell (2008: 8-9) explain, using ‘education reforms’, such as USE, to promote PPPs is a way in which the WB could be camouflaging ‘hidden forms of privatization’.

5.2.2 Creating Access

The EDPs state that the biggest problem in Uganda is the demand for education and that is what the USE (with the PPPs as its tool) to certain extent is able to address. Therefore, due to the fact that more private schools are applying and more students are joining, the PPPs are perceived as successful for the creation of access.

5.2.3 Quality

However, when it comes to the delivery of quality education the EDPs not only expressed the issues in the PPPs schools, as the government actors acknowledged, but they claim there are structural problems in the PPPs policy. Therefore, they expressed more clearly the causes of the issues of quality learning in the PPP schools. The WB mainly pointed out the school level management issues while the other EDPs stated the quality issues are caused by government’s contradicting expectations of the PPP schools.

5.2.3.1 Quality in PPP schools

The World Bank

The World Bank puts most emphasis on quality issues caused by poor school management. The WB suspects that the main reason why the PPPs are not working optimally is because of the competency (lack of training/experience) of private school management (Interview V, 2011). This is why in Uganda the WB has several projects under UPPET to train chairpersons of management boards, head teachers and key management personnel at the school level.

However these projects have difficulties in practice at the moment. As the WB specialist indicates:

“they have as yet to establish a manager of a person [and] lack passion for the cause” (...) “These managers might have the incentive to do other things with that money and not to repeat back in to the school for improving the learning environment”. (Interview V, 2011).

The WB specialist hereby implies that the “for-profit managers” of private schools will not automatically lead to higher efficiency, something that is *assumed* in global WB reports (such as Patrinos et al. 2009). This quality issue at school level of the PPPs arrangement shows how the theoretical concept of private management (as a PPP tool for the education problem of more *effectiveness at the school*) does not work in the case of Uganda. The national context of Uganda in this way differs from what should be taken from ‘international experience’.

EDPs

The EDPs with experience in the PPP schools expressed more critical evaluations on the nature of the private schools that are being partnered with. They argue that because many of the private schools are profit motivated, the quality of education will lower because the PPP schools want to utilize the minimum resource to get the highest output; the best examination results and therefore cut on costs that are essential for the quality of learning. Therefore the biggest problem of the PPPs policy according to these EDPs is that quality is assumed by the government and conflicts with the *contradicting behaviour of the private partners in reality* (Interview VI, X, XI, 2011).

First of all the EDPs noticed that in reality the PPP schools have the incentive to employ the cheapest teachers, not necessarily the most experienced or qualified. As the respondent from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) explained, their organisation has gathered data from which can be concluded that many of mathematics and science teachers in rural areas are not qualified. Since JICA runs the SESEMAT program (for training science and mathematics teachers) that covers the whole nation, they noticed that the capacity of the teacher in the remote/rural area is extremely low compared with those of urban areas (Interview XI, 2011).

Secondly, the PPP schools do not invest in science-subjects sufficiently since these are more expensive. Therefore these private schools are teaching more on arts subject for which

management and equipment is easier to come by compared to workshop machinery. This produces, what one EDP respondent calls, less ‘blue-collar’ (manual labour) oriented students that ‘white-collar’ ones, which is exactly what Uganda in their opinion does not need (Interview VI, 2011)

Thirdly the quality effects of the profit seeking mentality of PPP school managers are aggravated because some of the private schools are being pushed by government to take up more students than their capacity, and sometimes the government is late in payment of the capitation grant, producing even more incentives for the school to spend less on teachers and science materials.

In this way the EDPs’ critique shows that the expectation of government of the private schools providing quality is colliding with what is in the nature of private schools, i.e. being profit seeking entities. The EDPs in this way critique the government’s policy of partnering with private ‘for profit’ schools. Nevertheless although expressing this critique in the interviews they do not advocate changes in PPP policy. As we will see in the next chapter the civil society organisations’ discourse picks up this same point but in contrary to the EDPs do strongly advocate against ‘partnering’ with these private schools.

5.2.4 Efficiency

At micro level of the PPP schools the EDPs share the WB view, as explained above, that the efficiency issues of school level management is one of the main issues for quality. At macro level all the EDPs agree that the PPPs are an efficient way of delivering education under the mass reform of USE considering the government’s budget constraints. Nevertheless they doubt whether sufficient resources are being released to implement sufficient quality assuring mechanisms.

5.2.5 The Equity Situation

With the WB silent on the topic of equity in their main documents and interview, it became evident that most of the EDPs underline, that the unequal socio-economic situation in the Ugandan education sector is aggravated by the present USE program. In other words, according to these EDPs, a system for the poor and a system for the rich are created.

First of all because, the PPP schools that are aimed at poor households, are seen as the low-quality variant in the education field, compared to the other existing private and public schools that are not in the USE program. These schools are in general known to be of a higher

quality but also more expensive. For the existing private and public schools of high quality, tuition fees can reach exorbitantly high amounts and they are rising every year, and so are unavailable for many poor families. This is such an issue in present Ugandan society that it is a daily topic in Ugandan newspapers (see Appendix I)

Secondly, the unequal situation starts in primary education, because USE only takes on children coming from the primary cycle (with their PLE grades as key). There, the EDPs argue government's policy is already creating discrepancies between 'people with money and people without; the poor get poor education, the rich better education'. The Ugandan education system is therefore already reducing the chances for the socio-economically poor when they start their education, because bad primary education will affect the PLE results and therefore the chances in secondary education also. As the EDPs argue from their experience in the primary sub sector, the disadvantaged students are picked out of the system before they even get a chance to do the PLE. So the USE is already exclusively a system only for those who have been able to pay and finish the primary cycle; "leading to a lot of discrepancy and inequity" (Interview XIV, 2011). The respondents from the SNV and ILO even expressed that this kind of exclusion is against Children's Right Convention (CRC)²⁴.

Notwithstanding the fact that almost all EDPs in the interviews expressed that the PPPs are emphasizing inequality, the EDPs do not argue for a change of PPP policy, but for better implementation, standards and state regulation of the PPPs. In other words the EDPs believe the PPPs are a good policy but there is bad delivery.

5.2.6 Role of the state

'Good Policy, bad delivery'

The EDPs do not obstruct the PPPs. In general the EDPs argue the policy of the PPPs is well designed however the problem is the structure of service delivery in Uganda. As the WB specialist noted: "the issues are so many at each level that you do not know where to point and blame at times" (Interview V, 2011).

²⁴They argue that, although the CRC recognizes that the implementation and the integration in national laws, such as the USE program, is a progressive kind of process there is one article in the CRC that should be implemented immediately; the article against discrimination (Interview XIV and XIII, 2011). As the SNV sector leader even stated: "there is a big discussion/debate here when you talk about privatization in education and discrimination. I mean it is not easy to do that in such a way that you do not exclude any children, any learners from the system" (Interview XIV, 2011).

Nevertheless, the EDPs argue that the existing institutions for regulation need to be drastically strengthened. They argue the number of inspectors has not increased while the number of PPP schools has boomed, therefore accountability is weakened and better monitoring mechanisms and inspection are claimed to be necessary for assuring quality. In this way they argue the expectations and performance targets set up in the MOU should be better followed up by government regulation.

In sum, the EDPs expressed the need for more involvement of the state in PPPs, especially in the way the government works together with the PPP schools (at micro level).

5.3 Civil Society Actors Discourse

The CSOs are not in the social position of being obliged to discursively promote or officially recognize the PPP policy. The CSOs are seen in the education sector as advocating a rights-based approach for ‘quality’ education. Therefore, in contrary to the government actors and EDPs, the CSOs reject the PPPs policy because in their perceptions, the program neglects equitable access to quality education and is a form of privatization that is dangerous for education.

5.3.1 Privatization

The CSOs express an anti-privatization discourse. Symbolic for the CSOs discursive position towards the PPPs, the General Secretary of UNATU manifests her position on PPPs in UNATU’s magazine *The Voice of the Teachers*,:

“834 USE government schools will take 179,000 (capitation grants per year) while 637 Private schools will take 7 times as many as those in government schools under “the guise of Public Private Partnerships’, What is the role of the state in the provision of Public Secondary Education? Who controls the private schools? What is government’s interest in someone’s profit intended business? UNATU’s stand is that it should be the role of the state to provide Public education in the secondary schools and for that matter they must increase the resources in the government aided school rather than sending the resources to private schools where they have no control. These are seen as neo liberal policies that have turned education into a commodity that can be purchased by those who can afford rather than a public good that must be provided by the state. Government must not be proud of putting all such resources in someone’s profit driven investment” (UNATU 2010: 3).

The discourse of the interviewed CSOs is evidently different from the other stakeholders. The CSOs are more critical of policy solutions that try to make use of the private sector. Instead of being complementary to the public sector the creation of PPPs is seen by the CSOs as a failure

of government to create enough public schools to absorb the demand of students, and privatization is argued to be an *a priori* chance for government to run away from its responsibilities to provide public education. According to the CSO's, this consequentially deprives the public of its rights and changes education into a commodity by bringing in people with profit oriented motives to manage schools, sometimes even 'non-educationalists', who see schools as an enterprise. This could lead to a decrease in attention for civil responsibilities in private education and result in cost cutting measures that will intend to achieve good results, but not necessarily provide better quality education.

The CSO's argue that government has not sufficiently examined other solutions besides using the private school and is moving away from its original tasks of constructing schools. When it is inevitable to partner with private schools, the CSOs would rather see private schools which are community or mission/religion based, since these schools have less of a profit motive.

At the moment, because the relative number of public schools is declining, the CSOs fear privatization in the Ugandan secondary education sector will grow²⁵.

5.3.2 Access

Although the CSO's acknowledge that the PPP schools are helpful to some extent because: "some children just don't have any other school to go to" (Interview XVII, 2011), the CSOs do express a more critical standpoint on the creation of access. They question whether the access to education is meaningful when PPP schools are in such conditions that quality learning is almost not possible. In this sense the CSOs put much more emphasis on quality compared to the other stakeholder, especially compared to the government actors and consequentially perceive the PPPs arrangement as a less successful arrangement than its promoters.

²⁵ Because under USE the government is hardly involved in the physical construction of schools, except for the so called 'seed schools', that are secondary schools constructed in a sub county where there is no government aided secondary school. However the amount of these schools is relatively low nationally, 93 nationally in 2010 (Ministry of Education and Sports: USE/UPPET FAQ 2010).

5.3.3 Quality

According to the CSOs the quality of learning is a problem by private schools that are managed with a profit driven motive. As one CSO respondent expressed: “the quality of education is not pursued when the public good of education gets in the hands of the private man” (Interview XVII, 2011).

5.3.3.1 Quality in PPP schools

According to the CSOs, because most of the PPP schools are *profit driven*, there is an intrinsic incentive brought in to the education field to exploit the system, creating adverse consequences for the quality of learning in those schools. For instance when it comes to teachers, “the businessman building a school can easily take them in and underpay them, causing bad teaching conditions” (Interview XVII, 2011). Other examples are named above by the other stakeholders above.

According to the CSOs this profit driven aspect of PPP schools, that causes quality issues, is given space to grow under the present system. Because there is such a great demand for education, those who have money can start a school and can take advantage of the system created by USE. These people starting private schools are the majority who are ‘partnered with’ under the USE program. The CSOs abhor this development and claim government should look for partnerships with schools that have a more ‘public conscious’, such as the religious or faith based schools. These schools, according to the CSO’s, have more the values of providing service to the people and do not have the intention to make a profit and take advantage of teachers, parents or student.

However since the PPPs under the USE are mostly with the private for profit schools, the CSOs fear the quality will drop even more now that USE schools are booming and that there is talk of extending it to A-level.

5.3.4 Efficiency

The CSOs claim ‘efficiency’ is a dangerous and inappropriate term to be used in the governance of education. The CSOs’ argue the type of efficiency that is promoted by the WB and government to turn the head teachers to managers does not fit according to them with the school level practices. As one CSO respondent expressed:

“ the kind of efficiency the World Bank talks about can work in a factory but does not necessarily work the same way when it comes to public services (...) How do you expect here, when a teacher is managing a class of 200 children, where some have chairs, others don’t, teachers can’t move to reach everybody. But then you bring in the policy that all the children

must be promoted because of efficiency, because that will save cost. You then will take many students to pass who won't have the appropriate obtained learning competencies (Interview XVII, 2011)

This CSO complaint argues against the replacement of service ethics with the ethics of competition which, as Richard Sennet (1998) describes, involves the 'corrosion of character'; weakening and breaking down of the professional ethical systems of decision-making in schools and their replacement by entrepreneurial/competitive systems, which is a process of 'deprofessionalisation'.

Macro level efficiency

The CSOs are most of all critical to the application of the concept of efficiency to the macro level, of the national budget. They claim that the promotion of PPPs because of budgetary benefits is not legitimate because the government expenses for the education sector low; low in comparison to what the education sector would need. This then causes the lack of sufficient resources which are needed to implement the PPPs program correctly and so leads to the above mentioned problems of a lack of quality ensuring mechanisms and institutions.

There is not enough money being released by government because of external conditions from International Financing Institutes (IFIs), such as the IMF and WB, that pressure the GoU to have "single digit inflation rates" Interview XVII, 2011). Therefore the CSOs argue that the PPPs under the header of more 'efficiency' are promoted by the WB (and IMF) with insufficient attention to the education context of Uganda. The CSOs see this policy not as a 'challenge', as the government actors do, but more a 'pitfall' playing the booming amount of 'for profit' private schools in to the hand and leading to issues of for instance for the role of teachers as described by UNATU (see box 4).

Box 4 Efficiency-policy effects teachers

Aside from the direct effect on students, the immediate sector affected by the government not spending sufficient money for education are the teachers, according to the UNATU secretary general. UNATU's respondent fears that contract teachers in the private PPP schools do not have many rights or strong union representation and so can be fired at will by the managers of the school. This will then increase the number of cheap untrained teachers, in schools, because they are more profitable for the profit-oriented PPP schools (Interview XVII, 2011). Therefore UNATU states in their Strategic Plan, that effects of USE are either: introducing contract-teachers, who can be hired and fired at will, or bringing non-professionals into the workforce, with low qualifications and low salaries. The consequence, according to UNATU, is that this situation has led first of all to the creation of a parallel and informal labour market that undermines the status of professional teachers and is consequently weakening the teachers' unions' capacity to negotiate at national level. Secondly, UNATU argues that the spread of low quality and unregulated private schools will lower the quality of education and the integrity of the public education system. This will then affect the quality of education for the students (UNATU Five Year Strategic Plan (2008-2012: 8-10).

5.3.5 The Equity Situation

While some EDPs expressed their 'discomfort' with international right/norms in relation to the equity situation, the CSO actually use this as one of their central critiques on PPPs. As one of the CSOs stated:

"For us as a Civil Society Organization, we base the private-public partnership on equity consideration. Any PPP that does not look at equity considerations is a perjury, it is not right"(Interview XVIII, 2011).

The position of the CSO on the equity situation in Uganda is that the PPPs are reinforcing the socio-economic unequal situation of poorer children in remote areas who having less access to quality education, in this sense underlining an "Education for All or quality education for some" (Interview XIX, 2011).

This unequal situation is even worsened, the CSOs argue, first of all due to the fact that USE schools still requests a high level of Primary Leaving Exam results ²⁶. Secondly, because once students get accepted, the poorer ones are still in many cases worse off because of the 'hidden costs' (e.g. uniforms, as described above) that government has no control over.

²⁶This argument conforms with some of my field visits to USE schools, where the demand is so high that the schools select students based on their results from primary education (So not being able to guarantee that scoring a sufficient 'aggregate score' will allow student go to a USE school). As one headteacher of a USE school noted for instance: "Because there are many students competing for this free education and we do not have enough facilities to accommodate many. So many drop off at the cutting point and we end up picking the ones who perform well" (Interview XXII, 2011).

Thirdly, the CSOs are worried whether the profit-driven PPP schools are taking care of discriminated groups of children, like girls, as it is costly, for instance, to make a school gender responsive. As one of the CSOs said about the PPP schools managers: “those guys aren’t bothered about these costs” (Interview XVII, 2011).

This leads to the CSOs’ rejection of the terms of ‘free’ and ‘universal’ secondary education for all. As one of the CSOs noted:

“‘Universal’ would mean that all those who are willing to go to school would actually access it. That is not so. There are so many that are left out” (Interview XVIII, 2011).

5.3.6 Role of the state

The CSOs also strongly disapprove of the use of the term ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ in relation to the policy the government is implementing.

The CSOs criticize that the PPP arrangement should not be called a PPP because it is not a true ‘partnership’ between the two sectors. The sectors do not work together and the role of the state, as described above (for funding, regulation, assessment and policy guidance) is too weakly implemented. First of all for funding because the sustainability of government providing sufficient financial means is doubted. Secondly, when it comes to state regulation the CSOs argue there is insufficient monitoring by government inspectors and the partnership document of the Memorandum of Understanding is seen to be nothing more than a signature because both private schools and government are not following up on the agreements that are made in this document. And thirdly, the policy guidance of is perceived as a non transparent process that is hardly present at school level.

As a consequence the CSOs accuse the PPPs, as they have been implemented now, of being an empty agreement and a ‘quick fix’. The government is seen to use the private schools to fill in the gap but not a lot more. Therefore the CSOs argue that there is no actual partnership²⁷. The government is so moving away from its responsibilities and endorsing a form of privatization.

²⁷ The ‘true’ type of PPP, the CSOs described, is the one where contracts are signed with the government for certain allocated services, mostly hiring Western companies to execute them. According to the CSOs these are time-bound partnership agreements, that are unsustainable solutions and lead to a problem in ‘institutional memory’, such as certain projects of the WB or USAID. Although I do not doubt the relevance of these PPPs, they go beyond the scope of my research, I advise them for further research.

Alternatives

The CSOs propose alternatives to the PPPs, promoting a shift back to public provision of education. This sounds contradictory since PPPs were set up in the first place because the government argues that it does not have enough resources to provide public education for all. Therefore the CSOs describe some alternatives to PPPs that take the lack of resources into account. I briefly described two examples of alternatives from the interviewed stakeholders in boxes 5a and 5b.

Box 5a. Alternative to current PPPs as described by the Ugandan National Teacher Union

The UNATU secretary general is arguing that the state should opt for a Multi Stakeholder Approach (MSA) in Uganda. According to the UNATU respondent The MSA is not profit driven and therefore the “mega-resources” government is spending will not get lost in the ‘profit drive’ practices of private schools owners. The stakeholders that should be involved in this approach, according to this idea, are; teacher unions, NGO’s and line ministries (between MoES and Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health). If these parties all work together in a partnership and pull their resources together they will be able to complement the efforts of the government and generate enough financial capabilities to provide more public education. Together with putting a limit for government in working together with private school owners, according to the respondent of UNATU, this is what the government should concentrate on instead of looking for solutions that involve for-profit organizations. (Interview XVII, 2011).

Textbox 5b. Alternative to current PPPs as described by the Forum of Education NGOs Uganda

The national coordinator of FENU pleads for a “cost-sharing system” where government takes over the infrastructure of private schools or sets up infrastructure of schools. In this way stronger contracts with clearer agreements regarding non-compliance can be signed with the private providers and monitoring can be more effective. According to the FENU respondent this will improve quality ensuring mechanisms because it is easier to set up performance contracts (Interview XIX, 2011).

While these proposed alternatives could lead to all other sorts of problems, they demonstrate that there are possible alternatives to PPPs. In this way the CSO discourse dismisses the momentum that PPPs can create, as Miller and Gerson describe (2008), that PPPs are an inevitable policy solution.

5.4 Concluding remarks Data Analysis II

To conclude this chapter, we can state that the question of what is the effect of the PPPs program on the education problems does not give one straight answer. This chapter described three different answers, coming from three different discourses. From these three discourses however, the perceived general impact can be concluded. As can be seen in table 3.

Table 3 Discursive representations of the PPPs impact on education problems in Uganda (as expressed in the interviews)

Impact on:	Government discourse	EDP discourse	CSO discourse	Concluded impact
<i>Privatization</i>	Pro privatization and use of the private sector	Against privatization but pro use of the private sector, therefore more standards (and state regulation) are needed	Privatization and use of the private sector not legitimate	A form of privatization is perceived to exist. Dependent of discourse and social position determines the expressed desirability of this kind of privatization
<i>Access</i>	Main goal of policy and outweighs quality	Good for access	To some extent but not meaningful when there is no quality	Access to education benefits are evident, access to quality learning is not
<i>Quality</i>	Potential quality benefit but recognize problems and concern financial sustainability due to the partnering with weak schools	Structural problems with quality. WB: Underlines management issues. EDPs: Contradicting expectations of the private sector	Structural problem of profit driven private schools form a problem for quality.	Quality problems are evident. If PPPs have potential to provide quality it will depend on future implementation

<i>Efficiency</i>	Macro-level budget benefits	Same as quality complaints	Concept not applicable for public service	Causes quality issues but macro budget benefits
<i>Equity</i>	Implied by 'universal' policy	WB no opinion. Other EDPs in general see an intrinsic problem in the nature of the partnership but due to their social position they do not act on it	EFA or quality for some: not righteous	Equity to education access improved but worsened for quality
<i>Role of the state</i>	Funding, regulation, assessment (UNEB), policy guidance	There should be stronger and broader institutions. However the EDPs do not advocate for it	No true partnership, promote alternatives	Smaller role of the state in direct education provision

6. Data Analysis (III) Conditions for translation

While the previous data-chapters described in what way the stakeholders perceived the PPPs programmatic idea from both the ‘policy tools’ and ‘education problems’ perspective. This chapter will describe the conditions for translation of the PPPs program, answering the last sub question: *To what extent are the conditions for translation of the PPPs programmatic idea in Uganda met?*

Answer to the sub question will be given by describing both enabling and hindering factors. The extent of compliance to the conditions illustrates the impact on the Ugandan policy environment. As well, according to Walsh (2000), this approach helps to determine the hospitable political and institutional environment to forecast successful implementation (2000: 489). Both external and internal conditions will be described.

6.1 Enabling conditions

The enabling conditions that are supporting the translation of the PPPs program in the Uganda policy environment are the *influential promoters* of the program, the manner of *discursive promotion* and the *resonance* with existing policy preferences.

6.1.1 Influential promoters

The World Bank and other international organisations from the EDPs group, heavily back, both discursively and materially (through the UPPET loans), the PPPs in the Ugandan secondary education sector. While the Ugandan government is effectuating the PPPs, the WB showed an influential role from the start in getting the PPPs programmatic idea implemented and is still supporting the existing PPPs through their loans, technical support and IFC activities.

Currently the main executors of the PPPs policy are the government policy makers from the education department. They are the one pulling the strings regarding the PPP policy, with the private education commissioner at the forefront. This seems to increase their political morality because in this way the government actors can represent the PPPs as their own “home grown plan” (Interview I, 2011). Moreover the fact that both government and the WB, as the most influential actors in the education field, promote the PPPs, affects the integration

of the policy in to broader policy networks and guarantees the relative necessary resources, consequentially increasing the sustainability.

In addition, resistance to the PPPs arrangements is nationally compromised. Promoters of the PPPs in Uganda do not experience any national resistance to their policy e.g. from constituencies within civil society. These organizations fail to form an opposing force or strong voice in the PPPs debate.

Remarkably, government actors would like to see these civil society organizations to become stronger, to for instance combat the abuse (of government money) in private schools, which the government claims it cannot inspect accurately because of resource constraints. Therefore they note: “it would help for both sides if pressure groups were strong” (Interview III, 2011).

This underlines the theory of powerful policy promoters and their ideas, because the ideas of the not so powerful organisation will not find their way in to the policy discussion. In this way it is sometimes not about the ideas that mobilize resources but resources that mobilize action. As one CSO respondent expressed frustration about why plans by the WB always find a ‘voice’ in the policy debate:

“The issue is money is not chasing, you are chasing money. So if you are chasing money you are going to adapt and take up” (Interview XIX, 2011).

The fact that the PPPs are discursively and materially promoted shows that discourse goes hand in hand with the interests backing them. I will avoid the discussion which of the two is more important, because it neglects the possibility that it is the interaction between the two that counts (Campbell 2002: 37).

6.1.2 Discursive promotion

The government promotes the PPPs discursively to other national stakeholders by arguing their policy of PPPs, is the best they can deliver in light of their financial possibilities. Out of this situation flows the argument, as became visible in the interviews, of the PPPs promoting discourse in Uganda that engulfs other discourses. I summarized their argument as: *‘government does not have enough money to build all school to cater all the children, therefore they will assist schools that are already there so they do not have to build a new one’*. This argument is supported by a government’s second argument that *‘there has to be a framework for regulations and partnerships have to be strengthened’*.

On the one hand this argument shows they are ‘doing what they can’ with the available resources to create *access* in background of an immense need for education and resource constraints and show the intention to build in quality assuring mechanisms for the growing amount of private schools. This argument has the effect that other stakeholders are not able to form a *strong* contradicting or alternative discourse because this makes it seem like the government is doing the best it can’, and is on the way to provide better quality assurance mechanism. In this way the government’s PPPs idea seems to adhere to the urgency of the creation of access while simultaneously countering privatization critiques because it claims to do what it can to strengthen the government’s role. In this sense the government’s PPPs policy ideas displays its accommodationist powers (see Linder 1999) by enabling policy entrepreneurs adhering to different ideologies to agree on its implementation, such as the EDPs.

On the other hand, because of the lack of data and experience with PPP schools nationally – due to its short existence and rapid changing situation (of a growing amount of private schools), a strong counterargument is not formed in the education field. Therefore, many stakeholders believe the argument on face value although their experience in the sector makes them suspicious, because in practice there are a lot of problems with the PPPs. As one EDP respondent stated: “I believe in general the PPPs are a good idea” (Interview VII, 2011). This quote has been repeated several times in my interviews with the stakeholders when I asked for their opinion on PPPs. This kind of face value’ representations, according to Fairclough (2003: 88) have an ‘explanatory logic’ and a ‘logic of appearances’ of reality that do not go any deeper than listing appearances which evidence might change, rather than offering explanatory accounts of change in terms of causal relations (ibid: 89).

In addition, the expression of counterarguments by stakeholders other than the government does not seem to be possible. While in the case of the CSOs this is more clearly visible because they claim they are hardly taken serious or given the space to express their contradicting voices, the EDPs are also in some way compromised in this possibility. Not only are the EDPs not opposing because they believe in the promoting discourse on face-value, some of the EDPs are also not opposing because they do not want to risk their position by antagonizing the government. Some EDPs claimed that there are increasing strict rules for the whole government advocacy lobbying area and that as an International Organisation ”you are very easily kicked out” (Interview XIV, 2011). In other words, criticizing government

policy is seriously compromised. This frustrates some EDPs when it comes to the PPPs policy. They claim the EDPs should be held accountable for the conventions they underwrote, such as the Childs Right Convention (CRC) and that because they are an organisation that is based on a right based approach, they should be against PPPs as a new form of privatization. These more critical EDPs expressed disappointment with the other EDPs inability to challenge the government. As one of these EDPs stated:

“We should not swallow everything and sometimes ask the challenging questions and make those remarks. They [the other EDPs, red.] are just paying lip-service and they are just being so nice to the government, but I think we should not be so nice. We are spending tax-payers money. We have to be asking for real results and quality. We are not doing that sufficiently” (Interview XIV, 2011).

6.1.3. Resonation

The PPPs policy *resonates* with the prevailing policy paradigm in society, at the time of its formulation because it is a *framework for opportunity*, a *clear arrangement* and it fit the *privatization paradigm* for development.

Framework for opportunity

First of all the PPPs policy is perceived to resonate positively in the education field because of the opportunity the PPPs under USE create. A framework has been created that addresses a substantial number of students that did not have access before, especially in rural areas where “communities across the country have been yearning for education where there are no government schools” (Interview XVII, 2011). Notwithstanding the potential of the opportunity created, strong institutions, which have the appropriate quality assuring mechanisms, need to be developed. As one respondent noted: “We have the body of the car but we are lacking the engine to move it” (Interview XXI, 2011). The coming years will have to prove whether Uganda’s government actors are capable of ‘putting in a working engine’.

Clear PPPs arrangement

Secondly the PPPs policy resonates positively because the focal point of government is a clear policy for the ‘private partners’. For these schools the PPPs are a clear and straightforward arrangement of fixed capitation grants per students. As various scholars address, programs that provide focal points upon which policy makers can most easily build political coalitions are those that policy makers are likely to adopt (Kingdon 1984, Moore 1988). Therefore, the partnership is most of all the fast growing amount of PPP schools but also the fact that elite groups or local committees in particular areas adopt these PPP schools by giving them

resources and other support (Interview II, 2011). For these PPP schools ‘the focal point’ of the PPPs policy is made clear in workshops and small conferences at district level (next to the education reviews on national level) where government actors explain in detail how the program is run. The policy is made so convincing, for these private actors, that: “many of them (private school proprietors, red.) are running to register their partnership” (Interview II, 2011).

Nevertheless these beliefs in the PPPs arrangement are interwoven with interest to join the partnership. Pressure is created to join the PPPs arrangement because, for instance, the school could run in to problems of under enrolment if they do not join, as students could go to the private schools that do implement the USE.

Fits privatization paradigm

Thirdly the PPPs arrangement fits in to the existing privatization paradigm for development. Privatization has been going on in other sectors since the beginning of the 1990’s (Crawley 2000). In the secondary education sector, the amount of private schools has been increasing, especially since the beginning of UPE with a growing amount of children that are not catered for in secondary education by public schooling (Jacob et al. 2008: 871). The government sector promotes the private sector as a key to development (see datachapter I above on the National Development Plan). As part of this plan the PPPs are now being “baptized” as a development tool for education (Interview XVI, 2011). In this way, the PPPs idea is transposed in to the specific context of education, which will support its advance (Boxenbaum and Battilana 2005). Nevertheless this baptizing of the PPPs as a new development tool does not necessarily resonate with education practices that are specific for the education sector according to most interviewed stakeholders. As described below, the use of private sector in *education* under the PPPs arrangement is unfamiliar to previous policies.²⁸

²⁸ Apart from the exception that 2 out of the 4 interviewed government commissioner were aware that in the past the government did provide some private schools with seconded teachers, this was however stopped a number of years ago due to teacher shortages in the government sector (Interview II and Interview IV, 2011; LaRocque 2007: 19)

6.2 Flaws and hindering factors

The perceived flaws and hindering factors for translation of the PPPs program are the *symbolic policy, the unfamiliar education paradigm and lack of partnership interaction.*

6.2.1 Symbolic policy; flaw of implementation

The same political pressure of the Ugandan government (or president) that created the booming amount of PPP schools, also ensured that the PPP program was rushed in to, without much attention to the implementation (Chapman 2009). As Chapman describes, USE and the PPPs are best understood as a symbolic and political decision of Government. Less attention was given to planning an organizational strategy for implementation or for anticipating consequences of rapid expansion of secondary enrolments in the face of a shortage of funding and a sufficient cadre of qualified teachers. As Chapman analyzed, ‘Universal’ and ‘free’ clearly had powerful symbolic and political power in mobilizing citizens’ votes and educators’ support for government policy (Chapman 2009: 81). In this way the USE policy appears to be more important for what is expressed than what is produced, thereby affecting the quality of education because the implementation of the policy is perceived to be weak.

Rhetorical misuse of ‘quality’

Nevertheless arguments of quality advantages are still promoted by the PPP promoters, chiefly the government. This is also evident in other countries promoting PPPs, such as Verger and VanderKaaij noted in India where just as in Uganda the quality arguments are rhetorically employed to garner support for the PPPs. However there is not any evidence education quality will be assured under partnership frameworks (2010: 22-23). While PPPs are still undoubtedly beneficial for providing education access in a cost effective way, this discourse falls short when describing the quality of education that is being delivered. Public secondary schools or even government aided USE schools are generally more popular than the PPP schools. Therefore local adoption of the PPP idea is less prevalent when there are strong public schools in the area. This explains that public schools or government aided USE schools, when located in the neighbourhood, are preferred above the PPPs arrangement schools by the Ugandan public (children and parents) (Interview XVIII, 2011).

One way of exposing the symbolic abuse of the quality discourse that I discovered is by inquiring about the *personal* beliefs of policymakers, because (logically) private thoughts of actors do not always match with their public declarations. In Uganda, government actors are

promoting the PPPs program in policy interactions, even though they do not believe in this themselves. As one CSO respondent explained about meetings with government actors:

“Their policy officials will declare the quality of the PPP schools and they expressed to become even heavy handed on these private schools if they are not providing values that are required to be there. However these government policymakers all know that in practice these private schools are not putting a lot of attention to values and are mainly concerned with looking how the students will finish the curriculum from the perspective of passing the examinations and all the other quality problems. For instance this personal misbelieve in the private schools becomes painfully visible when they go to a lot of lobbying effort to get their own children in the strong public schools. The policy officials of the government do not personally believe in the quality of their policy and that is a vote of distrust in the secondary education provided by the private sector (this is different for the primary sector). Therefore I see their heart, of a policymaker in Uganda, actually favouring having a government secondary school” (Interview XVIII, 2011).

This shows that the PPPs policy promoters of the government do not see their own policy as argumentatively viable, and that they use arguments rhetorically which they personally do not believe²⁹. In this way these promoters are undermining and derogating their own discursive plausibility and are basing their discursive promotion of PPPs on assumptions and contradictions.

Another way of exposing assumptions regarding the PPPs promotional discourse is by inquiring where the evidence from their promotion comes from. In many ways argumentative backing of this discourse refers to an ‘ill-defined’ source, as in several documents of the GoU and the WB where the promoter refers to ‘international experience’. What I found however is that this experience is highly ambiguous in itself and is dubious to serve as an argumentative backing for the promotion of PPPs (see Appendix H for an example where I describe how the WB and GoU make use of intertextual assumptions in their main documents that promote PPPs).

6.2.2 Unfamiliar education paradigm

Another hindering factor for the translation of the PPPs program is that the policy is perceived to be unfamiliar to ‘how things work’ in the education field. The PPPs are therefore unfamiliar the existing education paradigm. As John L. Campbell describes (1998), paradigms constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors perceive and deem useful for solving problems. In contrast to programmatic ideas, which are precise, concrete, and policy-specific courses of action, which are articulated consciously by policy makers and experts in

²⁹This was underlined in informal contact I had with several government officials.

the cognitive foreground (as argued above frame convincing arguments and ‘focal points’ in the education sector), paradigms generally reside in their cognitive backgrounds as underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works. When programmatic ideas fit the dominant paradigm they appear natural and familiar and, as a result, are more likely to appeal to policy makers than alternatives that do not (1998: 389-390).

The present PPP policy in secondary education and its way of utilizing the private sector is perceived by all stakeholders as unfamiliar and also as unnatural by most stakeholders (except for the government and World Bank respondents). As these critical respondents note, the way the private sector is now utilized under the PPPs idea, comes from outside of Uganda and is not natural for the education system. They claim the PPPs in Uganda is a concept designed by ‘elite’ policy makers from government and the WB who do not promote the participation of citizens and do not incorporate the views of ‘the people’. Like Hodge and Greve (2010) concluded when analyzing a certain type of PPP (the PFI’s), the top down interests of the PPP advocates dominate over the public interests palpably. In Uganda the same seems the case because of the perception that the development paradigm of PPPs is resonating with the organizations at power but not with the CSOs or other excluded stakeholders, such as parents associations, citizens and other organisations from civil society.

These organisations fear the consequences of “a neoliberal privatization paradigm in Uganda that is trying to spread to the education sector” (Interview XVIII, 2011). As part of a “global agenda in coining PPPs” the Minister of Finance, the World Bank and the IMF are seen to promote the PPPs in various ways, for instance by organizing orientation workshops to government officials (Interview XVII, 2011). As a consequence the government officials are pressured to come and introduce the PPPs even when the context is not applicable. As one respondent noted:

“It is donor-driven thing that is in no way familiar to Ugandan policymakers. (...) certain people in the development sector internationally speak about it like it is a ‘rocket science idea’. Then a certain development buzz catches up, with the globalization forces claiming to transform the world” (Interview XVIII, 2011).

Unfamiliar Privatization in education

Except that the PPPs are an unfamiliar ‘top down’ promoted policy, the use of the private schools of the program is perceived to be unfamiliar to education. The rights based approach stakeholders in Uganda therefore fear that with the ‘enabling of the private sector’ the PPPs policy is bringing in a form of privatization. As a consequence “the gate has been opened for

a wild dog to cause problems” (Interview XVIII, 2011), with all the above mentioned problems caused by its profit seeking mentality.

6.2.3 Not a true partnership

The last hindering factor for translation of the PPPs in the Ugandan education sector is that the PPPs policy is perceived to lack sufficient content for being a true partnership; it consists of *empty rhetoric*, and lacks *risk sharing* and *mutual learning* procedures.

Empty Rhetoric

Except for the PPPs policy promoters, most stakeholders do not believe that the government has a true partnership agreement. They claim the policy of the PPPs arrangement is clear but besides the released capitation grants, ‘partnership’ interactions in the Ugandan PPP policy as a new form of governance hardly exist. There is therefore much confusion among stakeholders about what is actually meant with the ‘partnership’. This haziness surrounding the partnership concept exists among a large share of stakeholders in the education field and contributed to the face-value acceptance of the program, as described above.

This points to the fact that PPPs now serve more as a rhetorical concept that makes the PPPs promoting discourse more convincing. As Linder (1999) noted ‘multiple grammars’ of PPP exist, with governments avoiding the term ‘privatization’ or ‘contracting out’ in favour of speaking about ‘partnerships’. This word presents a warmer and friendlier proposition. In this way the PPPs in Uganda fit in to a *global* trend where the term ‘partnership’ is one of the ‘buzzwords’ that has gained growing prominence in development discourse, but has often remained an empty rhetoric (Klijn and Teisman 2002; Wettenhall 2003; Hodge and Greve 2010; Cornwall 2010). This is reiterated by the lack of ‘the built-in partnership benefits’ (see Linder 1999) that good working PPPs should contain, such as *risk sharing* and *mutual learning*.

Risk sharing in the Uganda PPPs

In Uganda ‘risk sharing’ in the PPPs is perceived to be far from reality. Benefits of *risk sharing* are built in to a partnership if the public sector’s role is essentially to define the scope of business; to specify priorities, targets, and outputs; and to set the performance regime by which the management of the PPP is given incentives to deliver. The essential role and

responsibility of the private sector in all PPPs is to deliver the business objectives of the PPP whilst offering more value for money to the public sector (LaRocque 2008).

In Uganda's PPPs arrangement the incentive for risk sharing is that the private schools receive a fixed fee per student. The schools are then not supposed to collect more from the students. Therefore the private school has to run the school as efficiently as possible with the money given by the government. The school is forced to do this as it will not receive any more money. While this seems to create an incentive for the private schools to be as efficient as possible and deliver as much 'value for money' as possible, in practice however this policy does not create this incentive and has adverse effects.

On the one hand, the risk is inflated for the government because there is not sufficient auditing of private schools by the government to control whether "money does not end up in the pockets of the school owners" (Interview IV, 2011). In this sense, the government has the budget but is not an actor in the field, meaning that the control mechanisms in the risk sharing procedure are not there, so that the risk of misusing the money by the private school owners is increased for government.

On the other hand the risk is aggravated for students and parents because the capitation grants are known to be of a low amount, while the private schools deal with large expenses, for instance loans for infrastructure. This creates too much pressure and incentives to extract money in every manner possible i.e. to transfer their risk to the student. In this way it is not about 'risk sharing' but more about 'risk accumulation', with students and parents having the biggest output risk.

This risk is to some extent accepted by government. As the commissioner of private schools stated "if you are so rigid, they may not make the profit and the school might collapse" (Interview II, 2011), meaning the government knows the private schools will have to collect more money to survive and they will to some extent allow this (or "not be too rigid about"). In other words the government in practice turns a blind eye to the improper actions of the private schools, which then transfers the potential risk to the student/parents because they will be subject to extra costs requested by the private schools.

The fact that eventually the children and parents will be charged for schooling in non-transparent ways could have severe effects for poor households. The 2009 Education for All Global Monitoring Report presents evidence which cautions against paying for schooling. It raises the concern that when poor households pay for education they divert income from other areas, including nutrition, health, shelter, and savings for emergencies (UNESCO 2009).

In this way the PPPs in Uganda do not seem to have the benefit *risk sharing*. As one respondent noted, the PPPs are not “translated into a language that will speak the provision of those services” (Interview XVIII, 2011), causing the risk to be inflated and transferred to society. This is an intrinsic problem of the promotion of PPPs, as Bjorn Harald Nordtveit (2005) analyzed, because the PPPs in many cases leaves the shadow on the risks faced by the citizens. This is caused according to Nordtveit by the perception of PPP theorizers that see education is not as a right or as a public good which is necessary for the society; it is rather considered as a product or merchandise (Nordtveit, 2005a: 30).

Mutual Learning


The *mutual learning* aspect of the PPPs seems even less developed. There are no clear mutual learning indicators for in what way the cooperation of PPPs could lead to the adoption values, norms and perspectives between the counterparts of the government and the private schools. These processes seem far from the reality of the partnership with the PPP schools where ‘the government does not go’.

Nevertheless, all stakeholders argue that a lot can be learned from private schools (although mostly from the community/ NGO private schools or the mission based schools with whom there is no partnership), for instance in teacher training and community participation and management efficiency. However because mutual learning is not happening “innovation stays innovation because the Ministry does not have enough capacity for taking up these kind of innovations to national level initiatives and draw them up to policies” (Interview XI, 2011). Therefore if there are benefits in one section, they are not sufficient means to pursue these and be able speak of a mutual learning processes.

In this way, although theory on mutual learning states that in order for mutual learning to work a longer-term strategic alliance is needed (Risse 2004: 207), the PPPs under USE are not showing signs of going in this direction.

6.3 Concluding remarks

Figure 5 Hindering conditions weighed against enabling conditions (source: own work)



In this chapter both the enabling and hindering conditions of the PPPs program in Uganda have been described. As can be seen in figure 5, the enabling conditions weigh heavier since they belong to the actors at power, which promote the PPPs, and the other stakeholders do not form an opposition. These government actors expect the PPPs policy will be further developed and promoted in the coming years. Therefore, although there may be just as much, or more, hindering conditions, as my research describes, they are not in the hands of the promoters at power and therefore are of lower importance. Nevertheless, this does not ensure successful implementation. In the contrary, the extensive present flaws and hindering conditions point out that a rigorous policy program, implying more access to quality education, is far from guaranteed.

My research revealed that there therefore are hegemonic discursive powers at hand, both materially with the influential promoters from the GoU and the WB, and discursive with

the cloud of promoters, based on rhetoric and assertions that do not guarantee quality of education.

Prevailing Hegemony of the PPPs promotional Discourse

As described in the introduction, PPPs are much contested concepts. However, this conceptual contestation in Uganda does not find its way in to the policy environment. There are hegemonic relations between the actors at power, that are promoting the PPPs discourse, and there is a lack of a strong countering discourse. The government's promotional discourse seems to cause a form of consent among other stakeholders. This coincides with a political science perspective of hegemonic power, as described by Gramsci, where power depends upon achieving consent or at least acquiescence rather than just having the resources to use force (Gramsci 1971).

The PPPs promoting discourse has the upper hand in the hegemonic struggle, that can be seen, according to Butler et al (2000) as a struggle between political forces can be seen as partly a contention over the claims of their particular visions and representations of the world to having a universal status. (Butler et al. 2000 in: Fairclough 2003: 45). The PPPs in Uganda as the solution for 'universal' secondary education are an example of this, creating 'consent or acquiescence' among stakeholders in the policy environment, by using face-value argumentation, and leaving little room for a strong counter argument to exist. Nevertheless, this chapter showed there are flaws and hindering factors in this PPP promotion.


7. Conclusions

I will conclude by describing the results and significance of the study, followed by main suggestions for discussion and further research.

7.1 Results of study

In this study I investigated the impact of the PPPs program in the Ugandan field of education. The result of this qualitative study is that I found particular circumstances are created in the translation of the PPPs in the Ugandan education context as visualized in figure 6.

Figure 6 Findings of this study



The underlying conclusion of these findings is the strong discursive difference on the impact of PPPs. Consistent with the international debate where PPPs are described to have mixed impacts on learning, the impact of the PPPs in Uganda shows mixed results, as can be seen in

figure 6 with the more positive impact represented on the left axis and the negative perceived impact on the right.³⁰

7.2 Significance of study

This research engages with the broader discussion on PPPs in international studies of education development by analyzing a case where the PPPs program is adopted: Uganda's secondary education. It can be inferred from the results of the analyzed politics, education problems and conditions for translation that the case of Uganda fits in to the *global* debate on PPPs. It is found to be a form of *privatization*, due to the lack of a *true partnership* arrangement, as the critics of PPPs point out.

7.2.1 Privatization

The Ugandan state is moving away from its involvement at school level and there is a growing amount of private schools. This leads to a kind of privatization that involves the opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis and the utilization of the private sector to deliver aspects of public education. Ball and Youdell called this a form of 'exogenous' privatization of public education (2007: 9). The PPPs would not be a form of privatization, as described by the *global* promoters from the World Bank, if the contracting would enable governments to install effective quality assurance mechanisms and 'private sector's skills and resources' would be brought in to the education sector (Patrinos et al. 2009). The PPPs in Uganda, as described in this research, are far removed from this model. First of all the contract (the MOU) is not perceived to work as an accountability mechanism of the government. Secondly, the quality assurance mechanisms are noted to be ineffective and insufficiently implemented and thirdly the private sector skills and processes, such as mutual learning and risk sharing, are far from being implemented in an innovative way. Therefore even respondents of the promoting organisations of the PPPs in Uganda acknowledged (direct or indirectly) that the PPPs are a form of privatization. As a consequence the negative effects of privatization of education (as described in box 1: p 16) can to a degree be expected.

³⁰ See that the left and right side of the diagram of figure 5 at the point of 'impact policy environment' and 'impact education problems' represent different perceived impacts of the PPPs

7.2.2 No true partnership

As part of the first case Universal Secondary Education, the PPPs in Uganda are not perceived as a strong policy innovation of ‘partnerships’ between the public and private sector in secondary education. On the contrary, the PPPs seem to fall more in line with many other countries where non-state provision has been growing by default, due to a failure to provide a clear policy framework that defines the partnership (see Rose 2010). As described in this research a kind of public policy language game is being played (see description of this term by Hodge and Greve 2010) that obscures the meaning rather than clarifies and sharpens the understanding of the partnership phenomena. Example of this are the face value deterministic argument (propounding ‘the government is already doing the best it can’) that is effectively used politically to gain support in the political landscape, and the ‘intertextual assumptions’ that endeavor to prove that PPPs have been successful internationally, while this is actually contentiously based on assumptions.

What is meant with the actual partnership interaction has hardly been specified in my interviews with the stakeholders or in policy documents of the promoting organisation. Therefore the PPPs policy in Uganda is seemingly carrying the unsuitable “partnership” name, since the PPP policy is perceived to come down to transactions of capitation grants and no significant other ‘partnership’ interactions. Consequently the case of Uganda is less of an innovative example of a PPP that is exerted for achieving the EFA goals. As Mitchell-Weaver and Manning observed (1991: 48-49):

[PPPs] must indeed represent some form of partnership. The actors must be involved in some ongoing set of interactions which require real partnership on the part of all concerned. A partnership assumes that several parties have combined forces to define and/or accomplish an objective (...) a silent partnership in which one of the parties provides only the capital necessary to implement the venture is a partnership in name only. Most supposed PPPs in third world development do not seem to meet this criterion.

In this way the case of Uganda resembles other cases where PPPs are implemented in developing countries. For instance, in the case of India, Srivastava (2010) described similar conclusions in her analysis of the role of the state under PPPs. Srivastava analyzed that in India recent government plans, also under the pressure of EFA, adopt the rhetoric of partnership, but fail to specify what this means. In particular, what Srivastava found is that when it is not clear what the government’s role is under the agreement, a nuanced understanding of their potential effects on education delivery is complicated (2010: 550-551). Consequently because in Uganda the partnership is ill-defined, it seems logical that the

education problems in Uganda are to a large extent not addressed, and that the discourse on the impact of PPPs is so varied, as can be extracted from my study.

Nevertheless, the education problems are claimed to be addressed, as written in the main policy documents and expressed in interviews with the government actors (see for instance the represented benefits of the PPPs in table 1). What can be concluded however is that the processes on how to improve these are not specified in those sources. In other words, there exists a good rhetoric (of policy) but bad implementation.

In this way this research leads to a discussion on PPPs, concerning in what way they are legitimately backed by strong, installed policy mechanisms that effectively address certain crucial education problems. In addition, discussion should lead to defining the role of the involved stakeholders.

7.3 Recommendations for Discussion

For policymakers and academics I recommend the following points for discussion as a result of this study:

7.3.1 Deconstructing ‘partnership’

The first point that should lead to discussion is the deconstruction of the PPPs discourse, due to its negative consequences. As Burgos (2004: 56) argues: “The way in which partnership is construed has political and ethical consequences that may appear overlooked in the rhetorical construction of reforms”. Therefore, there should be an investigation into what is meant with the partnership and which partnership processes or interactions take place between the designed policy tools and the education problems these tools address. Before using the concept of ‘partnership’ strategies of policy interaction must be appointed, which can be implemented to address specific goals, instead of, as in the case of Uganda, claiming certain problems are addressed but not expanding sufficiently how this is exactly executed. Therefore the PPP concept must be ‘unpacked’ of its rhetorical implications and valued for its actual policy interactions. In this way, as Srivastava argues (2010: 551):

The challenge at the heart of the institutional context for education delivery lies in deconstructing the conception of ‘partnership’ as a justifying principle that is seemingly neutral, normatively correct, and a viable solution for severely resource constrained countries to achieve EFA goals quickly.

Deconstructing such partnerships means that education management arrangements and regulation should be reassessed. While this does not necessarily imply full state control of all aspects of education, it also does not mean an uncritical acceptance of any strategy using the discourse of partnership as “a universal – almost a neutral – value upon which all specific agents and governments in general, would agree” (Burgos 2004: 58).

7.3.2 Involvement stakeholders

Therefore I recommend more involvement of other education stakeholders than the government and WB. This could lead to a better representation of the public interest, first of all by creating more *transparency* and secondly by inducing more *discursive priority on quality of education*.

Transparency

First of all more involvement of other stakeholders should be pursued because of the need of increased *transparency* of the PPPs policy. Governmental activities can be highly influenced or, in some cases, even taken over by private sector decision makers, such as is the case in Uganda, where the private school head teachers run the schools with little government interference and private school associations deliberate with government planners over the set policy. This is what Mitchell-Weaver and Manning (1991) describe as government engagement by someone other than the legitimately empowered holders of governmental power. This is what makes PPPs a very touchy business in political terms and it therefore needs a third party to be involved in the policy, for some semblance of the public interest to be identified and served. Therefore, as Mitchell-Weaver and Manning expand, this requires at least the active participation of government in some role throughout the process i.e. more involvement at school level for instance and it also probably requires other major societal actors to be involved, such as national constituencies as teacher unions (1991: 50).

Discursive priority on quality

Secondly the public interest could be better served with a stronger advocacy for quality of learning to be provided by the PPPs. Like in other developing countries the PPPs promoting discourse in Uganda is introducing the PPP approach, simply because the mode in favour of PPPs has become pervasive among donor agencies and World Bank field staff (EI 2009).

However, such a ‘mode’ among international organisations could be argued to lack legitimacy, especially among international education stakeholders.

As shown in this thesis, international organizations belonging to the EDP group are either part of the discursive ‘common ground’ of the PPP promoters (following face-value arguments) or they are aware of the quality issues on which they ‘do not act’. Instead they support the government’s effort that emphasizes access above quality, so taking for granted many of the quality and equity issues that the PPPs program is reaffirming. This position of the international organizations in Uganda is paradoxical in relation to the ‘international rights’, that such organizations convey internationally, e.g. the several declarations stressing equity and quality (see textbox 1). From an international perspective these organizations should underline quality as equally important. It could even be questioned whether quality should not come before access, taking into account the Universal Declarations and covenants (e.g. Jomtien and Dakar). As asserted by UNESCO (2005, 28-29), education is a set of processes and outcomes that are defined qualitatively: the quantity of children who participate is by definition a secondary consideration, merely filling spaces called schools‘ with children would not be sufficient to achieve quality education objectives. Which leads to the question: In what way is the EDPs role legitimate and should they not re-evaluate their positions on the matter of PPPs?

Therefore besides deconstructing the ‘partnership’ discourse I recommend further revision of the international actors’ positions that support PPP plans, which are perceived to be in contra to their internationally set goals i.e. their priority for quality of education.

What my thesis has demonstrated is that there are strong countering arguments against PPPs available which promote quality, coming from a CSO ‘rights based approach discourse’. The pitfall however is whether critical arguments can truly be expressed by the EDPs in the Ugandan education sector without risking its position within the sector. Then the question is: What is more legitimate; ensuring your position in the education sector and undermining international conventions or advocating these principles but risking reprimands?

Either way the first step this research recommends is to challenge existing PPPs on their discourse, whether for inconsistencies or alternatives. If we do not undertake such practices, as people interested in development, we could be stuck in an existing discourse that represents ‘one side of the story’. As an example of this we could think of one famous

discourse. Such as Margaret Thatcher's slogan went: 'TINA, There Is No Alternative' to economic liberalism for societies to develop (Berlinski 2008).

7.4 My approach and further research

I was able to analyze certain discourse on PPPs dominating the Ugandan field of education. My research showed a case where the mode in favor of the PPPs is more powerful than its opponents, while actually the arguments of the opponents of PPPs showed more semblances of what is happening in the reality of the PPP school, outside the PPPs promotion. I recommend my approach of research in other countries that are thinking of or have adopted PPPs, because the Critical Discourse Analysis is useful for deconstructing the promotion of PPPs by asking useful questions. Is there in other countries a discourse at power and a certain voice excluded? Is there a strong partnership or merely a form of privatization?

For further research in Uganda I advise bottom up efforts that inquire more school level realities of the PPPs arrangement.

While the focus on discourse in my research explains what is represented of reality, I did not explore directly how 'things actually work in reality'. For instance one of the arguments in this research is that the PPPs program is perceived not to be able to guarantee or even worsens the access to quality education. The indicator of the quality of education in the PPPs, is the stakeholders' perceptions. Meaning what the stakeholders have seen, heard and discussed. This indicator is valid to investigate relations between stakeholders and the role of ideas and policy formulation; as has been done in this research, nevertheless it should be doubted for its external validity because the findings cannot be generalized beyond the specific research context (of stakeholder discourse). To put it more simply my research has been about the discourse of the stakeholders on what happens in the PPPs but I have not visited the PPP schools to actually investigate the provided education and for instance compare this to non-PPP schools.

Therefore, self evidently, the best complementation that further research could contribute to my efforts would be a (quantitative) approach measuring the impact of the PPPs in the places where the program is implemented, at the level of the school. For instance, the way the policy interaction between the public and private sector works in practice could be researched. What are the measurable benefits of private provision of education at school level? In this way, since my research only touched the perceptions of these PPP schools

realities this kind of further research would complement my efforts by testing the rigor of my approach.

Besides my advice for further (quantitative) research at the school level other related qualitative approaches could contribute greatly to my approach. For example, these could analyze the real nature of the interaction between the public and private sector. This could include sectors that my research did not cover, such as the private sector with their associations and head teachers and religion-based schools. But most of all I would recommend further research with the ‘real stakeholder’: the Ugandan children, parents and teachers.

Word count: 27.863

8 Literature

- Action Aid Uganda. 2011. *Website Education*. <http://www.actionaid.org/uganda/what-we-do/education> [Last viewed May 26th 2011].
- African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 2011. *Project Portfolio 2011*. <http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/#c10693> [Last viewed May 25, 2011].
- Bano, Masooda. 2008 Non-profit education providers vis-a`-vis the private sector: comparative analysis of NGOs and Traditional Voluntary Organisations in Pakistan, *Compare* 38 (4): 471–82.
- Berlinski, Claire. 2008 “*There is no alternative*” *Why Margaret Thatcher Matters*. London: Basic Books
- Börzel, Tanja, Thomas Risse. 2002 *Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance?* The Edgar Grande/Louis W. Pauly (eds. *Complex Sovereignty: On the Reconstitution of Political Authority in the 21st Century*
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. 1992 *An invitation to reflexive sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Boxenbaum, E., and J. Battilana. 2005. *Importation as Innovation: Transposing Managerial Practices across Fields*. *Strategic Organization* 3, no. 4: 355-383.
- Brühl, Tanja, Tobias Debiel, Brigitte Hamm, Hartwig Hummel, and Jens Martens, eds. 2001. *Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess*. Bonn: Dietz Verlag
- Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Butler, J., Laclau, E. and Zizek, S. 2000 *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*, London: Verso.
- Campbell, John L. 1998. *Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy* *Theory and Society*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jun., 1998), pp. 377-409

- Campbell, John L. 2002. Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy. *Annual Review Sociology*. 2002. Volume 28:21–38. <http://soc.annualreviews.org/>
- Campbell, John L. 2004. *Institutional Change and globalization*. Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Centre for European Studies. 2006. Public- Private Partnerships. National experiences in the European Union. Study requested by the European Parliament on Internal Market and Consumer Protection.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/imco/studies/0602_ppp02_briefingnote_en.pdf
[Last viewed May 25th 2011]
- Cohen, L., Manion, L & Morrison, K. 2007. *Research Methods in education*. London and New York: Routledge
- Cornwall, Andrea and Deborah Eade, 2010. *Deconstructing Development Discourse Buzzwords and Fuzzwords*. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/bk-deconstructing-development-buzzwords-010910-en.pdf> [last visited August 10, 2011]
- Chapman David, W. , Lisa Burton, Jessica Werner 2009 *Universal Secondary Education in Uganda: The head teachers' dilemma*. *International Journal of Educational Development* 30: 77–82
- Crawley, Mike. 2000 *Economic policy keeps Museveni in West's favor*. *Christian Science Monitor*. Vol. 92, Issue 176
- Dakar Framework for Action 2000. Adopted by the World Education Forum. Dakar, Senegal.
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf> [Last visited September 2011]
- Draxler, Alexandra. 2008 *New Partnerships for EFA: Building on Experience*.
<http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GEI/Partnerships.pdf> [last visit: July 2010]
- Education International. 2009. *Public Private Partnerships in Education*. <http://download.ei-ie.org/docs/IRISDocuments/Research%20Website%20Documents/2009-00086-01-E.pdf>
[Last visit: May 18, 2011]

- European Union (EU) 2011.. *Education Projects 2011*. Delegation of European Union to Uganda 2011
http://www.deluga.ec.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=300 [Last viewed May 24th 2011].
- Fairclough, N. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Fairclough, N. 2003. *Analyzing Discourse*. London: Routledge
- Fairclough, N. and Thomas, P. 2004. *The discourse of Globalization and the globalization of discourse*, in D. Grant, C. Hardy, C. Osrick, and L. Putnam 9eds. *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse*. London: Sage
- Fairclough, N. 2005, *Peripheral Vision: Discourse analysis in organizations studies: The Case for Critical Realism*. *Organization Studies*, 26: 915-39
- Foucault, M. 1984 *The order of discourse*, in M. Shapiro (ed) *The Language of Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Fennell, Shailaja. 2007. Tilting at Windmills: Public-Private Partnerships in Indian Education Today. http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/recoup/WP5-SF_PPPs.pdf [Last viewed January 19th, 2011]
- FENU. 2010. Forum for Education NGOs in Uganda Strategic Plan 2010-2014.
- Fennell, Shailaja. 2010. *Public-Private Partnerships and Educational Outcomes: New Conceptual and Methodological Approaches*. Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty. Working Paper No.37 Development Studies, University of Cambridge
- Genevois, I., 2008. Can and should public private partnerships play a role in education? IIEP working document, UNESCO.
- Goldstein, Judith. *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, 3-30
- Gramsci, A. 1971 *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

- Hall, Peter. 1991. *Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State*. In: Richard R. Lau, Richard A. Smith, and Susan T. Fiske. *Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and Political Persuasion*. Journal of Politics 53/3 (1991): 644-675.
- Hall, David. 2004. *PPPs: a critique of the Green Paper*. Paper written from PSIRU on behalf of European Federation of Public Services Unions (EPSU).
www.psir.org/reports/2004-07-U-ECPPP.doc [Last viewed July, 04 2011]
- Hedger, E., T. Williamson, T. Muzoora and J. Stroh. 2010. *Sector Budget Support in Practice: Case Study Education Sector Uganda*. London: Overseas Development Institute and Mokoro.
- Hodge, Graeme. Carsten Greve. 2010 *Public-Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or Language Game?* The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 69, no. S1, pp. S8–S22
- IFC. 2001. *Handbook on PPPs and Education*.
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/edinvest.nsf/Content/PublicPrivatePartnerships> [Last visited August 12, 2011]
- IFC. 2010. *Brochure: IFC Africa Schools Uganda Program*
- IFC. 2011. *SME programs*.
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/africa.nsf/Content/SMED_Programs?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=13 [last visit: July 19, 2011]
- Government of Uganda. 2010. *National Development Plan 2010/2011 – 2014/2015*. Kampala, Uganda
- Jacob, James. Donald Holsinger. Christopher B. Mugimu. 2008. *Private Secondary Education in Uganda: Implications for Planning*. Teachers College Record. Columbia University. Volume 110, Number 4, April 2008, pp. 867–893
- Kingdon, G. 2007. *The Progress of School Education in India*. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23(2): 168–195.
- Kjaer P, Pedersen O. 2001. Translating liberalization: neoliberalism in the Danish negotiated economy. In *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis*, ed. JL Campbell, O.

- KPedersen, pp. 219–48. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 110, Number 4. pp. 867–893
- LaRocque, Norman. 2006. *Contracting for the Delivery of Education Services. A Typology and International Examples*, Wellington: Education Forum.
- LaRocque, Norman. 2007. Options for Increasing the Scope of Public-Private Partnerships at the Universal Post-Primary Education and Training Level in Uganda. Prepared for: Ministry of Education and Sports, Government of Uganda
- LaRocque Norman. 2008. Public Private Partnership in Basic Education - An International Review. CfBt. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/53193159/Norman-Larocque-2008-public-Private-Partnership-in-Basic-Education-An-International-Review> [last checked: 2011-08-03]
- LeCompte, M.D., and Goetz, J.P 1992. *Problems of reliability and validity in ethnographic research*. Review of Educational Research, 52: 31-60
- Linder, S. H. 1999. *Coming to terms with the public-private partnership: A grammar of multiple meanings*. American Behavioral Scientist 43, no. 1: 35.
- Lubienski, C. 2008. *School choice research in the United States and why it doesn't matter: the evolving economy of knowledge production in a contested policy domain*. Forsey, M., Davies, S. and Walford, G. (eds), *The Globalisation of School Choice?* Oxford, UK, Symposium Books, pp. 27–54.
- Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) & European Development Partners (EDPs) 2010. *Fast Track Initiative Appraisal Report: Updated Education Sector Strategic Plan 2010-2015*. Kampala, Uganda
- Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES). 2007. *Revised Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2015*. Kampala, Uganda
- Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES). 2009. *USE/UPPET Head Count Report, October 2009*. Kampala, Uganda
- Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) 2010. *USE/UPPET FAQs 2010*. Kampala, Uganda
- Miller, Steven & Gerson, Jack. 2008. *The Corporate Surge Against Public Schools* <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2304695/The-Corporate-Surge-Against-Public-Schools> [last checked: 2011-08-05]

- Miraftab, F. 2004. *Public-Private Partnerships: The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Development?* Journal of Planning Education and Research 24, no. 1: 89
- Mitchell-Weaver, C., and B. Manning. 1991. *Public-private partnerships in third world development: A conceptual overview*. Studies in Comparative International Development 26, no. 4: 45-67.
- Mundy, Karen and Chris Stalker 2010. *Hewlett Foundation Advocacy Appraisal for Quality Education Uganda*. UNPUBLISHED
- Nordtveit, Bjorn Harald. 2005. *The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Public-Private Partnerships in Senegal*.
<https://drum.umd.edu/dspace/bitstream/1903/2193/1/umi-umd-2190.pdf> [Last visit: February, 19. 2011]
- New Vision 2011, June 22nd. *USE enrolment up by 77%*.
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/758291?highlight&q=Universal Secondary Education> [last visit: June 30th 2011]
- OECD. 2005. *The role of market-type mechanisms in the provision of public services*. OECD Symposium, Paris, 3-4 March 2005.
- OECD. 2008. *Public-Private Partnerships: in Pursuit of risk sharing and value for money*. Paper for the PPP seminar in Zurich.
- Patrinos, H. A. and Sosale, S. 2007. *Public-private partnerships in education*. In: Patrinos, H. A. and Sosale, S. (eds), *Mobilizing the Private Sector for Public Education: A View from the Trenches*. Washington, DC, World Bank.
- Patrinos, Harry Anthony, Felipe Barrera-Osorio, and Juliana Guáqueta. 2009 *The role and impact of Public Private Partnerships in education*. Washington DC: World Bank
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079934475/547667-1135281523948/2065243-1239111225278/Role_Impact_PPP_Education.pdf [Last viewed, September 12, 2010]
- Patton, M. Q. 1990. *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (2nd ed). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

- Phillips and Hardy, C. 2002, *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction*. London: Sage.
- Robinson, M., & Friedman, S. 2007. *Civil society, democratization, and foreign aid: Civil engagement and public policy in South Africa and Uganda*. *Democratization*, 14(4), 643-668.
- Rochefort D, Cobb R. 1994. *Problem definition: an emerging perspective*. In: *The Politics of Problem Definition*, ed. .Rochefort, D. and R Cobb, pp. 1–31. Lawrence: Univ. Kans. Press
- Rose, R. 1993. *Lesson-drawing in public policy: A guide to learning across time and space*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Rose, P. 2010. *Achieving Education for All through public–private partnerships?* *Development in Practice* 20(4): 473-483.
- Robson, C. 2002. *Real World Research*. Oxford: Blackwell publishing.
- Sennett, R. 1998. *The Corrosion of Character: The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism*. New York, W.W. Norton.
- Sheil, Christopher. 2002. *The trouble with PPPs : an un-holy alliance*.
<http://evatt.labor.net.au/publications/papers/51.html> [last visit: September 12, 2011]
- Skrentny JD. 1996. *The Ironies of Affirmative: Politics, culture and justice in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
- Srivastava, P. 2010. *Public-Private Partnership or Privatization? Questioning the State's Role in Education in India*. *Development in Practice* 20, no 4-5: 540-553.
- Teisman, Geert R. Erik Hans Klijn. 2002. *Partnership arrangements: Governmental rhetoric or government scheme*. *Public administration review*. March/April 2002 Vol. 62, No.2
- Tooley, James & Dixon, Pauline. 2005. *Private Schools Serving the Poor: a study from Delhi, India*. New Delhi: Centre for Civil Society
- Ugandan National Education Board (UNEB) 2010. *General Performance Uganda Certificate of Education UCE*. Kampala, Uganda
- Uganda National Commission for UNESCO (UNATCOM). 2009 October 1st. *Report on the Stakeholders Workshop on Education for All*. Kampala, Uganda

- UNATU Newsletter. The voice of the teachers. January 2010 issue. *Government cautioned on Education public private partnership investment*. Kampala, Uganda
- UNATU (n/d) Five Year Strategic Plan 2008-2012. Kampala, Uganda
- UNESCO-IIEP, Caillods Francoise 2001 *Financing secondary Education in developing countries, Strategies for sustainable growth*. UNESCO Publishing, International Institute for Educational Planning.
- UNESCO. 2005. *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005*.
http://www.unesco.org/education/gmr_download/chapter1.pdf [Last visit: January 21, 2011]
- Ugandan National NGO Forum (UNNGOF). 2008. *Organizational Strategy 2008/9-2011/12*. Kampala, Uganda.
- Verger, Antoni and Sanne VanderKaaij, 2010. *The National Politics of Global Policies: Public-Private Partnerships in Indian Education*. University of Amsterdam
- Wodak, R. (2000) From conflict to consensus? The co-construction of a policy paer, in: P. Muntigle, G Weiss and R. Wodak (eds) *European Union Discourse on Un/Employment*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- World Bank. 2009. Patrinos, Harry Anthony, Felipe Barrera-Osorio, and Juliana Guáqueta. *The role and impact of Public Private Partnerships in education*.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079934475/547667-1135281523948/2065243-1239111225278/Role_Impact_PPP_Education.pdf [Last visit: October 21st, 2010]
- World Bank 2009. Project Appraisal Document for Uganda Post Primary Education Training (PAD-UPPET). Adaptable Program Lending (APL1) Project.
- Walsh, J. I. 2000. *When Do Ideas Matter? Explaining the Successes and Failures of Thatchrite Ideas*. Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 4: 483-516
- Wettenhall, R. 2003. *The rhetoric and reality of public-private partnerships*. Public Organization Review 3, no. 1: 77–107

9. Appendices

Appendix A

Interview guide

This interview is built up in three parts: First I want to talk about the Public-Private partnerships policies that exist. After that I want to talk about the national policy conditions for PPPs.

Could you introduce me shortly about the work of your organization and what consists of you main responsibilities?

- *PPPs in Uganda*

How important is privatization in secondary education in Uganda?

What would you describe as Public-Private Partnerships in secondary education?

What kind of PPPs is being debated?

- From delivery of service to
- Private operation of public schools and most widely implemented;
- Vouchers

Do you think these PPPs can drive to some kind of deep policy reform in the country?

In which spaces and forums has it been discussed? (seminars, donor coordination meetings, etc.)

What is the position of your organization in the context of this debate?

How do you think PPPS can improve/affect education in Uganda?

What kind of education problems do they address in your opinion?

- Do they (have the potential) to lead to more access, quality, effectiveness and/ or mutual learning?

Where does the evidence in which you base your analysis on PPPs come from?

Do you think PPPs imply risk sharing among the public and the private sectors? In what way will risk be shared?

Do you think PPPs may conduct to mutual learning between the public and the private sector? What can the public sector learn from the private one under PPP frameworks? And viceversa?

What should be the role of the state under PPPs?

- Extent of direct provision:

- Funding
- Planning
- Regulation
- Evaluation

- *National education policy conditions*

(I want to talk about certain points/conditions in national policy context and ask your opinion as a stakeholder with experience in this environment)

- What do you think are the main barriers to implement PPPs in the country?
 - Hindering and enabling factors?
- Clarity and consistency
 - Do you think the PPPs idea is convincing (local) policymakers in Uganda?
- Familiarity
 - Are the PPP ideas similar to/familiar with previous policies in Uganda?
- Resonation
 - Who are the main promoters of PPP policies in Uganda? Is there a common understanding on the PPP model to promote and how?
 - Are there education stakeholders resisting the idea of PPPs?

- *Contacts*

(Varying every interview I asked for further contacts as part of the ‘snowball-method’ for data gathering)

Appendix B

Activities respondents Education Development Partners (except WB)

In Primary Education:

Irish Aid, SNV, ILO, UNICEF and the Embassy of the Netherlands have been mostly active in primary education, all in many different projects. The Embassy of the Netherlands is one of the main founders of the recent Quality Education Initiative, a program that is focused on improving quality of learning in 12 districts in primary schools. UNICEF's main education activity is in Early Childhood Education while the ILO is working on a area separate to the rest of the EDPs on the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). SNV focuses primarily on the provision of technical assistance at the district level, mainly in the form of school improvement programs, but increasingly to support community monitoring of service delivery. The E.U, Ireland and the Embassy of the Netherlands (partially) support the basic education sector via their general budget support. Either due to their concerns with the leakage of resources that occurs between the central government, districts and schools, or because they believe that donor funding to the basic education sub-sector is likely to displace government effort, an increasing volume of aid is being channelled as project-based funding (Hedger et al. 2010). However for the coming years some EDPs, such as the Netherlands, showed signs of shifting their attention to the BTVET sector; because of the pressure to getting out of Budget support and in to more BTVET.

In Business Technical and Vocational Education (BTVET):

The Belgian Embassy, the EU, and the GTZ are mostly working in the BTVET sector. In this post-primary sector (note: not the same as secondary) Irish Aid has also been supporting this program to a lesser extent. The EU is supporting vocational training through NGOs in Northern Uganda and Karamoja (EU 2011). JICA is working on infrastructure development and provision of equipment combined with staff training. They are to a large extent present in the secondary education sector with their SESEMAT program, which trains Secondary Science and Mathematics Teachers. The AfDB has two running projects; the 'Support to Post Primary Education Project' and the 'Post Primary Education and Training Expansion and Improvement Project'. The former started in 2006 and is a project that supports TVET and science education and creates and supports seed schools; which are secondary schools for

rural sub-counties that have never had public secondary schools. The latter is a project that started in 2009 and aims to help the Government of Uganda build the human capital necessary for the country to reach its economic and social development goals as part of the Government's UPPEP Program (AfDB 2011).

Appendix C

Main activities Civil Society Organisations

The Uganda National Teachers Association (UNATU)

The Uganda National Teachers Association (UNATU) is the largest constituency-based CSO in the education sector, and among the strongest of the Ugandan unions that belong to the National Organization of Trade Unions (Mundy and Stalker 2010: 22). They take on a rights based approach, concentrating on trade unions rights¹. Over the past decade it has received project funding from several Northern unions and from bilateral donors. It is growing at a national level and tries to communicate a ‘civil society voice’ which advocates public education. UNATU is led by its General Secretary, Teopista Birungi Mayonja. She is also a Board Member of Education International, a former chair (2007-2009) of FENU, and represents UNATU on the Ministry of Education and Sports Sector Reviews.

The Forum of Education NGOs Uganda

Registered in 2001, FENU is a coalition of NGOs and other CSOs active on education issues. FENU positions itself as promoting ‘education rights for all people in Uganda’ (Strategic Plan 2010-2015). It is officially recognized by government as the voice of civil society in the education sector, and represents civil society in the Education Sector Reviews and the bi-monthly Education Sector Consultative Group (ESCG). One of their main strategic objectives is to influence government and donor priority areas and actions towards improving access and quality of education for all in Uganda. As written in their Strategic Plan their main undertakings are to ‘strengthen policy analysis’, ‘lobby parliament and government departments’, ‘work with media’ and ‘sustain campaigns’. Via this strategy they claim to work for the outcome of “an empowered society that appreciates their rights to education and are able to hold leaders accountable” (2010: 12-13).

Action Aid

Action Aid is an INGO that has largely moved away from direct service delivery, and now operates primarily by supporting domestic NGOs and CSOs. They strongly emphasize a rights-based approach. As they state on their website: “Our main objective is to influence the attainment of the universal right to free quality and relevant education for all through

networks, alliances and our critical engagements” (Action Aid 2011). Currently, regarding education in Uganda, Action Aid mainly focuses on projects concerning issues relating to girl-child education. Their highly experienced representative has also been director of education at the Commonwealth Education Fund in Uganda.

Appendix D

List of Interviewees.

Recorded interviews held between January-March 2011

Organisation	Type of organisation	Respondent's position	Reference
Ministry of Education and Sports	Government Actor	Commissioner of Planning and Budgeting	Interview I
Ministry of Education and Sports	Government Actor	Commissioner of Private Schools	Interview II
Ministry of Education and Sports	Government Actor	Commissioner of Secondary Schools	Interview III
Ministry of Education and Sports	Government Actor	Commissioner of BTVET	Interview IV
World Bank	Education Development Partner	Education Specialist	Interview V
African Development Bank	Education Development Partner	Education Specialist and architect	Interview VI
Embassy of the Netherlands	Education Development Partner	Senior Policy Officer Education	Interview VII
European Union	Education Development Partner	Education Advisor	Interview VIII
Embassy of Belgium	Education Development Partner	1 st Secretary for Development Cooperation	Interview IX
Irish Aid	Education Development Partner	Education and Local development advisor	Interview X

Japan International Cooperation Agency	Education Development Partner	Project Formulation Advisor (education)	Interview XI
GTZ	Education Development Partner	Chief Technical Advisor PEVOT	Interview XII
International Labour Organisation	Education Development Partner	Chief Technical Advisor	Interview XIII
SNV	Education Development Partner	Education Advisor/National Sector Leader	Interview XIV
UNICEF	Education Development Partner	Chief Education and Keep Children Learning Cluster	Interview XV
UNESCO	International Organisation	Assistant Secretary General	Interview XVI
UNATU	Civil Society Organisation	Secretary General	Interview XVII
Action Aid	Civil Society Organisation	Manager Education	Interview XVIII
FENU	Civil Society Organisation	National Coordinator	Interview XIX
MARA foundation	Private Sector	Program Manager 'Next Generation program'	Interview XX
Private Education Development Network (PEDN)	Private Sector	Executive Director	Interview XXI
	USE school	Mathematics Teacher	Interview XXII

Appendix E

Education Development Partners 2010

(Interviewed stakeholder organisations are highlighted in yellow)

- African Development Bank (AfDB)
- Belgium Development Agency (BTC)
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ/PEVOT)
- Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium
- Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN)
- European Union (EU)
- International Labour Organization (ILO)
- Irish Aid/Embassy of Ireland
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
- Netherlands Development Agency (SNV)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)³¹
- World Bank (WB)
- Embassy of Sweden

³¹ USAID was the only organisation that I wanted to interview but was not able to make time, as they explained me this was due to internal reorganizations at the time of my fieldwork.

Appendix F

Objective PPPs in MoE&S revised Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2015: 17

Objective 3: An effective and efficient education sector

Sub-objective 3.1.4: Formalize, build and enhance public-private partnerships in service delivery and capacity building

Strategies

(a) Formalize, build and enhance public-private partnerships in service delivery

The Ministry's main roles vis-à-vis private schools and institutions are, first, to encourage their development and sustainability and, second, to protect the consumer of education services by setting standards and monitoring all schools - public and private - for compliance. The Ministry will collaborate with private schools by:

- (i) sending bursaries to private schools particularly in USE;
- (ii) providing initial stock of instructional materials to schools participating in USE;
- (iii) providing initial stock of science kits/equipments;
- (iv) providing for community oversight of secondary schools through Boards of Governors;
- (v) soliciting community contributions to the school construction and maintenance;
- (vi) supporting and encouraging NGO programs for disadvantaged groups and in conflict areas;
- (vii) restructuring secondary department to provide for oversight responsibility of private schools;
- (viii) grading and licensing private schools;
- (ix) ensuring access to affordable long-term financing;
- (x) providing tax incentive to deserving private schools;

- (xi) strengthening EMIS to capture enrolments of all schools (private and government); and,
- (xii) strengthen monitoring and support supervision in private schools.

Appendix G

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SPORTS

AND

FOUNDATION BODIES/PROPRIETORS

OF

PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS.

The memorandum of understanding is made thisday of2007.

Between

The Government of Uganda represented by Ministry of Education and Sports P. O. Box 7063 Kampala

And

Proprietors ofherein represented by Chairperson of the Board of Governors and hereafter referred to as the proprietor. Both to be known as parties to this understanding.

Whereas,

- (a) The parties are desirous of entering into an understanding in respect of Universal Secondary Education (USE).
- (b) The parties are also desirous of identifying the responsibilities, roles and functions of the Government and the Proprietors in the partnership and promotion of education in Uganda.
- (c) The Parties therefore, agree to work together as per this Memorandum of Understanding.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT

- (i) Ascertaining the number of students to benefit from the government bursary
- (ii) Remitting the bursary funds directly to institution's Bank accounts.
- (iii) Taking responsibility for quality assurance, policy guidance, monitoring and evaluation
- (IV) Ensure that all PPP schools have functional Boards of Governors
- (v) Providing national admission guidelines for all students to be enrolled in partnering school.
- (vi) Monitoring the general development and progress of the schools.
- (vii) Undertake a headcount to ascertain the enrolment.
- (viii) Providing guidelines for the utilization of the bursary

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROPRIETOR OF THE PRIVATE SCHOOL

- (i) Providing for the welfare and discipline of the students.
- (ii) Ensuring proper accountability of all disbursed funds, and submitted to Ministry of Education and Sports.
- (iii) Ensuring that students admitted are eligible.
- (iv) Ensuring that the monies received are used specifically for teaching and learning.
- (v) Ensuring that the school has a qualified head teacher at graduate level.

- (vi) Ensuring that qualified staff is in place to deliver the secondary curriculum and remunerated accordingly, retained for as long as they perform their duties diligently and until their contractual obligation may determine.
- (vii) A functional Board of Governors is in place as provided for by the Education Act 1970 and BoG guidelines.
- (viii) Ensuring that proper books of accounts are kept including students registers.
- (ix) Ensuring that the institution meets the basic requirements and minimum standards
- (x) Ensuring that the class size is as recommended in the USE implementation guidelines of 60 students per stream.
- (xi) Ensuring that regular statistical returns required by the Ministry of Education and Sports are filled as and when they are required and
- (xii) Declaring the number of students to benefit from the Bursary.

1 INTERPRETATION In this Memorandum of Understanding,
Unless the context otherwise requires, the
Following words and phrases have the
Meanings indicated against them.

- (i) Foundation Body Means an individual or group
Organization(s), which found and manage
An education institution.
- (ii) Bursary Amount of money that Government pays
A private secondary school where students
Under USE programme have enrolled
- (v) USE Refers to Universal Secondary Education

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

- (i) Once this Memorandum of Understanding is executed, it is not acceptable
for the Proprietor to expel, discontinue any student from such a school
without due consultation with the ministry responsible for Education and
Sports.
- (ii) Once a school has been earmarked to participate in the programme,
regardless of the character of the Foundation Body, it is expected to be
national, non-sectarian and egalitarian in its operation and activities.
- (iii) A bursary shall only be payable for students who have enrolled in the
school and appear on the register of the school.
- (iv) Students who have been enrolled in a private Secondary School under this
arrangement shall not be obliged to become boarders since the bursary
cannot cater for the full boarding fees.
- (v) An institution which overstates the number of beneficiaries of the bursary
shall immediately cease to benefit from the Bursary and all monies
received fraudulently refunded to government.
- (vi)** A school shall not change status or location without notifying the MoES
first.
- (vii) The MoES shall be consulted before a school changes ownership, merges
with another or acquisition takes place.

3. Settlement of disputes

Without prejudice to any other remedy for breach of a Memorandum of Understanding, either party by giving ninety (90) days written notice of default to other party may terminate this memorandum of understanding if either party fails to

- (i) perform its obligation as required and
- (ii) Have disputes settled amicably as provided in the terms of the memorandum of understanding

4. This memorandum is being promoted under the Construction of the Republic of Uganda, which aims at promoting education.

Ministry of Education and Sports**Foundation Body**

Names.....

Names.....

Signature.....

Signature.....

Permanent Secretary

.....

Witness

.....

Witness

Appendix H

Intertextual assumptions of PPPs promotion in main documents

When looking deeper in the promotional discourse of PPPs by both the World Bank and the Government of Uganda their argumentations are largely based on intertextual assumptions, as Faircough describes (2003), that the ‘outside’ of a text is brought into the text, but that lack contextual evidence. In the case of Uganda; PPPs are promoted based to a large extent on international experience for more quality, equity and efficiency. However this contradicts with the impact of the PPPs in Uganda observed in the previous chapter of for instance the quality issues.

First of all, such assumptions are evident in several policy reports and strategic plans of the GoU. As described above, the MoES’s ESSP bases its strategies on the goals stated in the NDP. The goal of the NDP for more public efficiency is used to promote the PPPs in the ESSP. This goal is based on “international experience” that proved that “PPP’s can be a powerful incentive for improving the quality and efficiency of public services” (NDP 2010: 63). However, in the NDP document, there is no further explanation of where this international experience comes from. Therefore, there argumentation to validate PPPs is based on an ‘ill-defined’ backed assumption that overwrites the whole international debate of PPPs. What is striking is that this is the government’s foundational position which all the government actors in Uganda (have to) refer to and base their policy on.

Secondly, The WBs PPPs promotional discourse in the case of Uganda as well uses the intertextual assumptions. The WB international report on THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN EDUCATION by Patrinos et al. the case of Uganda is mentioned once and is based on LaRocque’s source (LaRocque 2008 in Patrinos et al: 2009: 20-21) (see chapter 5.1.4). Here the PPPs as part of the USE are part of one of the examples of “education service contracts include quality output specifications” as a means of introducing “accountability and risk-sharing between governments and private providers in the provision of education”(2009: 21). This statement comes from the WB in one of its main documents on PPPs describes the PPP arrangement in Uganda as an example for other countries of how a PPP can be designed, thereby implying its applicability in Uganda. As described in the previous chapter, such promotion however is highly doubted for its legitimacy in the Uganda context because it is keeping silent the quality and implementation issues. This example of the World Bank contradicts to the GoU. Because, on the one hand the

Government of Uganda bases its evidence on PPPs' international experience, as written in the NDP, while on the other hand promoted PPPs globally, in the WB report example, use the Ugandan case as a contextual example. In this way a kind of a vacuum exists where argumentative backing of the PPPs disappears. Where does the evidence then come from that PPPs work?

Appendix I

High school fees national topic of discussion

My fieldwork research was during the time when Primary Leaving Exam figures were released in the beginning of 2011. Therefore in this time, the discussion on the high secondary school fees was a ‘hot topic’ in the national newspapers. The significance of this discussion is that quality comes with money. The good quality schools ask fees between 500.000 and 750.000 (approximately 250-400 dollars) per term compared to the 47.000 (24 dollar) for PPP schools. However these low fees schools are known to be of extreme low quality, such as the PPP schools. Therefore parents take extreme efforts to get enough money for their children to go to good school (see figure 7 for instance: a part taken from the newspaper New Vision).

Figure 7 Parents suffer from high school fees (source January 29, 2011)



