Globalizing Educational Interventions in Zones of Conflict: The Role of Dutch Aid to Education and Conflict

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[A] Introduction

This paper seeks to understand the rising tide of interest and action in the area of education and conflict by the international donor and development community since 2000 and to hone in on one key bi-lateral donor, the Netherlands. In line with the book’s overall objective we are seeking to understand how a global education and conflict agenda emerged within the field of international education and development and the role of Dutch aid to education within this process. While much contemporary research has been done relating to the transfer of ideas and policies and the role of the World Bank, the IMF and other powerful states, from various perspectives (Cammack 2004; Cammack 2007), less is written about the role of smaller bi-lateral donors in these processes – either as catalysts for the spread of the global education agenda or as mediators. On this issue we draw insights from the potential differences between US and European interests, and consequently their approaches on the international stage, and theoretical debates on whether tensions can best be understood through triadic understandings of global politics (Asia, Europe, USA); bi-polar (North versus
South) or class fractions and the rise of a transnational capitalist class (Robinson 1996; Amin 2004; Hardt et al. 2006; Negri 2008).

The chapter will proceed as follows: firstly, we will explore the broader development literature to chart the rise of the conflict and development agenda and the role of education therein. Secondly, we will explore the particular role of Dutch involvement in these processes and its critiques. This section draws on 15 interviews conducted in April and June 2010 with both Dutch ministry officials and civil society actors working on the theme of education and conflict, as well as a range of policy documents. We analyse the role of several related departments within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that are involved in the area, the most important or active one being the social department DSO/OO (who are responsible for the themes of education and research, health and civil society), followed by the Fragility and Peace Building Unit (EFV) and the humanitarian aid department (DMH/HH). In addition, we also include some initial insights into the role of and relationship with the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Finally we will reflect on the contradictory role of the Dutch in the global governance of education and conflict, linking the chapter back to broader debates contained in this book.

[A] Understanding the Rise of Interest in Conflict and Development

In this section we seek to tell the story of the rise of interest in education and conflict in the global education agenda. This begins in the early 1990s in the
period after the end of the Cold War. This led to the end of bi-polarism in international relations, which in turn resulted in a drop in overall development aid, but also a shift of focus in development policy and education policy towards the least developed countries and population groups. The removal of Cold War tensions also produced a noticeable, albeit partial, shift away from the overwhelmingly partisan and highly political allocation of aid during the cold war (Lundborg 1998; Wang 1999; Christian Aid 2004).

These Post Cold War shifts led to an increased focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and joint donor efforts to improve the coordination of international development policy during the 1990s. These efforts culminated in the Millennium Development Goals – and aspects of the Education For All objectives therein. As part of a global education agenda, in 2005 donors agreed in the Paris Declaration to ‘harmonise’ their aid efforts in developing contexts, for instance through mechanisms such as the Sector Wide Approaches (Swaps) to education ensuring ownership and alignment with aid recipients development strategies (Mundy 2002; Mundy 2006; King 2007; OECD 2005/2008). While not without both critics and critiques, there was a feeling that the architecture of aid was becoming more coherent and being targeted towards those areas of most need (Cosgrave 2005), even if the rhetoric often outpaced the financing (GCE 2009). On the other hand this period also represented the rise of US hegemony and the broader consolidation of the neoliberal global project. This had the effect in the field of education and development of globalizing a set of neoliberal inspired education policy recipes including decentralization, privatization, new public
management etc. These policies were initiated in the heat of the Cold War under World Bank/IMF sponsored structural adjustment policies but continue on to the present in different forms (Robertson et al. 2007).

Parallel to these Post Cold War developments of increased donor coordination and consensus and neoliberal hegemony was also a rise in Western interventionism, often under the leadership of the United States, in high profile conflicts from the Balkans to Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Post Cold War peace dividend appeared to be ending before it had begun. Importantly, Western interventions in these conflicts were also discursively framed as ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Fearon 2008, p. 52), drawing on issues of human security, human rights, democracy and freedom for their justification (Roberts 2000; Forsythe 2000). The previous UN gospel of non-interventionism in the sovereign affairs of member states became tempered by the right of the international community to intervene in cases where the ‘human security’ of the population were at risk. Critics saw this new humanitarianism as a new mode of imperialism (Chomsky 1994; Chossudovsky 1997; Chomsky 1999; Chossudovsky 2002).

Increased intervention into conflict zones was also catalysed by the fallout from the 9/11 attacks. Suddenly the insecurity and conflict occurring outside of the core global powers was recognized as producing insecurity at home (Duffield 2007). This led to an increased push to merge issues of international development with national security concerns – the merging of security and
development – a logic that had of course been present throughout the Cold War. Almost immediately the US and other Western powers began to prioritise concerns over ‘terrorism’ and sought to integrate all other aspects of government policy under this overarching objective. During the Bush administration, development and humanitarian organizations were often simplistically treated as ‘force multipliers’ (Novelli 2010), and while the language has softened under the Obama administration, the central thrust of linking development aid to national security objectives has remained intact (Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission 2010). In June 2008, USAID released their new ‘civil military cooperation policy’ (2008), explaining their 3D-approach, incorporating Defence, Diplomacy and Development and stating that: “Development is also recognized as a key element of any successful whole-of-government counterterrorism and counter-insurgency effort” (USAID 2008, p. 1). While the US was and remains the most vigorous agent in the process of merging security and development, the EU and other donors (including DFID, AUSAID, Japan and the Dutch as this paper will show) have similar policies (EU 2003, p.13).

While the renewed commitment and funding (see below) of Western governments to the importance of international development might be welcomed, this ‘joined up’ whole-of-government 3D-approach brought with it dangers for the development and humanitarian community of being taken over by the generally more powerful security wing of national governments. Moreover, as noted recently by the ‘Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission’ (2010), mixing development cooperation with other policies or ‘commercial,
security or geopolitical interests’ undermines the possibilities of aligning overseas development assistance with internationally agreed aid effectiveness principles, like the Paris Agenda. Similarly, as the failure of both the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations is becoming increasingly evident, so it appears that there is a shift in military strategy from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency. This shift has important implications for development practices and actors as counterinsurgency strategy seeks to control population groups and within this strategy is a component of winning hearts and minds through strategies such as social investments in health and education. This process blurs lines between aid worker and soldier, development issues and military strategy, which has a range of implications, not least the fact that it fuels accusations of western aid agency collaboration with occupying forces, which has increased the number of attacks on aid workers (Stoddard et al. 2006; Stoddard et al. 2009).

While the dynamics and nature of the development and conflict agenda remain hotly debated, what is less contested is the fact that conflict is now at the centre of the development policy and debate. Since the 1990’s there has been a massive increase in the number of UN peacekeeping troops and humanitarian and development actors operating in conflict situations. By 1995, humanitarian agencies were responding to a total of 28 complex emergencies around the world, increasing from just five in 1985 (Bradbury 1995; Slim 1996). By the mid 1990s emergency spending had increased by over 600% from its mid 1980s point to over 3.5 USD billion and has continued to rise (Fearon 2008). Personnel had increased by over 700% since 1999 to 110,000
personnel with a budget of 7 USD billion in 2008. According to the 2008 Reality of Aid Report (2008, p. 8): “aid allocations to the most severely conflict-affected countries….increased from 9.3% of total ODA in 2000 (for 12 countries) to 20.4% (for 10 countries) in 2006”. Coupled with a general increase in ODA during the same period, aid to conflict affected countries has nearly tripled in real terms between 2000-2006. In 2007, according to a recent OECD/DAC report (2008, p. 8) 38.4 percent of total ODA (USD 37.2 billion) went to conflict and fragile states.

What is also clear from the literature is that the distribution of aid among severely- conflict-affected countries was, and remains, highly unequal and reflects the rise of the security agenda. In 2006 Iraq and Afghanistan accounted for over 60% of all aid to severely conflict-affected countries (Reality of Aid 2008, p. 217). In 2007, (OECD/DAC 2008, p. 8) of the 38.4 percent of total ODA (USD 37.2 billion) that went to conflict and fragile states, over half was directed to just five countries: Iraq (23 percent), Afghanistan (9.9 percent), and Ethiopia, Pakistan and Sudan (sharing 17% of the total).

[A] Understanding the Rise of Education and Conflict

Since the late 1990s and in tandem with the expansion of development and humanitarian intervention in conflict zones, there has been a parallel increase in interest and recognition of the importance of education delivery in conflict and post conflict zones. This we believe has been the result of three key
First, education, like food and shelter, has come to be seen as part of the core building blocks of human development and a necessary and vital part of humanitarian response in conflict situations in particular (Save the Children 2010). Since 2008, there has also been a Global Education Cluster, headed by UNICEF and the International Save the Children Alliance that coordinates the educational response in emergency situations, as part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that assumes overall coordination, and develops policy involving UN and non-UN humanitarian partners operating in conflict zones. Central to the rise in prominence of education within conflict situations has been the actions of the ‘Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies’ (INEE), which emerged out of the World Education Forum in Dakar. INEE is a network created to improve inter-agency communication and collaboration within the context of education in emergencies, and has proved an effective lobbying, advocacy and policy coordination and development institution. As with the more general increases in development aid to conflict effected zones (Fearon 2008, p. 72), increases in aid to education are at least partly due to the success of organizations like Save the Children, INEE, and UNICEF to successfully lobby for an expansion their own mandates and activities in education – within a growing conflict and development funding regime.

Secondly, the success of these linked organizations and practitioners in
placing education and conflict firmly on the international development agenda has been aided by a recognition from bi-lateral donors that a large proportion of the world’s out of school children are located in conflict and post conflict countries and thus this issue needs to be addressed if the EFA goals are to be achieved (Stewart 2003; Save the Children 2007; Save The Children 2008). This has also led to a growing awareness of the relationship between education and conflict, and its potentially catalytic and preventative roles (Bush et al. 2000; DFID 2003), though we would argue that the technical politics of delivering education in contexts of conflict rather than its political/cultural nature is highlighted in donor engagement to date. The Dutch, as we will show below, in the period 2007-2010 have been very much part of this bilateral donor involvement to get education in conflict affected areas on the international agenda.

Thirdly, the merging of security and development outlined above has also penetrated the field of education and development. In education this emerges as a process of reinterpreting both the purposes and the practices of both education and development – as having potential ‘security benefits’. An illustration of this is the prevalence of references to the role of education in the US’s counter-terrorism strategies elaborated in ‘the Patterns of Global Terrorism Annual Reports’ (since 2004 renamed ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’). As an example, the 2007 report, in Chapter 5, ‘Terrorist Safe Havens’, sub-section 7 focuses on Basic Education in Muslim Countries. In this section it notes that:
The Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies continued to support an increased focus on education in predominantly Muslim countries and those with significant Muslim populations. The United States’ approach stresses mobilizing public and private resources as partners to improve access, quality, and the relevance of education, with a specific emphasis on developing civic-mindedness in young people. In many Muslim-majority countries, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the challenge was to increase country capacity to provide universal access to primary education and literacy (US State Department 2008, p. 243).

Similarly, as part of the US military’s counterinsurgency strategy in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan “humanitarian and civic assistance” “can include such non-emergency services as constructing schools, performing dental procedures, and even vaccinating the livestock of farmers” (Brigety 2008). Crucially for us, it appears that educational provision (particularly for girls) became a key discursive justification for the military intervention in Afghanistan, and educational progress as a means of demonstrating the alleged success of the occupation.

These combined reasons have led to a growing commitment to the area of education and conflict and have, not surprisingly, led to increased funds being allocated to education in conflict zones. While Save the Children see this as insufficient to meet the challenges ahead (noting that while 39 million of the 56
million out of school children live in conflict affected countries, only 33% of funding was allocated to them in 2006; Save the Children 2007; 2008; 2010), the funds allocated are increasing. DFID in its recent Education Strategy Paper (2010) notes that in the coming five years, 50% of all aid to education will be directed to education in conflict and ‘fragile states’ i. What should also be noted is that as with the general aid disbursements to conflict and fragile states, the distribution of educational aid between countries is highly uneven with several high profile countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and Afghanistan receiving large portions of the cake.

In conclusion what we can say at this point is that the rise of the education and conflict agenda has been facilitated by a range of external and internal factors: by Post Cold War and Post 9/11 (geo)political realities and intentions; by EFA and MDG goals; by the advocacy of organizations like Save the Children, UNICEF and INEE – pushing for the humanitarian and human rights agenda of education; and finally also through the agency of military and security sectors that see building schools and strengthening education in certain conflict zones as part of their military strategy to win the hearts and minds of the civilian populations. Many of these issues and actors appear to clash with each other and produce unlikely bedfellows. In the next section we will begin to unravel where the Netherlands government fits into this complicated picture.

[A] Dutch aid to education in emergencies and conflicts
Within the field of educational aid to conflict affected states the Dutch are widely seen as playing an important leadership role, both in terms of their funding commitment, their receptivity and support for educational interventions in conflicts, and for their innovation in developing new funding mechanisms to deliver aid to conflict affected countries. Save the Children in their background paper (2009, p.20) for UNESCOs Global Monitoring Report 2010 wrote how ‘the Netherlands’ substantial weight as one of the key education donors has given them considerable sway in influencing the shape of the international aid architecture’. They particularly refer to the Dutch influence as the largest donor to the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) catalytic fund in opening up the system for countries under fragile or conflictive conditions, and the biggest Dutch investment in education and conflict, the UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT) Programme, totalling 201 million USD.

Historically, the Dutch see themselves as pioneers in the field of international relations. Until the 1950s, they held on strongly to their ‘neutrality’ in international affairs, while during the Cold War this relatively small European country saw itself forced to become part of two important strategic alliances: NATO and – what is now called - the European Union. Dutch membership of NATO and its strong loyalty to the United States were seen as counterweights to either a Russian invasion or domination from the continental powers of Germany or France. This position gave the Dutch a relatively strong voice in the international arena during the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War meant a drastic shift in this balance of power, as NATO lost its original function. Subsequently, the attacks of 9/11 transformed both NATO and the Dutch-US relationship into an unequal and unilateral US dominated situation based on the idea of mutual insecurity, which continues to date. Instead of the former Dutch international position of neutrality and international stability (linked to its export-oriented trade system), the military again has become a major instrument of foreign policy, as was exemplified by the Dutch participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, ongoing processes of globalization and regionalisation resulted in the creation of a more regulated European market and community, where Dutch influence diminished rapidly (Tromp 2006). The Dutch thus find themselves in a subservient position in both a US and a European ‘pact’. Current foreign policies seem to be based on the idea that there is no other choice then to ‘go with the flow or drop out of the game’ (Tromp 2006, translated by authors). As we now move on to explore the Dutch role in education and conflict, we seek to highlight how the contemporary positive, yet also contradictory role of the Dutch in the field of education can at least be partially understood from the changing position of the Netherlands in this historical geopolitical context.

The education and development department (DSO) of the MFA started to actively work on the theme of education and conflict around 2005, although earlier interest in the theme became apparent in the wake of the World Education Forum in Dakar 2000. Based on the interviews and policy documents, we found four main reasons why the social department of the MFA started to invest in education in conflict situations over the last five years,
which both tie into rationales already highlighted and bring in new ‘local’ dimensions. First, for most Ministry officials of the social development department reaching the MDGs was the main reason to prioritize education in conflicts and emergencies. As one of them said: ‘our motivation was inspired by reaching the MDGs, considering the fact that most of school children falling outside of the [education] system live in conflict areas’ (interview 6-4-2010).

Second, the social development staff members also confirmed that by 2007 there was a financial opportunity to open up resources for this theme. The Dutch government had committed itself to allocating 15% of total ODA to education (around 600 million Euros per annum), and the Minister of Development Cooperation, Koenders (2007- February 2010) was prioritising aid to conflict affected areas and fragile states in his policy note ‘Our Common Concern’ (MFA 2007a). Thirdly, this financial opportunity paved the way for the Dutch government to aim for strategic international leadership on the issue. The Dutch were frustrated with the rigidity of the FTI funding mechanism, particularly for conflict affected states, seeking firstly to reform the FTI and then to bypass it via an innovative partnership with UNICEF. Another ministry official explained that:

we were able to show other donors that it was possible to do something. That we shouldn’t just wait for the FTI. We had the courage to explore new possibilities to fund education in conflict affected areas through UNICEF (Interview 06-04-2010).
Fourthly, there was an enabling international and national/institutional context for the rise of interest in education in conflict situations. As has been shown above, since Dakar in 2000 and the emergence of INEE, awareness of the need to invest in education in emergencies and conflict grew rapidly. At the level of the Dutch MFA, we observe how individual institutional factors also might have played a role in pushing the theme of conflict up the development agenda, because fragile states and development cooperation in conflict areas was a major priority of ex-minister Koenders. The enabling context was thus the product of a combination of international factors and personal interests and agenda setting processes. This enabling context was also closely linked to the ‘security agenda’, which saw the development sector as an additional tool in strengthening and addressing security concerns. While the social development department saw its engagement as inspired by the MDGs, the conducive environment for engagement in conflict zones was no doubt facilitated by Minister Koenders’ enthusiasm for an ‘integrated 3D approach’ to development, with much resemblance to USAID’s 3D-approach discussed above. This resulted in the creation of the *Fragility and Peace Building Unit* within the Dutch MFA, which explicitly sought to link Dutch military, diplomacy and development policies around the world. Parallel to this, the Dutch Ministry of Defence, caught up in the unpopular war in Afghanistan, was seeking social policies to assist in their counterinsurgency strategies in their zone of control in Afghanistan (Uruzgan), which included building schools (Ministry of Defense 2011a).iii In the next section, we will look more closely at Dutch engagement in education in conflict affected countries, trying to understand further the motivations, the practices and the underlying rationales.
The Dutch are guided in their policy formation and aid allocation by the policy ideas of various other international actors, particularly the World Bank and the OECD/DAC. With regard to the World Bank, apart from being a key development partner at country level, the Dutch also rely heavily on the Bank’s reports and guidelines. In 2007, the OECD/DAC (2007) also drafted an influential set of guidelines for policy and implementation called ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’. The guiding policy principles as formulated by a staff member of the social department in a draft IIEP paper are closely related to these OECD/DAC principles:

The guiding policy principles of [Government of the Netherlands] are: 1) an integrated approach; 2) local partners, local priorities; 3) context specific approach and political sensitivity; 4) fast, flexible and long-term involvement; 5) multilateral where possible, bilateral where needed; 6) prevention and 7) taking responsible risks (Eijkholt 2011).

Besides immediate and short term emergency relief (for a large part through the UNICEF-EEPCT programme), the government of the Netherlands emphasises the importance of longer term ‘capacity building’ strategies in fragile environments. They were actively involved in the development of Guidelines for Capacity Development in the Education Sector within the
Education for All Fast Track Initiative Framework, which aims to implement the OECD/DAC and Paris principles. Capacity development has been at the core of the Dutch bilateral aid development programme in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the creation of technical and vocational training centres in Agricultural education. However, based on earlier policy experiences, the Dutch see it as one of their major challenges to balance these immediate and longer term priorities of education in conflict situations, because of demands for results from Parliament and tax-payers (Eijkholt 2011).

Influenced by the World Bank’s ‘Assessing Aid’ report (1998), the Dutch have limited the number of partner countries drastically over the last decade from over 100 to around 33 in 2007, with currently only 15 partner countries, due to a recent change of government and development policy. The Dutch have recognised that a former focus on ‘good governance’ as a selection norm led to the neglect of countries that do not fulfil those criteria: countries that are ‘fragile’ or affected by conflicts (Save the Children 2009, p. 23). The policy notes on Dutch Development Cooperation ‘Our Common Concern’ (2007a) and the New Policy Letter to the House of Representatives (2011b) specify the partner countries in three different types; profile 1 countries are selected on criteria linked to the ‘accelerated achievement of MDGs’, profile 2 countries belong to the ‘security and development’ group and profile 3 countries that have a ‘broad-based relationship’ with the Netherlands. The current government has, however, announced to cut down on its development aid to education and health because they see less surplus value in these sectors,
while they are prioritising security, agriculture and climate issues (MFA 2011a). Education is no longer a policy priority for development cooperation, but, in line with our former discussion of global prioritisation of education and conflict, Dutch development policy commitment to ‘education in weak states will continue or even increase’ (MFA 2011b).

The major financing innovation of the Dutch in the area of education and conflict has been the creation of the UNICEF-EEPCT programme. The first proposal for this USD 201 million programme was written in 2006, and in that same year the Dutch were involved in working toward opening up the FTI system for fragile states. This programme came about mainly because of four reasons: at the time there was enough money available in the Dutch MFA to invest in this theme; the FTI Catalytic Fund as it was designed then did not allow allocations for fragile states and the Dutch sought an alternative route; it was a response to the void between humanitarian and development stages of aid; and there were good connections and former experiences between the Dutch and UNICEF.

The programme seeks to establish innovative strategies and delivery mechanisms so that educational interventions in fragile countries are a first step in a continuous reform process that will get countries back on a development path. Flexible funding is provided to accommodate the changing needs of a country (Eijkholt 2011).
In the initial design of the programme, 50% was allocated to education in emergencies/crisis, 24% to strengthening ‘resilience’ of education systems, 16% to preparedness education systems, and 10% to knowledge on reliable policy-interventions and instruments. Most (75%) of this funding was channelled to the national level, 15% to the regional and 10% to the international level (MFA, 2006). UNICEF is solely responsible for country selection, and UNICEF’s strategies are aligned with CAPs and JAMs.

According to Save the Children’s recent report The Future is Now (2010, p. 49), the UNICEF-EEPCT programme has contributed to a range of activities, including ‘rebuilding and revitalising education systems in post-crises contexts, [...] investing in Education Management Information Systems, curriculum reform, systems to develop teacher capacity, and a teacher payroll system in Southern Sudan’. So far, education activities have been supported by the EEPCT programme in around 37 countries (MFA 2007a; UNICEF 2011).

Besides these multilateral programmes, the Dutch also have supported education in conflict situations through bilateral aid flows (particularly with regards to higher education) and through non-governmental/private aid channels. The social development department is actively involved in the INEE working group on Education and Fragility (Branelly et al. 2009) which brings together bilateral donors, multilateral organisations and INGOs working in the field of education and conflict. Although the government of the Netherlands does not ‘directly’ support INEE on a multilateral basis, INEE is indirectly funded by the Dutch through the UNICEF-EEPCT programme (over the period September 2007 - July 2010 this indirect funding to INEE was 1,258,591 US$).
In the last few years, like many other bi-lateral donors, there has also been a shift from focusing mostly on basic education to supporting the whole education sector, including post-secondary forms of education and technical and vocational training. This broader approach to the education sector is also reflected in the various programmes for education in conflict areas that include, for instance, technical and vocational training projects and support to higher education institutes.

As for the other two relevant departments in the MFA, the Humanitarian Department and the Fragility and Peace Building Unit, this enabling context has also played a role in their efforts for education in emergencies or conflict areas. However, for the humanitarian department education is still not seen as a priority when providing basic human needs to people in emergency situations, even though Save the Children’s ‘Last in Line, Last in School’ Report as well as IIEPs ‘Donor’s Engagement’ publication both urge the Dutch Government to include education in its official humanitarian strategy (Save the Children 2007, p. 32; Branelly et al. 2009, p. 131). Here, we see a difference with the general international recognition of the need to include education as a key humanitarian need that we considered above and the internal policies of the Dutch MFA. The Fragility and Peace Building Unit EFV has begun to acknowledge education’s pivotal role in conflict prevention and reconciliation processes and is seeking to find ways to engage with and in the education sector.
Despite the active involvement in supporting education in conflict affected regions, there has been no official policy documentation developed within the social development department. Still, there are a number of internal policy documents, and social development department has been involved in supporting the publication and dissemination of several UNESCO-IIEP publications together with the ‘IS Academie’ research group on Education and Development of the University of Amsterdamvi. The humanitarian department does not see education as a humanitarian priority, and thus has not included this in its policy documents. The Fragility and Peace Building Unit do have a policy document on fragile states and development in conflict areas which include some references to the need to support the education sector. Within this part of the MFA, education is seen as an instrument to create a peace dividend (MFA 2007b). Providing schooling to local populations in conflict areas is seen as part of the ‘integral 3D-approach’, through cooperation with the military as well as with civil society and the private sector. This cooperation is also reflected in the inclusion of these actors in so-called ‘knowledge circles’ that are promoted in the Netherlands by EFV and DSO/OO.

Although the 2007 policy note ‘Our Common Concern’ recognises that a focus on fragile states is necessary because they lag behind in reaching the MDGs (Eijkholt 2011), EFVs policy on Fragile States and the (Ex-)Minister of Development Cooperation Koenders’ discourse show similarities to the US counter-terrorism strategy report for an integral 3D state approach and the
importance of education as a peace dividend in cases such as Afghanistan.

Based on the principles of this approach, Koenders claims we cannot solve the problem of fragile states through development cooperation alone. [...] In tackling the multiple causes of fragility, my colleagues and I seek to integrate three aspects: development, diplomacy and defence (the three Ds). This consistent multi-track strategy involves a solid, joint analysis of the problem; intensive international cooperation; investment of sufficient resources and people; long-term political commitment; support for parliaments and other countervailing powers, and unflagging attention to state performance. We also need to bear Western businesses and governments in mind, as they sometimes play a role in the abuse of power by elites in fragile states (MFA 2007c).

Linking back to the section on the global agenda on education and conflict, when Koenders talks about his ‘colleagues’ here, he seems to refer not only to his Dutch colleagues within the MFA but also to colleagues ‘abroad’ (DFID, USAID) who similarly align with the 3D approach. In the province of Uruzgan in Afghanistan,

the Dutch actively promote an integrated approach to security, governance, reconstruction and construction as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Furthermore, ‘the Netherlands is
keen for all relevant parts of government, civil society and the private sector to be involved in formulating and implementing policy (Eijkholt 2011).

This integrated approach is also present outside of the MFA, for instance through the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) mission of the Ministry of Defence (2011a). In CIMIC, education is seen as a crucial instrument for development and to stimulate hope for the future. The network of Cultural Affairs and Education consist of reservists that are experts in the education or cultural sectors: ‘The network ensures a contextualised understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of development projects’ (2011a). This CIMIC network is involved in defence missions to Iraq, Afghanistan and the African continent.

[B] The Dutch integrated 3D-approach in Afghanistan

Returning to the Afghanistan case, we will now look at some concrete examples of the Dutch integrated approach that was implemented during the Dutch military presence in the Afghan province of Uruzgan until 2010. Over the past four years, the Dutch ministers of Development Coordination, of Foreign Affairs and of Defence worked together, because ‘stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan is not only important for the country itself, but also contribute to more security in the Netherlands and the rest of the world’ (MFA 2010a). In February 2011, the last Dutch soldiers left Uruzgan as part of the ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force). Dutch political and
development advisors of the MFA work in the country as well, and Dutch money is invested in reconstruction projects at the local and national level. This combined security-development strategy is seen as ‘a powerful tool in the struggle against radicalisation’ (2010b).

At the national level, 25 million Euros per year is invested through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the WB, to cover salaries of ministry officials, offer microcredit loans, support the national solidarity programme (NSP), the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the EQUIP education programme\textsuperscript{vii}. An amount of 50 million is invested until 2011 to support the judicial system and policy through the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan, managed by the UNDP (Ministry of Defence 2011b).

The 3D approach with its civil-military cooperation in Uruzgan is perceived as a success story, since ‘development aid reaches most of the local communities, which consequently choose to turn against the insurgents [the Taliban]’.\textsuperscript{viii} It can thus be argued that education has been part of a Dutch counter-insurgency strategy in the Uruzgan province. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of the Dutch military worked through a so-called ‘inkblot method’, where they first support the Afghan military in creating safe areas and consequently work on reconstruction of infrastructure, school buildings and basic health care facilities. According to the MFA, this is also called ‘the Dutch Approach’, which means:
a combination of respect for the local population, an understanding of religion, local values and customs and act as less aggressive as possible. Still, there are situations in which the army has to act forcefully in their struggle against the Taliban. It is essential for every success to be an Afghan success. Therefore we act together as much as possible with the Afghan military and police (2010b).

Schools were being (re)built as part of the ISAF or the civil-military CIMIC activities. A captain explains ‘we have built 5 brand new schools, and one protective wall for an existing school against floods. [...] These quick projects are psychologically important because they create goodwill with the local population. We call them force-acceptance activities’ (2010b). Longer term reconstruction projects are also funded by the Dutch but implemented by the Afghan government or international multilateral or non-governmental organisations.

In conclusion to this section, we would like to recall the warning signs of integrating development into the area of security, particularly considering the current Dutch political decision to enter a new and highly debated ‘police-mission’ in the province of Kunduz. The Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission in a recent report wrote:

Mixing development cooperation with other policies, or even subordinating it, makes ODA hard to align with internationally agreed
aid effectiveness principles. Although this practice is more profound in the USA than in the European countries visited by this Commission, the importance of delinking development cooperation from commercial, security or geopolitical interests cannot be overemphasised (SAEC 2010, p. 24).

Arguing for the ‘security benefits’ of education might open up funding to build (back) schools in conflict zones. However, we see this as a potentially dangerous road. Is building schools to win the hearts and minds of the local population a good strategy when it is unclear what will happen within these schools afterwards? Will local and international development workers be safe when they would have to cooperate with the military in zones of violent conflict? And what if the merging of development and security provides more arguments to cut down on development spending because the military will take care of ‘building back better’ education systems in (post)-war situations? Both the sustainability and the ethics of military involvement in development delivery remains highly contentious.

[A] Conclusions: The role of the Dutch in Aid to Education in Conflict affected Countries – globaliser or globalised?

In line with other publications that analyse Dutch aid to education and conflict (Save the Children 2009; Brannelly 2009; Save the Children 2010; Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission 2010), we agree that there are a number of
positive sides to the Dutch way of supporting education in conflict affected countries, such as their flexibility, short and longer term programmes, their attempts to innovate and to provide international leadership on the theme. Committed to the OECD/DAC principles and the Paris Declaration, the Dutch appear less interested than some donors in branding their aid, and more willing than most to pool funds, align aid with others and work collectively in the field of education (Lopes Cardozo et al. 2011). However, the current shift towards national (economic) interests (2011) at the expense of social investments of the new Dutch development cooperation strategy, show warning signs of how former prioritisation of education based on the principles of solidarity and poverty reduction are rapidly being undermined.

We also note several potential dangers of the emerging ‘integrated 3D-approach’ and the increasing encroachment of more powerful sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that threaten to undermine the ‘developmental’ aspects of education in conflict affected zones and subordinate them to military or diplomatic short term objectives, including Dutch self interest in terms of their economy and national security. This process appears both as an internal dynamic, but also a reflection of the more global security agenda that threatens long term and sustainable investments in education in conflict affected countries.

Beyond these struggles, there is also a broader issue of the intellectual dependency of the Dutch MFA on other international players, not least the
World Bank and DFID. While the Dutch appear innovative in developing modes of delivery of aid, they are less innovative in producing alternative policies on projects and practices, of raising issues on the content of education in conflict affected zones, opening up the issue of the drivers of both war and peace within the education systems themselves and how to address them. Instead, they reproduce a service delivery rationale for education in conflict zones without addressing the particularities of conflict and context. This might be a problem of a lack of independent knowledge production within the Netherlands in this policy field, but also perhaps a sense of dealing with the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ of policy intervention, which may be problematic, particularly when the agendas of the World Bank, DFID and USAID might be in tension with the broader foreign policy and development objectives of the Dutch on the international stage.

In conclusion, we can say that Dutch activity in the field of education and conflict is contradictory. While on the one hand they lead on the practicalities and funding issues, on the other they follow in terms of the content of global agenda setting. They are both a key catalyst and contributor to the global agenda on education and conflict as well as a consumer of the core ideas that frame this agenda, produced by the World Bank, DFID and the OECD. Returning to the theoretical debates on ways to understand the tensions in the global politics of international development, this paper demonstrates the Dutch state’s subordinate position within global power relations (vis-a-vis the USA and the UK), but also their ongoing influence in North-South development relations.
[B] Endnotes

i We consider ‘fragile states’ as a complicated and value laden concept, however we chose to use the term for this chapter in order to stay close to the discourse used in the global and Dutch policy environment.

ii For more information on the Education for All Fast-track Initiative (EFA FTI) see <http://www.educationfasttrack.org/>.

iii There is relatively low public support for Dutch involvement in Afghanistan (NOS news, 21 April 2008). When the Dutch government decided to prolongue its stay in the Uruzgan province from 2007 to August 2010, 60% of the Dutch public thought this extra investment would not be well spend, and 43% was against the decision (TNS NIPO 2007).

iv Profile 1 partner countries include: Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda and Rwanda. Profile 2 partner countries are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Yemen, Palestinian Territories and Sudan. Profile 3 partner countries include: Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia and Kenya.

v CAP = Consolidated Appeals Process; JAM = Joint Assessment Mission.


vii Education Quality Improvement Project together with the Afghan Ministry of Education and also funded by the World Bank (Eijkholt 2011).
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