Participation and its Discontents:
Participatory Education Reforms in an Age of Globalization-A Case Study of Aceh, Indonesia

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# Table of Contents

Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 6

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 6

1.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Introduction to Aceh ..................................................................................................................... 8

1.3a A Brief Introduction to Acehnese History .................................................................................. 9

1.4 Decentralization Reforms in Indonesia ........................................................................................ 11

1.5 Education Legislation .................................................................................................................. 13

1.6 Thesis Structure and Research Focus ......................................................................................... 14

Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................................... 16

2.1 Literature review: School Based Management .............................................................................. 16

2.1a Participatory approaches to development ............................................................................... 16

2.1b SBM- A Brief Introduction ......................................................................................................... 17

2.1c A political history of SBM .......................................................................................................... 18

2.1d SBM in Indonesia ....................................................................................................................... 19

2.1e The School Committee .............................................................................................................. 21

2.2 Case studies .................................................................................................................................. 22

Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................................... 24

3.1 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................ 24

3.1a Critical Discourse Analysis ........................................................................................................ 27

3.1b Floating signifiers and colloquial notions ................................................................................... 29

3.2 Strategic Selectivities and the Political Utilities of Discourse: Control, Legitimization, Collusion and Co-optation ...................................................................................................................... 31

3.2a Strategic Selectivities .................................................................................................................. 31

3.2b Control ....................................................................................................................................... 32

3.2c Co-optation and Collusion .......................................................................................................... 32

3.2d Legitimization and Conflict Management ............................................................................... 33

3.3 Existing frameworks and ConceptualScheme ......................................................................... 35

Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................................... 39

4.1 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 39

4.1a Epistemology and Ontology ....................................................................................................... 39

4.2b Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 39
4.1c Unit of analysis .............................................................. 41
4.2 Scope of limitations .......................................................... 42
4.3 Ethical Considerations ...................................................... 44

Chapter 5: Findings: The Strategic Selective Context- Institutional, Cultural, and Socio-Economic Barriers to Participation in Aceh ........................................ 45
5.1 Institutional structure .......................................................... 45
5.2 Indonesian Culture and the Legacy of Centralization ................ 50
5.3 The Urban-Rural Divide ...................................................... 53
  5.3a Urban Rural Divide and Participation in Practice ...................... 55
  5.3b Conflict and Disaster ...................................................... 57
5.4 Taking stock and Looking Forward .................................... 58

Chapter 6: Strategic Selectivities and Political Utilities in Action ........ 60
6.1 SBM implementation in Indonesia- Recent Studies and overview of Survey at CS1 ........................................................................ 60
  6.1a Survey Descriptives CS1 .................................................. 62
6.2 Legitimation and Control ..................................................... 64
  6.2a Ambiguous Policy and Legitmation ................................... 64
  6.2b Concertive Control and Questionable Commitment ............... 68
6.3 Co-optation ........................................................................ 69
  6.3a Co-optation and SC authority .......................................... 70
6.4 Collusion, election, transparency and trust ............................. 72
  6.4a Collusion ........................................................................ 72
  6.4b Exclusion through Collusion ............................................ 74
  6.4c Collusion in the Electoral Process ..................................... 75
6.5 Socialization, Transparency, and Parental Participation ........... 80
6.6 The Actual Role of the Committee ....................................... 83
6.7 Taking Stock and Looking forward ..................................... 84

Chapter 7: Reflections on the Current Research ......................... 87
References ............................................................................ 91
Appendices ........................................................................... 96
Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Notions of participation in the developmental context have become ubiquitous among development agencies, NGOs, governmental organizations, and local communities alike. Particularly, the practice of School Based Management (SBM) has been implemented for the purpose of integrating the participatory process into the sphere of education. Premised on the notion that democratization is mutually beneficial for both the development endeavor and local beneficiaries, participatory interventions have become so widespread that they have been deemed ‘methodological parochialism’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001) and the ‘new orthodoxy’ of development (Henkel and Stirrat 2001). Critics contend that actors capitalize on the highly symbolic rhetoric of participation and democracy (Malen 1993; Anderson 1998; Anderson 2010) in ways that define, delineate, and control participation itself, thwarting any substantive or transformative efforts by local actors.

Invariably, problems arise from the ambiguity of such discourse (democracy, community, participation, and empowerment to name just a few) and their potential to homogenize, essentialize, and obscure power relationships within and among individuals, communities, and institutions (Reynolds 2000; Guijt and Shah 2001). Aceh province in Indonesia, concurrent with national education reforms undertaken across Indonesia, is in the process of implementing such participatory reforms in the education sector. A long history of autonomy coupled with special political, cultural, and economic sovereignty makes Aceh a dynamic, complex, and potentially promising context from which education decentralization and SBM reforms may be examined.

1.2 Purpose

This research describes newly created arenas of participation (particularly school committees) in the evolving political, social, and institutional landscape and by what means they may act as mechanisms in a transformatory process, both academically and on a broader social scale. Transformatory, for the intent of this research, refers
to the engagement and alteration of extent social, political, economic or academic contexts. The research further seeks to explore the ways in which SBM may be complicit or culpable in the reproduction or reinforcement of extant power structures. Special consideration is paid to the highly contested, unequal, and complex areas of interaction ‘between social, cultural, political and economic structures, institutions, and actors at multiple levels’ (Lopes Cardozo and Shah forthcoming).

Many critical theorists including Barker, Anderson, Malen, and Parfitt, (to name just a few) have raised concerns about the oft-overlooked ramifications of participatory reforms, and specifically, SBM. This research hopes to engage the ideas and frameworks raised by critical theorists in an attempt to describe how these reforms are manifesting in the Indonesian, and more specifically, Acehnese context.

In this research I attempt to explicate the dual, and often contradictory, nature of decentralization of education in Indonesia as a form of local democratization and as providing new means of agency and, using post-structuralism and other frameworks associated with critical theory, as modalities of obscuring power through the use of hegemonic discourse on multiple scales. Robert Chambers (1997) argues that participatory approaches to development must retain an ongoing ‘self-critical epistemological awareness’ and maintain the critical reflexivity that is inherent in the approach. McGee (2002, cited in Cooke and Kothari 2001) states that this reflexivity is necessary to maintain an ongoing dialogue of ethics, standards, and practice that prevent abuses and exploitation and through which methodological and practical problems can be addressed. This research is done in the hopes that it will add to the existing body of knowledge regarding SBM and decentralization, along with the successes and caveats, using the dynamic context of Aceh as a case study.
1.3 Introduction to Aceh

Aceh is a region exemplified by incongruity. At once a region of immense natural abundance, rich cultural identity, and spectacular history, it is also a region marred by a history of prolonged ethnic conflict and recent natural disaster. Aceh finds itself in a dynamic post-conflict and post-disaster ‘moment’ (Lopes Cardozo and Shah forthcoming) occurring in a political context of decentralization that has transformed the political landscape of the region. Despite the recent environmental and social upheaval, one ostensible contradiction remains a source of optimism. Namely, that though Aceh remains one of the most impoverished regions of Indonesia (UNDP 2010), through natural disaster, ethnic conflict, and political reformation, literacy rates and school enrollment are consistently, and sometimes dramatically, higher than those of other regions and those of Indonesia as a whole (Evans 2010). In Aceh, participation in primary school reached 99.03% in 2011, decreasing only to 94.07% for secondary school, and 72.41% for high school, respectively. These numbers remain significantly higher than the national average (www.Aceh.BPS.in).1

Such incongruities extend to the functional and theoretical concerns that arise from such a context, especially in the process of decentralization. Notably, the paradoxical nature of decentralization as localized democratization on one hand, and decentralization reforms as capable of surreptitious reinforcement of existing power relations and exacerbation of economic and social inequality on the other.

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1 National average for primary school is 95%, 66% in secondary schools (Vernez et al 2013).
1.3a A Brief Introduction to Acehnese History

Aceh has a rich history of autonomy. A primary birthplace of the Malay-language Islamic culture in the 14th and 15th centuries, Aceh historically considered itself a *negeri*—a polity and place situated in a broader context (Reid 2004), an independent state that maintained various alliances and trade partnerships. Historically, the Acehnese proudly referred to their homeland as *Serambi Mekkah*, ‘the gate to the holy land’ (Riddell 2006). Preceding Dutch colonialism, Aceh’s economic, political, and cultural ties were along the Indian ocean and Malayan Peninsula, but political ties extended to the Ottoman empire, and later strong political and trade relationships were forged with America, Turkey, England, France, and Italy among others. This historical independence was a precursor to a long modern history of resistance to external rule, prompting the Dutch governor in the 1930’s to note that the “Acehnese nourished a fanatical love of freedom, reinforced by a powerful sense of race” (Reid 2004).

During the Dutch colonial rule the Acehnese maintained a fierce resistance that resulted in 100,000 Acehnese and 16,000 Dutch casualties in the years between 1873-1914. During World War II, resistance was redirected toward the Japanese
occupation, and following national Independence in 1949, towards the Indonesian state based in Jakarta. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM, was formed in 1976 as both a political and military resistance to what the Acehnese saw was yet another in a series of occupations, this time by the “Javanese” (Reid 2004; Aspinall 2006).

A number of laws were enacted to quell the violence but any action taken by the government to ameliorate the bloodshed inevitably failed due to continued escalations of real and perceived human rights abuses being committed by the Jakarta government (Reid 2004). Special autonomy for Aceh (Law 44/1999) expanded the breadth of local power for Islamic law, customary law, and education. Special autonomy law for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) (Law 18/2001) allowed for the implementation of shariah law and access to 70% of oil and gas revenues for the next 8 years. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002 also failed to reduce violence (Missbach 2009).

The seeds of an eventual ceasefire were sewn as a result of the cataclysmic tsunami that struck coastlines around the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, of which Aceh was an epicenter. The tsunami claimed more than 160,000 lives in Aceh and decimated entire villages, leaving 550,000 more people displaced. As a result, the central government was coerced into letting of humanitarian aid and assistance enter the region (Miller and Bunnel 2010).

Peace talks with GAM were resumed though violence persisted. Peace accords were signed in Helsinki in August 2005 which included giving special autonomy to Aceh including ‘self-government’ as opposed to special autonomy offered in previous concessions. The Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA 11/2006) passed in July 2006 (Missbach 2009). By the time of the ceasefire in August 2005, more than 15,000 lost their lives in the conflict (Miller and Bunnel 2010).
1.4 Decentralization Reforms in Indonesia

Jakarta has long been the fulcrum Indonesian authority, citing the necessity to maintain national unity in such a geographically massive and diverse state (Alm et al 2001). In the period following President Suharto’s resignation following the Asian financial crisis (Sumintono 2009), a massive structural reform began among governmental institutions through the processes of deconcentration and globalization. Globalization as described by Dale and Robertson (2006), the most recent form of capital accumulation, is epitomized by neoliberal policy. Throughout the neoliberal model, influence is wrested from the state and ceded upwards to the global market forces or localized downwards, what Gough (2004) has referred to as ‘neo-liberal localism.’ The prevailing perception is that centralized authority is an impediment to democratic expression (Weiler 1993; Malen 1994) and economic efficiency. What has emerged in Indonesia, as throughout the world, is what Brenner (2004) has called ‘a fundamental restructuring of traditional nation states economically, politically, and geographically.’

Contrary to the prognostications of some political-economic theorists, the rapid globalization and subsequent global market integration has not led to the demise of the traditional nation state but in its reconfiguration politicially, geographically, economically, and socially (Brenner 2004). Decentralization occurs along a continuum between four dimensions: degree, breadth, location, and functions of power transfer (Sumintono 2009). Three definitive forms are described in the literature (Abu-Duhou 1999; Rondinelli et al 1989; Zajda and Gamage 2009)

1. **Deconcentration**- the transfer ‘of some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies, and it is a shifting of the workloads from centrally located officials to staff or offices of the regional capital or center’ (Abu-Duhou 1999)

2. **Delegation**- The transfer of some functions of decision making and management to lower levels while remaining indirectly controlled by central government (Sumintono 2009)
3. Devolution- The creation or strengthening of ‘sub-national units of government’ which are considerably outside of the direct control of central authority (Rondinelli 1983)

Sumintono (2009) notes that ‘the nature of regulation that allocates power to some levels and not others reflects the social reality of power within the society.’ The differing forms have far reaching implications in regards to local participation and democracy (Daun and Mundy 2011). Notably, in Indonesia, reorientation of power from the central government is described as ‘deconcentration,’ considered the weakest form of power transfer (Alme et al 2001). Such reticence towards large-scale power devolution from the central government will be discussed further in chapter 6.

Specifically, Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government (UU PD) and Law No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions (UU PKPD) were the catalysts of the decentralization process. The implementation of these laws, which commenced on 1 January 2001, is transforming intergovernmental fiscal relations in Indonesia. (Alm et al 2001). These laws would soon have major effects on educational policy and the eventual implementation of SBM throughout Indonesia.

Law No. 22/1999 eradicated the hierarchical nature of the district (referred to as *kota* for urban areas and *kapubutan* for rural areas) and provincial governments. The district governments are granted more autonomy and no longer defer to the provincial governor, but are held accountable by the locally elected assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, or DPRD). In contrast, the provinces maintain their upward relationship with the central government (Alm et al 2001). It also makes the district level the responsibility of the local governments, with a few exceptions. This law was eventually replaced by law no. 32/2004 that further clarified these relationships, where there was no stated hierarchal determination between municipality and provincial governments, and the provincial government would act as regents of the central government, thus extending its power.
Alternatively, governors are to be locally elected, engendering accountability locally (Simatupang 2009).

Law No.25/1999 reforms the monetary transfer systems from central to local governments. No longer would local governments receive separate transfer for civil servant salaries but receive block grants but a general allocation fund for the region to be used at their discretion. The devolution of responsibilities to provincial and local kota/kobaputan coincides with expectations of efficiency and accountability. In principle, the restructuring of government is meant to bring it closer to the people, and therefore more responsive to their immediate needs. Having laid out the political and economic/financial context of deconcentration/decentralization in Indonesia, I will now address the effects of such on the education system.

### 1.5 Education Legislation

Despite rapid economic growth and global influence, the state of education in Indonesia on the national level remains vastly incongruous to the economic indicators. The scale of the Indonesian education sector is massive, operating about 170,000 primary schools and 25,000 junior high across its 33 provinces, serving over 40 million children (Vernez et al 2013).

The decentralization of education partly began in the 1990s spurred by criticisms of the perceived over-centralization of the government. Further social pressures emerging towards the end president Suharto’s regime forced the government to take action in all its public sectors (Amirrachman et al 2009; Bandur 2009). Following the resignation of Suharto, the new government put forth a number of measures aimed at restructuring the education system in line with laws already in place (Bandur 2009).

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2 More than 90% of the primary schools are public, with that proportion decreasing to 44% for junior high and 33% for secondary schools. Close to 50 percent of students attend schools in urban areas. Enrollment is almost universal at primary school (95%) but drops to 66% in secondary schools (Vernez et al 2013).
Passed in 2002 Kepmendiknas No. 044/U/2002 mandated that all districts must form school committees and education boards (Amirrachman et al. 2009). Indonesia implemented a comprehensive SBM curriculum for all its public, private, and madrasa schools with the passage of the Law on The National Education System (No. 20/2003), Aceh being no exception. Law 20 in 2003 officially established SBM as the modus operandi of school management across the country (Vernez et al. 2013).

Finally, two important measures were adopted in 2005. Firstly, Peraturan Pemerintah 19/2005 put forth clear regulation in regards to the expected standards of school based management, one of which was school development planning. Secondly, the government introduced School Operational Funding (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah known as BOS grants are based on a fixed per pupil calculation), providing for the first time a consistent per capita based funding. This funding has been increasing greatly, 50% in 2009 and a supposed 30% more in 2012 (Heyward et al. 2011). Before returning to the topic of SBM in more depth, I will quickly discuss the structure and purpose of the forthcoming chapters.

### 1.6 Thesis Structure and Research Focus

This study aims to describe the ‘dynamic interplay between social, political, and economic structures, institutions, and actors at multiple levels’ (Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2013) by exploring political utilities of discourse and power, its applications and repercussions, in the context of SBM implementation in Aceh province, Indonesia. The primary research question is this:

To what extent does the implementation of school based management in Aceh represent democratic, inclusive, and transformative participation or to what extent does it mirror and reify existing power relations at multiple scales? The issue of scales necessitates three sub domains of inquiry:

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3 See figure 1 in appendix for full operationalization table
1) How has education decentralization transformed the political, economic, and social landscape?

2) Who participates in the SBM process and implementation in regards to inclusiveness and representation of the local community?

3) What is the capacity of the participatory reforms to foster transformatory change given the current cultural, political, and economic contexts?

In an attempt to adequately answer these questions, I have divided up the thesis thusly. In Chapter 2, I use a literature review to flesh out the basic tenants of SBM and the theory behind its implementation as well as its current manifestation in Indonesia. The role and purpose of the school committee is then briefly discussed. This chapter is followed by a theoretical framework that is intended to provide a solid theoretical base from which the research was conducted and by which the reader may be prepared to engage the empirical analysis (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 4 is dedicated to explicating the methodological process of the research. The empirical section, chapters 5 and 6, lays forth the current findings while concomitantly comparing and contrasting these to relevant research and theory. Finally, Chapter 7 attempts to address the research question and reflect on the current research.
Chapter 2

2.1 Literature review: School Based Management

2.1a Participatory approaches to development

Participatory educational approaches fall along a continuum that encompass neoliberal, liberal, and progressive paradigms. It is through these lenses that policy makers conceptualize the policy-making environment, as the associated ideas and narratives ‘provide the cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world’ (Hay 2002). Each differs on the grounds of governance principles, strategies, modes of participation, actors, the relation to the market, and views on the nature of the citizen (Edwards and Klees 2012). To eventually place Indonesia, and by proxy Aceh, along this spectrum, I will very briefly provide an overview of the central characteristics of each before focusing examination solely on SBM.

The neoliberal model is grounded in neoclassical economics in which consumer pressures and market forces, coinciding with the systematic erosion of state authority and power ultimately result in outcomes of efficiency and accountability and, for education, the attendant academic improvements. The primary proponents consist of international finance institutions, global development institutions, and conservative think tanks. Participation is seen as part of ‘the invisible hand’, exercised through mechanisms like school councils, and school choice (Edwards and Klees 2012).

The Liberal paradigm conceptualizes participation as a process that involves individuals, communities and civil service organizations (CSOs) in the developmental process. Participation is conceptualized as an instrumental value utilized to ‘improve, strengthen, and legitimate policies’ and/or as an ‘input for official or otherwise institutionally circumscribed processes’ (Edwards and Klees 2012). It is a layered approach that mediates between existing institutions, often driven by multi-laterals and INGOs (Ibid).
 Progressive reforms on the other hand are born of the critical perspective, in particular critical pedagogy or popular education that insists its adherents question the existence of existing structures of governance and development. They are based on the premise that participation cannot be excised from empowerment and must result in a process in which social, economic, and political power relationships are addressed and replaced with alternative systems (Edwards and Klees 2012).

Incarnations of SBM exist within neoliberal and liberal strategies of educational development. To adequately examine the state of SBM Aceh, we first must look broadly at context specific studies regarding SBM that have been conducted specifically within the Indonesian context up to this point, while bearing in mind the implicit discursive and macro-political elements. First, we will examine the tenants and history of SBM.

2.1b SBM- A Brief Introduction

SBM is considered a participatory approach to education reform. The adoption of SBM in Indonesia is not without precedence, as education decentralization has been occurring systematically globally. SBM has emerged as the methodology of choice in the education sector (Bandur 2009) and can take many different forms that vary along a continuum in regards to the ‘responsibilities and authority delegated to the school’ and to whom it is devolved (Vernez et al 1013). First developed and implemented in America, Canada, the UK, and Australia it involves the systematic decentralization of responsibility and authority directly to the school level. The school gains autonomy in regards to goals, policies, curriculum, standards and accountability. SBM promotes the broadening of constituencies in decision making to include a variety of stakeholders possibly including students, parents, teachers, and community leaders. In theory, SBM grants schools greater autonomy of schools to manage resources, determine the ways in which educational resources are delivered, increase flexibility, determine the direction of the school, ensure quality education, and respond to the needs of the community (Cranston 2001). It has been called a ‘pragmatic approach to a formal alteration of the bureaucratic model of
school administration with a democratic structure’ (Bandur 848, cites Gamage 1996)

This allocation of responsibility and decision making to the local level is based on the premise that those closest to the ground and knowledgeable about local context should have a strong voice in the decision making and be responsible for those decisions. (Weiler 1993; Dempster 2000; Anderson 1998). Theoretically, an increase in accountability, community participation, efficiency, and student outcomes will be achieved. Through the strategic planning, improved financial management, and community participation (Heywood et al 2011) equity and access should be increased as well (Firman and Tola 2008). SBM is also intended to increase leadership among stakeholders of a school (Worldbank.org), while increased participation of parents is theorized to incite local pressure to improve quality and accountability (Daun and Mundy 2011).

In Latin America, two evaluations reported that that SBM contributed to an improvement in test scores (World Bank Cites Kind and Olzer 1998, Olzer 2001). In Mexico the program has resulted in the extra resource procurement by rural and disadvantaged schools, although more additional studies correlating SBM with clear educational outcomes is lacking (Heyward et al 2007, Malen 1993). Recently, a 2010 meta-analysis by Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos compared the effects of 20 intensive SBM programs in 11 developing countries that varied largely along the continuum of devolved authority mentioned previously. The results regarding efficacy were varied within and across the interventions due, ostensibly, to the contextual (political, economic, and methodological) variations that occur between forms of SBM and the contingencies in which they are implemented.

2.1c A political history of SBM

SBM policies have been promulgated by International Organizations (IOs) for almost 20 years (Poppema 2012), yet there remains no clear empirical impetus for such massive promotion aside from a handful of studies with mixed results and minimum improvements that often lack clear cause. A brief examination of the historicity of
SBM policies clearly show that such massive pushes for institutional restructuring and destructuralization are not divorced from economic and political motivations. Similarly, Edwards and Klees (2012) note that ‘calls for and examples of participation are always political and ideological.’ Even today, educational decentralization is often a precondition for IO assistance (Bjork 2003).

The history of SBM has been criticized as having been motivated by desires to systematically undermine political and economic sovereignty, specifically in places where social movements and reforms inconsistent with the neoliberal zeitgeist have occurred. The first examples of SBM projects occur in Central America, specifically Honduras and El Salvador, where massive investments (either overt or covert) were made militarily, economically, and politically to groups opposing the populist movements gaining traction. The ultimate goal of such interventions was the creation of a social and economic structure conducive to the neoliberal free market model (Popemma 2012).

In both cases, movements rooted in popular democracy and nationalism were undermined due to their perceived incongruity with neoliberalism. SBM was a tool mobilized to undermine popular sentiments and instill a more conservative and market-friendly society. The popular educational movements that were highly successful in expanding and improving educational outcomes were doomed because of their roots in emancipatory and social-democratic ideology (Novelli 2012; Popemma 2012). Subsequent education decentralization projects have, in general, followed these early models.

2.1d SBM in Indonesia

As mentioned previously, SBM is not homogenous in its manifestations. The characteristics differ widely along two dimensions: amount of authority devolved, and to whom the authority is devolved unto (Vernez et al 2013). The form being introduced in Indonesia is considered moderate (Bruns et al 2011; Barrera-Ossario et al 2009) where school councils exist but serve only an advisory position, and the
authority to higher and fire teachers remains within state control (Barerra-Ossario et al 2009; Vernez et al 2013).4

The educational paradigm adopted in Indonesia exists between the neoliberal and liberal, where support for both policy development and implementation is done with the explicit aid and direction of international aid organizations, the central government, and with existing civil service organizations (CSOs). The goals of efficiency, accountability, and competition are seen as key to improve educational quality (Yonazawa and Muta 2001)

The Decentralized Basic Education 1 (DBE1), funded by USAID, was conducted by in Indonesia from 2005-2011 to explore the effect of the decentralization education policies that began in the 1990s and were later cemented by law No. 044/U/2002. Aceh was a participant in this initial study by USAID, and showed positive improvement (RTI 2010). The program in DBE1 was school based and involved many stakeholders in the school community. Teachers, parents, principals, staff, and community members were all involved. Teachers were trained in SBM methods on-site throughout the project (Heyward et al 2011).

In Indonesia preliminary data suggests that implementation of SBM may (emphasis added) create an environment conducive to managerial and participatory improvements in schools and, over time, can improve learning outcomes (Heyward et al 2011). Analyses of the 2003 and 2006 International Student Assessment also showed improved learning outcomes associated with SBM. Heyward et al the note that these outcomes are true only if SBM is implemented with ‘exemplary pedagogics’ and, further, that links are difficult to establish and to prove in the short term. They further recognize the possibility that schools were already undergoing improvement. Although decentralization began in the 1990s, Indonesian students scored 34 (Math) and 36 (Science) out of 45 participating countries on the TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Study) in 2003 (Firman and Tola 2008). Bjork (2006) implicates the lack of solid results and difficulties of education

4 See figure 2 in appendix for classification of SBM reforms by region
decentralization has met in Indonesia due to the incongruity of a strong centralized history (discussed further in Chapter 5)

2.1e The School Committee

In Indonesia, school committees (komite sekolah) operate as an advisor and facilitator for the implementation of a school’s educational policy. The SC exists as the primary avenue for participation for parents, the community, and other relevant stakeholders. Importantly, they are also given responsibility for fiscal oversight, mediating between the community, school and government, and lastly, the duty to ensure transparency and accountability at the school (Vernez et al 2013). The comprehensive World Bank study by Vernez et al note the following intended functions, among others, of the school committee:

- Provide recommendations and input about educational programs and policy, oversee school budget plans, development of facilities, teacher training, and other school-related issues
- Provide outreach to increase commitment of local society to quality education
- Increase parental motivation and participation in their child’s education
- Collect monetary and educational resources for the school
- Supervise and evaluate implementation of educational policy and program implementation

According to government legislation, the SC is to be composed of parents, educational professional organizations (such as the regional education council), alumni and students, representatives of the business sector, and prominent figures of the community. The chair is to be elected by the SC members, and no participants receive compensation. The mandate stipulates that a five-member preparation committee composed of the principle and representatives of teachers and parents are to select potential candidates of which are subjected to election (Vernez et al 2013).
2.2 Case studies

The case studies included in this research differed dramatically in their physical, managerial, and educational environments. Both cases were chosen due to their relatively close proximity to the research institute (ICAIOS, the International Center for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies), their physical location (one urban and one rural) and their willingness to participate in the study. Case study 1 (CS1, Banda Aceh) was located less 1 kilometer from the two primary higher educational institutions in the area and ICAIOS. It is the school of choice for many of the lecturers at these universities due to both its proximity and its reputation as a quality school. A large gate surrounds the two-story school where, inside, classrooms surround a large courtyard lined with shade-bearing trees and a wrought-iron gate. A volleyball net, sports equipment, and benches dot the grounds. At first sight, the school is structured and clean in both its facilities and management style. According to the principle, the school consists of 391 students and 25 teachers, a medium sized school according to her. Parents of students consistently note the high quality and standards of the school and it ranks in the top quartile in Banda Aceh according to 2012/2013 test results.\(^5\) The school committee seems to be high functioning, to the extent that, as the principle explained, the school has acted as a model school for observation by committee members and school management from districts as far as Central Aceh and Nagan Raya.

Less than 10 kilometers away, case study 2 (CS2) in Aceh Besar stood in stark contrast. The school consists of a three sided school building surrounding a dusty courtyard. It enrolled 96 students in the 2013 school year. CS2 ranked just below the median score for its district in the 2012/2013 testing. Many students lacked shoes and school uniforms seem to be optional and do not match. Acehnese is spoken as the primary language of the school, Bhasa Indonesia secondly, and English or other languages are functionally non-existent. Upon our first arrival, the kids spill out of the rooms enthusiastically and remain outside for the rest of our time there. Some teachers have not shown up to their posts. In both case studies, I

\(^5\) Scores derived from each school's sum results in Math, Science, and Bahasa Indonesia.
have attempted to gain insight from a variety of stakeholders including parents, teachers, principals, administrators, and SC members.
Chapter 3

3.1 Theoretical Framework

For this research I will employ various trends of thought in post-structuralist and critical realist theory. Post-structuralism encompasses a vast body of literature and has spawned many theoretical factions within its domain. Post-structuralism is often used interchangeably with post-modernism, which Jean-Francois Lyotard described as an ‘incredulity of meta-narratives’ (Cited in Parfitt 2012). This entails a dismissal of the all-encompassing theories of human history and development. Examples of which may be the market fundamentalism (epitomized be neoliberal ideology) espoused by the World Bank, or as in this paper, participatory reforms as a universal remedy. A general skepticism of positivist and empiricist claims of reality is maintained due to the general dismissal of universal truths (Parfitt 2012 online).

Though much of the theory is anchored in post-structuralist thought on discourse, the primary source research is not confined specifically to this domain. Post-structuralism does not adequately address issues of agency and structure. Therefore, I will apply much of the epistemological and ontological aspects of critical realism (specifically the strategic-relational approach, SRA, developed by Bob Jessop and Colin Hay) in the research questions and data interpretation. Both theories deny mechanistic, reductionist, and all-encompassing theories of power, discourse, and development. Critical realism contends that mechanistic type models of state power must be consistently reformed due the natural dynamics and complexities of actual states and that means by which legitimacy is assured is contextually and historically distinct. Actors, whether states, institutions, or individuals, navigate a complex political, economic, and social environment that is never stagnant, but full of ‘contradictions and movements’ (Jessop 2006).

The strategic relational approach (SRA), specifically, conceptualizes structures as strategically selective in form, content and operations, and actions are regarded as structurally embedded (constrained), context-sensitive, and structuring. Jessop’s
approach shows how structures and agents act on strategies that privilege some strategies, actors, identities, and spatial-temporal horizons in their reproduction. It also leaves room for reflexivity by both structures (capable of agency) and agents (capable of structuralization) in subsequent reproduction or transformation (Jessop 2006).

The efficacy of strategic action is much contingent on access to resources and knowledge, where those lacking in such face significant impediments compared to those with access. It is in this framework that Hay defines power - the ability to shape contexts in which the less power formulate strategy. Naturally, structural constraints imposed by actors with higher levels of structuralization, whether intentional or unintentional, set the context for the relatively powerless may or may not engage in meaningful influence or strategic action (Hay2002).

Inspired by Dale and Robertson's recent work regarding a 'Critical, Cultural Political Economy of Education,' or CCCPE (2013), an attempt has been made for the integration of culture into the examination of the political and economic. They, in turn, have drawn upon Jessop's Cultural Political Economy, which asserts that that both history and institutions constitute economic and political dynamics (2004) and focuses on the process of semiosis in the process of social and economic reproduction.

The dynamic environment, composed of institutional frameworks, history, culture, power, and economics form the encompassing contingency called the strategically selective context (Hay 2002), in which actors form strategic calculations and engage in strategic action. Access to knowledge and resources influence the efficacy of particular actions to reproduce or transform the strategically selective context. Strategic selectivities are the potential avenues of strategic action, actor specific, that are utilized according to the current evaluations in the strategic selective context as a whole. The dialectic of strategic actors embedded within the strategically selective context and engaging in strategic calculation and actions is summed up by the following figure reproduced from Hay (2002)
The sum of these actions ultimately determine who participates and for what end. Hay also acknowledges the reflexive and learning capabilities of actors to re-evaluate strategy. Outcomes can result in the (partial) transformation or reproduction of the overall strategically selective context.

Robertson and Dale point out the ‘tendency to reduce the political and economic largely to—albeit complex—contexts for education (capitalism), on the one hand, and in viewing the cultural as policy ‘discourse’, on the other’ (Robertson and Dale 2013). A myopic examination of only one or two of these domains (political, economic, or cultural) would fail to take into consideration ‘the fact that education represents, and is reflected, in crucial multiple relationships with, and within, societies; it is a complex and variegated agency of social reproduction’ (Ibid). It is the hope of this research to lay forth some of the current underpinnings of the
complex and multi-scalar strategically selective context in which participatory reforms are being implemented in Aceh.

In the next section I will delve into theoretical components based in post-structural and critical theory utilized in analysis. Firstly I will briefly summarize the tenants of critical discourse analysis before describing relevant components of discourse, dubbed ‘floating signifiers, and their relation to particular political utilities described in the analysis (control, legitimation, as well as collusion and co-optation). These political utilities represent strategic action by which various actors and institutions may undermine or foster meaningful change or further exacerbate inequalities within the Indonesian and Acehnese context.

3.1a Critical Discourse Analysis

A major theoretical movement within post-structuralist thought is critical discourse analysis (CDA), much of which is based on the work of Michele Foucault. It would later play a prominent role throughout all critical theories. CDA contends that knowledge and power are inescapably linked. As he notes in *Discipline and Punish*:

> Power and knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (1979, p 27).

Parfitt (2012) defines discourse as a ‘field or body of knowledge constituted by a power relation’ that is likely to mirror the meanings and interests conferred on it by elite groups. Power and domination are inherent in language, and ‘discourse is used as a set of statements concepts and expressions which constitute a way of understanding particular issues and ‘framing’ the subject in such a way that what can be talked about and what the subject compromises is formulated so that they reinforce existing power relations’ (Cooke 2001). It is the purpose of the critical discourse analyst to investigate ‘the role of discourse in the challenge and (re)production of dominance’ (van Dijk 1993). This promotion of particular narratives by elites will be important when discussing Jessop’s ‘strategic selectivities’ in section 3.2.
The discourse of participation in the developmental contexts has become ubiquitous among development agencies, NGOs, governmental organizations, and local communities as a response to criticisms of traditional top-down development (Cooke and Kothari 2001). In conjunction with the almost universal uptake of participatory reforms among and within institutions, critical theoretical concerns have also been voiced. Many of these concerns culminated in Cooke and Kothari’s *Participation: The New Tyranny?* (2001). Post-structural theorists contend that issues of power, privilege, and coercion must also be brought to the foreground, and recognize participation and education as discourse. Luke (1996) notes in his seminal work on educational discourse:

Like other types of ‘official knowledge’ educational research is mediated by a complex political economy that entails the immediate statements and imperatives of the institutions it serves; the politics of the academics, government funding agencies and corporations where theory, research, and curriculum are undertaken; and larger political and economic interests that influence what can be said, by whom, and in what terms across and within institutions (Luke 1996 p.3).

Dale and Robertson (2006) explain how the appropriation (co-optation) of education models from above, i.e. adopting a externally formulated system from above such as SBM, plays a ‘direct and functional’ role in global capital accumulation. This is implemented through global pressures by which the most powerful actors exert disproportional influence in both the designing and implementation of educational policy and pedagogics. They further argue that such motivations for educational reform and investment are not premised on grounds of educational significance, but on returns on investment (Robertson and Dale 2013). Through the standardization and application of externally derived education policy, the role of the market is extended and the role of the nation-state reduced (Ibid.). Williams (2004) writes:

Whenever the World Bank places its faith in a new buzz-word, developing nations are forced to follow suit. Hence, ‘participation’ is being increasingly written in to
South government’s (social) development projects, both as a method of delivery and (although perhaps more rarely) as an intended outcome in itself (2004, p558).

Participation discourse is often framed in a way that negates alternatives. Such limited discursive conceptualizations 'may eliminate a whole range of realistic alternatives' (Hay 2002). It replaces the radical and fundamental ideas in the roots of participation with participation that is conservative and less threatening to the status quo and powerful interests (Cooke 2001). SBM projects are typically implemented in countries where international organizations have a great deal of political and economic leverage such as post-conflict areas and areas undergoing substantial social, political, or economic transformations (Popemma 2012). Aceh specifically, and Indonesia more broadly, fit squarely into this demographic. The political history SBM as discussed in the previous chapter shows clearly that policy is not, and has never been divorced from global interests and discursive power. The following sections address other ways in which participatory reforms may be depoliticized on other scales.

3.1b Floating signifiers and colloquial notions

Central to many post-structuralist’s conceptions of the power of language are ‘floating signifiers’ that, according to Rahnema (2010) are ‘Like Lego pieces, the words fit arbitrarily together and support the most fanciful constructions. They have no content, but do serve a function.’ These high valence words maintain disparate meanings depending on the purpose of utilization and by whom (Anderson 2010). The idiosyncratic meanings cannot be dissociated from things like class, race, gender, age, ideology, etcetera, rendering them definitionally meaningless, yet high in symbolic and knowledge capital. Participation, community, and even globalization, central to SBM and development discourse are just a few and will be briefly discussed.

Unsurprisingly, globalization itself does not have a singular definition. It conceptualization and utilization as such differs among theorists and actors, ultimately conforming to their ideological preconceptions about the causes and
mechanisms in the world in which they operate. It is a theoretical floating signifier, maintaining disparate meaning and function for neo-liberals, Marxists, structuralists, post-structuralists, and so on. Much of the discrepancies lie in the issues related to agency and structure as much as the role of capital and power. Necessarily, this research is premised on one such conceptualization of globalization, stemming from the SRA primarily.

The notion of participation in particular is a commanding floating signifier. Rahnema (2010) recognizes often-dismissed components of participation. Participation by definition does not only encompass transitive aspects (goal-oriented, fulfilling, empowering) but intransitive properties as well. Further, it is not always a free exercise, but may be or manipulated or teleguided, co-opted or coerced. In sum, participation is not always related to the moral and desirable goals that that rhetoric would have us conjure (Rahnema 2010), but the reductivist tendency has become encompassing as a potent element of discourse.

Finally, The floating signifier lurks deeply beneath the central notion of ‘community’, a word so central to the stated goals of SBM. Colloquially, community conjures ideas of solidarity and belonging, or of locality, social activity, or social structure. Some may assume that because of prolonged common struggle for autonomy that the Acehnese are a relatively homogenous community. This notion is easily discredited by even just a cursory critical analysis. Communities include class, gender, status, politics, occupation, interests, and beliefs among any number of others and the social categorizations are limitless and permeable. There is an inclination to treat communities as singular and unproblematic in their spatial boundaries as opposed to multi-faceted and conflating (Williams 2004) and occurring within power structures. Uncritically using high-valence rhetoric such as ‘community’ ignores power differences (Williams 2004) and implies false homogeneity. Alternately, community should be conceptualized as a living and contested entity (Hickey and Mohan 2004).
Like participation, community commonly represents a subjective good, Giddens (1994 cited in Reynolds 2000) further elucidates aspects of the more nefarious tendencies of communities. Communities may act as mechanisms of oppression, capable of undermining individual autonomy and exerting ‘compelling pressures towards conformism.’

The highly symbolic nature of participatory rhetoric provides those who utilize it political utility (Weiler 1993), a strategic resource akin to those alluded to by Hay (2002). This political utility extends to a number of domains and a few of the almost infinite (legitimation, co-optation, collusion, and control) are discussed below. Using the discourse of participation and community, participatory reforms may reinforce privilege and actually increase the control exerted on participants (Weiler 1993; Malen 1994; Barker 1993; Anderson 2006). Next, some the political utilities derived of participatory discourse will be discussed in some detail.

### 3.2 Strategic Selectivities and the Political Utilities of Discourse: Control, Legitimization, Collusion and Co-optation

#### 3.2a Strategic Selectivities

There is an inherent political utility based on the notion of participation that extends beyond participation in practice (Anderson 2006; Anderson 1998; Malen 1994). The legitimizing nature of participatory reforms can be used in ways that maintain rather than change the status quo, reinforce privilege, and increase control exerted on participants via a number of forces. (Anderson 2006; Williams 2004; Anderson 1998; Barker 1993; Malen 1994). Political utilities are forms of strategic action, derived from the field of strategic selectivities given a particular strategically selective context. This research focuses on five of such ‘political utilities:’ 1) control, 2) co-optation and collusion, and 3) legitimation and conflict management.

Such political utilities permeate both the discourse and practice of SBM, and are central components used in the forthcoming analysis. They represent a few of
mechanisms and avenues of strategic selectivity employed by the actors to further economic interests, social cohesion or exclusion, and political legitimacy, among other goals (Jessop 2010; Jessop 2001). It is important how these particular political utilities have been utilized in the decentralization process in ways that may thwart attempts towards transformatory participation in education.

3.2b Control

Participation as a mechanism of control is put forth by Barker (1993) and reiterated by Anderson (2006) and Malen (1994). They propose that participatory policy in organizations represent a disciplinary practice where through the shift of responsibilities downward from management, employees are increasingly regulated through self-management. Instead of empowerment, this results in a more effective form of control and increased productivity. It obfuscates the source of control while simultaneously increasing it (Barker 1993; Anderson 2006). Sumintono (2009 cites McGinn and Welsh 1999) defines decentralization of regulation as a framework that is used to ‘constrain and shape decisions and behaviors of [the] organizations members.’

Barker calls this ‘concertive control.’ Associations, committees, and contracts channel participation in predictable ways and are established community structures that mirror familiar bureaucratic structures (Cleaver 2001). Cooke (2001) calls this the ‘domestication of dissent,’ which restricts participation to pre-determined arenas. He contends that the spread of participatory reforms represent the spread of managerialist and neoliberal thinking from the private sector to NGOs, donors, and state bureaucracies and reflect the idea that a single technocratic approach can be applied universally to all contexts.

3.2c Co-optation and Collusion

Malen (1994) explains that when institutions are charged with a demand of effectiveness and coordination, they are prone to delegate tasks rather than relinquish power. Hence, deconcentration, the weakest form of decentralization, as opposed to devolution or delegation. Through the process of co-optation, lesser
organizations are incorporated into pre-existing policies. By incorporating marginalized groups, it may simply draw them closer to the structure by which they are subjugated; the very act of inclusion as a participant can be seen as an extension of power by another (Kothari 2001).

Co-optation extends to individuals when organizational members buy into goals and policy developed somewhere else, often steeped in populist rhetoric (Anderson 2006) such as participation. These symbolic associations can be capitalized on to dispel criticisms, acquire legitimacy and garner support (Weiler 1993; Malen 1993). Under the auspice of neutral or universally positive discourse, the political utility of the rhetoric of participation is actualized.

Participatory structure often become arenas that foster collusion among dominate groups with similar interests. Bacharach and Botwinick (1992 cited Anderson 2006) describe the inegalitarian nature of participatory system that tends to benefit the rich over the poor and the active of the apathetic. Pradham et al (2013) showed that active engagement of the community and fair representation via a transparent and democratic process can not only engage those not typically represented, but lead, when in combination with other interventions, to better learning outcomes. Unfortunately, such progressive representations are not the norm, and participatory structures tend to represent those with existing authority.

3.2d Legitimization and Conflict Management

Malen (1994) and Weiler (1993) define legitimacy as the ‘normative basis of authority,’ supported by it’s ‘symbolic rightness.’ Legitimacy has its base in core values and ‘general perceptions of fairness and humanness.’ While the state maintains the precarious task of maintaining control while maintaining or enhancing legitimacy, often, maintaining control results in a loss of legitimacy and vice versa (Weiler 1993). Decentralization legislation tends to arise from political turmoil at all levels of a government (Sumintono 2009) and is rooted in a state’s ongoing need to legitimize itself (Weiler 1993; Malen 1994). Decentralization functions as a means by which the state maintains or increases control by means of
utilizing populist and democratic rhetoric. Thus, decentralization is a tool for control, conflict management, and ‘compensatory legitimation’ (Weiler 1993).

The symbolic rightness is rooted in such ‘high-valence’ rhetoric like community and participation. Participation is used to foster legitimacy on multiple scales, from global IOs, to the central government down, and horizontally from the school to stakeholders in the community. Locally, participatory reforms that seek to broaden constituencies by reaching out to parents and communities are linked to the need for the institutions to gain legitimacy from the relevant stakeholders. On the local and national scales, implementation of SBM fosters an air of systematic and responsive democratization. It gives the impression of being on the cutting edge of educational practice, responsive, and democratic. This process of legitimization may be paramount to actual outcomes. This is suggested by the weak empirical warrant SBM (Malen 1994; Heyward 2010). Therefore this ulterior purpose based in the need for legitimation and capitalizing on participatory rhetoric may be a primary motive behind implementation.

A critique of the top-down implementation of SBM is that it acts to add parallel structures through which conflict may be diffused by the existence of “additional layers of insulation.” These layers protect the central government or school management from “contentious interaction” and unpopular decisions (Weiler 1993; Malen 1994). By incorporating large and diverse group of people into the foundation of a project or policy, people involved are deemed to be determinates of the success or failure, whether or not the participants are directly involved. The burden of success is therefore effectively transferred from the macro-level or meso-level to the micro-level, and in the process the government, or implementing organization, has distanced itself from failure (Williams 2004). In sum, these reforms may be enacted more for their utilitarian properties than their substantive viability (Malen 1994).
3.3 Existing frameworks and Conceptual Scheme

In the process of deconstructing the politics and discourse of education, Anderson (2006) posits an analytical framework from which one can attempt to move toward what he calls “authentic participation.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micropolitical Considerations:</th>
<th>Key question...</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity as...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad inclusion</td>
<td>Who participates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Participation</td>
<td>Participation in which spheres?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic local conditions and processes</td>
<td>What conditions and processes should be present locally?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macropolitical Considerations:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coherence between means and ends of participation</td>
<td>Participation toward what end?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on broader structural inequities</td>
<td>What conditions and processes should be present at broader institutional and societal levels?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The framework takes into account both the micro and macro-political scales. Williams 2004, working towards a similar idea of ‘authentic participation’ that she calls ‘radical democracy’ further proffers three more questions:

1) To what extent do participatory development programs contribute to processes of political learning among the poor?
2) To what degree do participatory programs reshape political networks?
3) How do participatory programs affect existing patterns of political representation, including changes to the language of political claims and competition

Both are clearly progressive in their approaches in their engagement of political and social structures. In utilizing these frameworks they have attempted define new and
more specific understandings of participation, rather than relying on symbolic incantation. Anderson’s framework may help us uncover the purposes of particular reforms and the conditions in which they exist. The questions developed by Williams help determine the extent to which reforms can truly be thought of as representing an attempt at real transformation, or simply a reproduction of the status quo. An important aspect of both models regards the means and ends by which people are incorporated. The research questions designed for this study attempt to reflect aspects of both of these frameworks while also attempting to emphasize the interconnectivity of a variety of stakeholders on multiple scales with considerations of agency and power, as opposed to vague notions ‘international community’ (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008) or reductive ideas of ‘community involvement’ and participation. The following conceptual representation attempts to describe the components outlined in the theoretical framework and the multi-scalar relationships therein, composed ‘...of various layers of structures and generative mechanisms’ (Joseph 2000 cited in Robertson and Dale 2013).
The conceptual scheme represents the interrelationships of discourse, culture, political economy, political utilities/strategic selectivities and the subsequent reproduction or transformation of structure and agency. It takes into account three scales of socio-political relationships implicated in this research, in which strategic actors exist. The sum of the components represent ‘strategically selective context’ (Jessop 2009) in which actors may engage. The first and largest represented is the macro-level, consisting of global participatory discourse emanating from, and being imposed by, global institutions and policy-makers.
The meso-level represents the existing power relationships between governments and schools, as well as large-scale influence of Indonesian culture (shared values, norms, taboos, sanctions and their effect on governance, discourse, modes of engagement, etcetera). Finally, the micro-level represents power relationships within and among the local actors and the school. Also implicated is the dialectic between local culture and power structures.

Ends and means is contingent upon the ideological paradigm (neo-liberal, liberal, or progressive), which determines who participates in newly created arenas of participation, the scope of agency and authority delegated to particular actors, as well as the intended outcomes. While progressive reforms, born from below, attempt to restructure and transform existing power relationships, the liberal and neo-liberal ideology in practice in globally and in Indonesia have been criticized as resulting in social reproduction. This limits the number and efficacy of strategic action by the least powerful actors.

In the next chapter, we delve into the methodological process, beginning necessarily, with a brief explication of the epistemological and ontological assumptions from which the research was undertaken.
Chapter 4

4.1 Methodology

4.1a Epistemology and Ontology

Critical realism assumes an ontological realist position that differentiates between the real, actual, and the empirical and their relational nature, or, ‘the internally necessary and/or external contingent relations that obtain within and among the dimensions’ (Jessop 2006). The ‘real’ represents mechanisms that have led to actual events, the actual are the events which have been generated by such mechanisms, and the empirical are the observable experiences.

The critical realist’s epistemological relativism makes a distinction between ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ dimensions of scientific inquiry. The transitive dimension (knowledge) is derived from ‘retroductive theoretical hypotheses about intransitive objects and evidential statements generated through transitive inquiry’ (Jessop 2006). The evidential statements are recognized as being derived from scientific rigor and therefore contingent and fallible. They do not directly reflect real or actual phenomena as they cannot be produced in laboratory conditions, and therefore can only be explanatory (Jessop 2006).

4.2b Methods

The research was conducted in the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar regencies (kota/kabupaten) of Aceh, Indonesia. Much of the data collection process was qualitative involving open and semi-structured interviews with parents, NGO members, students, community members, teachers, government officials, and experts/academics in Banda Aceh. Importantly I was also able to interview members of the community who actively do not, or are not able to participate in the SBM projects, information just as essential to this research as that derived by people who do. By utilizing the semi-structured interview technique, the interviews were directed towards the most pertinent information given the limited time allocated for
the study. Alternately, a survey was utilized to systematically collect opinions and information from parents at one case study.

In total 7 government officials from DINAS (Department of Education), MPD (Aceh Education Council), and LPMP (Indonesian Institute for Quality of Education and Personnel), and one academic researcher involved in the LOGICA 2 study (Local Aid Innovations for Communities in Aceh sponsored by Australian Aid) were interviewed. As explained previously, two case studies were undertaken in both the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar regencies. In case study one (Banda Aceh), the principle, committee head and committee secretary partook in semi-structured, in-depth interviews. 21 parents completed a survey, with 4 of those volunteering to participate in a subsequent in-depth interview. Some primary financial and school committee documents were ascertained. In case study two, the principle and vice principle participated in the semi-structured interview, as well as 6 parents and one focus group of 3 parents participating in informal semi-structured interviews. Primary financial documents were able to be ascertained from this case study. Due to the lack of a functioning school committee, no committee members were available for interviews. Through the LPMP I was able to retrieve government statistics regarding the academic outcomes and standings for the current year (2013) for both of the case studies and their districts. These statistics will be of use in the analysis section to put the case studies in context.

Because the research consists of both qualitative and quantitative data, multiple avenues of analysis were be employed. For the quantitative data (organization data, governmental data, and committee demographic analysis) the statistical software SPSS was utilized. The open-sourced qualitative analysis program TAMS aided in the coding and organization of that data that was derived from the qualitative aspects of the research. It was used to help glean important trends and phenomena out of the seemingly unstructured jumble that can result from months’ worth of extensive interviews.
It is important to note that the roles of many participants overlapped. For example, many of the government officials and parents were also lecturers at the university and some government officials are parents of children in primary schools and have participated in the school committee, but I have referenced them in their primary, and sometimes secondary, capacities as it pertains to this research.

4.1c Unit of analysis

The primary unit of analysis in the research is the school committee. As mentioned before, I attempted to gather information on multiple scales. The following figure represents the scale, indicators and the potential outcomes derived from such data in the analysis of the SCs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meso-Indicators</th>
<th>Micro-Indicators</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental statistics and data</td>
<td>School case studies- Interviews, observations, and demographic analysis of school committees</td>
<td>Capacity of committees to implement change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational (committee and school) data</td>
<td>Interviews with both regional governmental actors and school committees</td>
<td>Who participates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with community members not involved in committee decisions</td>
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Figure 4: Levels of Analysis
4.2 Scope of limitations

Due to the multi-scalar nature of the social and political structures involved in the implementation of SBM, the research must encompass multiple scales. For the purpose of this research, these are divided into the macro, meso, and micro-levels. It would have neither been prudent nor pragmatic to attempt to focus on all levels. For the sake of pragmatics, the focus was narrowed to the meso and micro levels, while the macro level is addressed in the theoretical framework but not empirically addressed in the research methods. The macro-scale consists of the theoretical (and realized) relationships of discourse, power, and agency on various scales and for specific purposes. The research was conducted on the meso-scale (committee-regional) and the micro-scale (committee-community). In the later two, I utilize secondary sources like existing organizational or governmental data, as well as primary data garnered via observation, interviews, and surveys.

I am cognizant that schools in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar do not represent schools in other areas of Aceh. Chambers (2006) calls this limitation of generalizability the spatial bias (cited in Sumner and Tribe 2008). Following the 2004 tsunami, NGOs and aid flowed disproportionately into Banda Aceh to be dispersed throughout the region (UNDP 2010). For this reason, SBM implemented with the help of these organizations and resources may be markedly different in its implementation and outcomes than in other areas of the region. Furthermore, Banda Aceh was spared much of the violence experienced in throughout the region during years of conflict (Reid 2004) which differentiates it from much of the region. To address this, I attempted to vary my case studies.

The literature used, and the data presented, inherently represent forms of academic discourse. This is true not just in the esoteric and theoretical sense. Much of the empirical data presented was generated through funding by the World Bank, for the World Bank, and was conducted according to the standards and practices of the World Bank and affiliated organizations to further particular goals or interests. This was kept in mind throughout the research and analysis and should be noted by the reader.
In accordance with Chambers’ observation cited in the section on depoliticization regarding group representation, I remained be aware as to who represents what aspects of the community and, following the purpose of the research, tried to engage with those who are not part of the SBM project to avoid what he dubs the ‘personal bias’ (Chambers 2006 cited in Sumner 2008). I Furthermore attempted to reduce social desirability bias that occurs when the respondents report answers that cast themselves or their organization/school in a favorable light. Many surveys were completed on school grounds, potentially compounding this effect. Social desirability bias was (attempted to be) ameliorated via the anonymous nature of the survey.

The timing of the fieldwork proved to be, at the very least, inconvenient. The beginning of the fieldwork (mid-June) coincided with the summer holiday for schools in Indonesia. School began in mid-July, and continued shortly before the commencement of the Ramadan holiday, which resulted in decreased school hours and decreased availability of participants and is followed by the week long Idul Fitri holiday.

The duration of the research was relatively short (13 weeks) and covers newly implemented policy that is at once spatially and temporally specific. There remains the necessity for more longitudinal and geographically diverse studies to address the broader context of SBM implementation throughout Aceh and over periods of time.

Importantly, the current research is heavily skewed towards the theoretical. In doing so, I recognize that such a theoretical stretch that encompasses such a relatively short period of empirical work may be viewed skeptically, and perhaps rightly so. But I hope to have begun to lay forward a foundation from which further research may incorporate and link the mutually fortifying components of post-structuralism, SRA, CDA, CCCPE, and CPA in regards to the globalization of education and political economy. I hope to follow up on the current research with future fieldwork endeavors.
4.3 Ethical Considerations

In undergoing research in the developmental context, ethical considerations are tantamount throughout the process. May (1997: 54 cited in Scheyvens 2003) writes that an ethical issue ‘arises when we try to decide between one coarse of action and another not in terms of expediency or efficiency but by reference to standards of what is morally right and wrong.’

I was sensitive to the nature of subjects such as conflict/war, inequality, and corruption (Tribe and Sumner 2008) all somewhat implicated in the context and scope of research. This, along with issues regarding reciprocity and socially ‘correct’ behaviors were determined by consultation with researchers, locals, and NGO workers that have an extensive knowledge of the local context before the research began.

Informed consent (provided orally) ensured that participants participate freely and openly to partake in the research, as well as the option to not participate or withdraw at any time. They were further asked if they are comfortable being recorded before a recording device was turned on. Participants had the right to ask questions at any time regarding the purpose, process, or potential outcomes. Following completion, participants will have access to the final product should they desire it (Scheyvens 2003).

I partook in continuous self-reflexivity and acknowledged how my presence may influence outcomes. At the most extreme end of this principle was to not exacerbate problems between people and groups within the community. I was there as a student and researcher and not an activist. I reject rational objectivity as described by Shevans (2003) and recognize myself as not neutral and apolitical but as reacting/interacting, involved and ultimately responsible.
Chapter 5

Findings: The Strategic Selective Context- Institutional, Cultural, and Socio-Economic Barriers to Participation in Aceh

The role of existing cultural, socio-economic, and political structures and their implicit effect on modes and efficacy of participation is fundamental. Like any context, any reform occurs not in a vacuum, but within a sphere of constantly evolving sets of power inter-relations. SRA importantly pays attention to 'how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, and some actions over others' (Jessop 2004; 2001).

This chapter attempts to extrapolate the institutional, cultural, political and socio-economic context of Aceh in order to more thoroughly link these concepts with participation in practice and as fundamental components of the strategically selective context. Firstly, an attempt to describe the evolving and amoebic institutional structure should help to expound the dynamic and complex nature of the institutional landscape. We then explore how the centralized history of Indonesia, related cultural attitudes, and socio-economic differences may act as fundamental barriers to effective participatory reforms in Indonesia, and Aceh specifically, as they mutually constitute aspects of the strategic selective context.

5.1 Institutional structure

The multi-various structure of educational institutions in Aceh, as they emanate from the national to local levels via various ministries, departments, and councils is complex and multifarious, where spheres of influence and authority often conflate, contradict, or remain obscure (Sumintono 2009; Amarrachman 2009). As yet, I, nor my colleagues, have come across a clear operationalization of these institutions and their inter-relationships. Both for the reader, and for future researchers in the field, we have attempted to provide a working document which may be further extrapolated or amended. From the information gathered at interviews, and with
the help of actors at various levels, a working conceptualization of the organizational structure has been produced collaboratively with colleagues in the field from University of Amsterdam.
Figure 5

Education System
Aceh Province, Indonesia

National Level
- Ministry of Education and Culture
  Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional (MoNE)
- Ministry of Religious Affairs
  Kementerian Agama (MoRA)

Provincial Level
- Governor appoints head
- Department of Education
  Dinas Pendidikan (DoE)
- Minister appoints head
- Department of Religious Affairs
  Dinas Agama (DoRA)

Local Level
- Education Coordination Team
  Tim Koordinasi Pembinaan Pendidikan
- Aceh Council of Education
  Majelis Pendidikan Daerah (MPD)
- MoNE Curriculum
- MoRA Curriculum
- Sub-district Office*
- Local Communities, NGOs, CSOs, Private Sector

State School
- Private
- Public
- SD-S
- SMP-S
- SMA-S
- SMK-S
- SD-N
- SMP-N
- SMA-N
- SMK-N
- *Only in rural areas

Madrasa
- Private
- Public
- MI-S
- MTs-S
- MA-S
- MA-N
- MI-N
- MTs-N
- *Only in rural areas

Secular University
- Syiah Kuala University (SKU)

Religious University
- Institut Agama Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry (IAIN Ar-Raniry)

*SMK is vocational school
*School Committee
*Boarding school

Lembaga Peningkatan Mutu Pendidikan (LPMP)
This conceptualization provides a visual representation of the multi-scalar and (neo)liberal qualities of education system in Aceh and Indonesia as a whole. What is not included, for the sake of pragmatics, are the various inputs both monetarily and technical, of various IOs on multiple scales.

The Aceh Education Council (Majelis Pendidikan Daerah or MPD) was a version of the Education Council developed in Aceh in 1990, well before the 2003 law mandated that such councils be created in every province in the country. A member explains its function:

MPD1- ‘This organization is non-government but in some cases is supporting the government in setting education policies...in monitoring, it is also mediating between the communities and the government including school committees.’

According to their website their goals include developing Islamic education system throughout the province, policy development and advising, monitoring and evaluation, as well as motivating the general public to participate in building and improving the quality of education to innovate and excel (mpd-aceh.org). Education councils are intended to be non-governmental, independent, and equal to local government (Amirrachman et al 2009) but it is difficult to assess to what extent the MPD is actually non-governmental or equal, as it is fully embedded, mandated, by and functionally dependent on the governmental institutions from which it was developed.

TKPPA (Tim Koordinasi Pembangunan Pendidikan Aceh, or Aceh Education Development Coordination Team) was formed by Governor Decree No. 420.05/15/2010. According to their website, TKPPA is responsible for ‘coordinating, reviewing, formulating strategies and policies as well as monitoring and evaluation of educational development in Aceh’ (tkppa.acehprov.gp.id). The same MPD member describes the function of the TKPPA:

MPD1- ‘In 2010 the Government of Aceh established the coordinating team for education development to respond to the idea that Aceh
would need better coordination due to the large amount of money being devoted to education and there has to be a sector wide approach...’

Decentralization necessitates a need for new modes of control and accountability. Therefore, institutions are created where none had existed before (Daun 2009). This need dictated the creation of the LPMP (Lembaga Peningkatan Mutu Pendidikan), a national institute dedicated to quality assurance in education. LPMP measures school and educator performance along a number of scales and measures.

Such a massive restructuring and the development of new arenas authority has necessarily created tensions and conflicts of interest between and among institutions regarding authority and power both horizontally and vertically in the bureaucratic structure (Sumintono, 2009; Amirrachman 2009). Brenner (2009) reiterates the often contentious and ever evolving nature of institutions when viewed via the SRA:

state space never entails the creation of a ‘blank slate’ on which totally new scalar arrangements could be established, but occurs through a conflictual layering process in which emergent rescaling processes collide with and only partially rework inherited landscapes of state scalar organization. (2009, p 134).

These contentions are evidenced by the ambiguity of scope of the Education Council authority and the arising conflicts that have been noted by Sumintono (2009) and Amirrachman (2009). These contentions are also implicated in the reticence of government and school officials to devolve any real authority to the SC, as well as the struggle of SC to understand their functions and to assert the authority they have ostensibly been given by the government mandate. Next, we see that it is not only this evolving, sometimes confusing and contentious institutional landscape that may act as a potential barrier to smooth implementation of participatory education reforms. The protracted history of centralization has made a lasting impression on
the Indonesian psyche. This may impede the uptake and of even the most ‘authentic’ and democratic of participatory reforms (Bjork 2003) and modes of participation.

5.2 Indonesian Culture and the Legacy of Centralization

Perceptions and behaviors of actors towards the decentralization process and participation in SBM reflect the complexity of the social realities. This includes the effects of the highly centralized past of modern Indonesia. Notions of a model citizen have been systematically ingrained in the preceding decades, including strong respect of the social order from a socio-spatial position, as much defined as much from above as below (Bjork 2003). Amirrachman et al (2009) note:

...tensions... accompanied community participation. In the Indonesian context, the tensions seemed to have stemmed both from the legacy of centralization and the socially complex nature of Indonesian society including a certain deference to higher authority (Amirrachman et al 2009 cites Amal 1994; Bjork 2003).

These historically born cultural nuances have led to a reluctance among participants at all levels, beginning at the most basic levels of parental engagement with schools. This predilection in Acehnese society not to ‘rock the boat’ and the culture of deference present throughout the country results in the inability of the marginalized to address their socio-economic or cultural superiors and engage in the participatory process. Power relations were directly felt and experienced by parents in a number of instances. The following dialogue took place with one of the two respondents who were recipients of the BOS scholarship for low-income families at CS1:

R- Are you able to voice your concerns? Why or why not?
P- Since the committee conducts a meeting every 6 months, I get access to tell my aspiration through the meeting. However, I have never delivered it yet because I find it difficult to do it verbally in a meeting as I am not brave enough.

R- Do you feel part of the school community?
P-I do not feel that I am part of the school community because I feel some gaps amongst parents and social class. I consider myself as a person from low social class so it’s not easy to interact with people from a higher social class. On the other hand, I do not think that aspiration from low class people’s opinions would ever be heard, and this happens everywhere including in the villages.*

The MoNE official reiterated the these sentiments:

R-Could a parent show up and say 'I want to be a candidate'?
MoNE-Its very rare, and its Acehnese culture not to impose yourself

The respondent from the low-income family explained further how that in the meetings, even parents coming from the same working background do not interact. There is no formal process for engaging marginalized people in the community. The inclusion of working class or marginalized people is contingent on a principle or SC committee that is active, sympathetic, and effective, as a top MoNE official and separately the MPD official explain:

R- Specifically regarding the parents and the committees, are there any ways to engage those parents?
MoNE- if the committee is active yes, if it is then there is opportunity to do so. First of all, these poor people do not know their rights. For example he doesn't know that his kids have the right to scholarship, he doesn't know there is a block grant to make sure there kids go to school, or their right to take part in the committee. They don't know it if the committee isn’t active. That’s why we expect an active community through the selection of good committee

MPD1- It all depends on whether the, those involved in the SC are active or not. If they are active then the community is involved

The BOS grants seemed further foster the historical air of deference and indebtedness of recipients towards the SC or extant institutions. One BOS

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* The * symbol is used to indicate that the interview has been translated from the original Bahasa Indonesia by a research assistant in the field. In quotations where the participant is not identified by the primary role, dialogue will organized by ‘R’-researcher and ‘P’- participant
scholarship recipient state that though he ‘does not know where to go if I have complaints. I am just happy to have the scholarship’ (R11). Another (R1) reported that ‘The school does not involve all parents in decision making process [but] I think it is the school's job to make policies.’ When asked about the effectiveness of the school committee he responded:

‘I think the school committee has been achieving its goal as additional needs of the students are already fulfilled by using the fees.’

But added the caveat:

‘Some of the fees should be allocated to provide more textbooks to the library so that the library will have enough number of textbooks to be borrowed and used by every student in the class.’ *

The implication of this response is that the respondent chose not to engage with the SC on the issue of textbooks, a notably important issue, because he believes that the SC has already fulfilled their obligations, to him and the school, by the covering of his school fees.  

Sumintono et al (2012) argue that that the existence of only high profile figures in the SCs make some parents hesitant to confront the community figures. This reluctance exists among all participants in the decentralization and SBM process resulting in a lack of active and meaningful participation on multiple levels. This begins with the parents’ reticence to actively engage the school, as the participants have described, and the schools reluctance to make decisions independent of the traditional bureaucracy (Vernex et al 2013). Both are limited by aspects the selective strategic context regarding history and culture.

The SC committee does not hold a parallel authority to the school as is intended by the decree. In fact the decree can be interpreted to place the SC below the school in which it is situated. (Sumintono et al 2012). This results in ‘a persistence of centralist culture and the reluctance of the SC to assume further power’

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7 The monthly allocation of 30,000 IDR by the BOS scholarship translates to roughly 2.50 USD at the time of writing.
(Amirachman 2009) and is demonstrated by the results of the 2013 World Bank study summarized in section 6.3. The strong culture of deference and bureaucracy make these barriers to authentic and effective participation difficult to overcome. Bjork (2003) quotes Donald Emerson:

democratizing Indonesia [means] trying to dismantle a system of fear and favor, deference and influence, talent and venality, by turning its own elements against it—elements that for three decades have been used to entrench it (2003, p 212).

Cultural barriers are not the sole factor implicated in the messy and uneven implementation and lack of authentic participation in SBM across Indonesia. Much of the disparate outcomes result from the economic and social realities between geographic (or economic) regions.

5.3 The Urban-Rural Divide

The location of a school is one determinant of educational outcomes, participation rates, and levels of funding. Because ‘the pattern of local participation tends to mirror the socio-economic and cultural (capital) distribution in the local area of the school’ (Daun 2009) it is important these socio-economic distributions are examined in the context of this research.

Regional inequalities have long been noted in the Indonesian context, education notwithstanding. ‘Differences in wealth and social class, a further factor that has long fractured Indonesian integration, have deepened in recent years, partly under the influence of external agencies, such as the World Bank and Asian Development bank, which have each pressed for more structural adjustment measures’ (Amirrachman 2009). Globalization and structural adjustment has advantaged powerful communities with existing cultural and economic resources (Ibid). ‘Under the competitive nature of the decentralization process such disparities have the potential to be increased’(Amirrachman et al 2009). Exacerbation of wealth
inequalities between region and schools has been a prominent theme indicated by numerous studies (Bjork 2003).

There remains a stark dichotomy between urban and rural schools, and the districts in which they belong. This divide is evidenced anecdotally by the material and academic realities experienced between the two case studies. In the Latin American context, decentralization has not been shown to directly improve the quality of education, but has widened the gap between rich and poor schools (Prawda 1992).

Toi (2009), Amirrachman (2009), and Shoraku (2008) are just a few that have reported similar findings in other regions of Indonesia. The gap in the educational attainment by geographic region is evidenced by test scores of Banda Aceh and Aceh Bessar (figure 6), where Aceh Bessar is considered to be a more homogenously rural context.

Academic disparities aside, schools in urban areas are more than four times as likely to receive supplementary funds from district and provincial governments than schools in rural areas. In rural areas only 12% of the school revenue can be attributed to such supplementary funding, while it accounts for an average of 45% in urban schools (Vernez 2013). A few explanatory factors for this uneven distribution are mentioned in the forthcoming section (6.4) regarding collusion. The same study also found that parents in urban areas where more likely to have received written information from the child’s school. This is not surprising, and is

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8 The figure was created by totaling the Math, Science, and Bahasa Indonesia test scores for each primary school in the district (Banda Aceh, n=79, and Aceh Bessar, n=188). Plot displays minimum, first quartile, median, second quartile, and maximum scores for each district.
consistent with amount of information that parents claim to receive from the school in the case studies in this research.

5.3a Urban Rural Divide and Participation in Practice

Regarding the democratic process in the SC elections, the findings of Amirrachman et al (2009) of two schools, one urban and one rural in Bintang, Indonesia, correlate with the findings of the current study. Urban schools in each setting had an arguably democratic process. In the rural school, the researchers found the election process to be engineered, whereas the current research found it to be non-existent.

In regards to school capacity, the rural and urban schools differ considerably. This extends beyond matters of funding. According to one researcher ‘in the sectors of education and health, there are problems with the availability with the civil servants in rural areas.’ Teachers do not want to work in under-funded rural regions and are not offered incentives to do so (Bunnel and miller 2010). Though they are required to remain at their posts for a particular amount of time. The LOGICA2 researcher adds:

‘On one hand the government has put in the policy that the schools, in the remote areas, have to stay at least 5-8 years, they have [a] signed commitment. In reality, they can stay for only one year and can get kind of ‘miracle letter’ [letter of transfer] from an influencing person in the government. Then he or she can move.’

He explains further that this is preventable, but continues due to the lack of commitment by the government.

Parents in rural areas are more likely to be of working class and too busy with the acts of daily subsistence (Vernez 2013) as are working class people in urban areas such as Banda Aceh. Fine (1993 cited in Daun 2009) and Lareau (1987 cited in Daun 2009) correlated parental education with time available and economic resources within the family (among other factors) with parental participation in cities in the US. The current findings reiterate these results. This was shown in the responses of
some respondents. One beneficiary of the BOS scholarship reported a workweek of 6 days, working 10 hours each day. This heavy workload is not conducive to regular or sustained participation. Two other parents reported being too busy to attend the election (in which only 3 others of 20 reported attending). The MoNe official admits:

‘They [the poor] really want to participate but they don’t know how, and secondly, because most parents… are busy with working and daily economic activities, they don’t have time to participate.’

Interviews showed that many parents had strong opinions that they would like to voice. The issue of the inadequacy of school textbooks arose on three occasions independently in the interviews at CS1, twice by BOS scholarships recipients who could not afford them, and another by outspoken and sympathetic lecturer and parent. The issue was never adequately addressed by the school. Instead, projects tended to be aesthetically oriented, such as installing a wrought iron gate around the courtyard or air conditioning units in the schoolrooms. The lack of attention to these fundamental materials of learning reflect the notion that schools may be placing priorities on aesthetics and superficialities rather than basic learning materials at the behest of the more well-off parents. A colleague affiliated with ICIAOS proffered that the focus on aesthetic projects at schools may be explained by the competitive, market-oriented per-pupil funding scheme. In order to attract more students, schools have focused on superficialities that would make positive first impressions for prospective students’ parents or relevant stakeholders. Unlike learning improvements these projects are immediately tangible. This is a strategic action carried on the school level, on the basis of acquiring much-needed funds based in the per-pupil funding model.

Linkage between schools, committees and local institutions also vary. Amirrachman et al (2009) found that the principle in the urban school seized SBM policy and used it to coordinate linkages with key politicians. Such linkage could provide one explanatory mechanism for the managerial, academic, aesthetic, and economic pre-eminence of CS1, where members of the SC were established members of the community. Linkage represents one strategy in which less powerful institutions can
acquire previously unrealized authority. Solid support from influential parents and local community benefit the school in a number of ways. But, as always it seems in Aceh, the story may not be so simple

5.3b Conflict and Disaster

The urban-rural divide in funding and outcomes among schools is noted internationally, but in Aceh, as is often the case, the situation is more complex. Both the history of violence and the more recent tsunami have disproportionately affected aid allocation in the province. In post disaster situations, resources are disproportionately channeled into urban areas, where either a real or perceived capacity and logistical advantage exists. International aid organizations allocated aid accordingly, without much hindsight about the history of conflict, ‘aggravating pre-existing conflict based socio-economic disparities between Aceh’s less conflict affected urban centers and the war torn hinterlands’ (Bunnel and Miller 2010).

Figure 7: Post conflict and post tsunami aid by district (2008)

Source: UNDP 2010
The figure makes evident the massively disproportionate distribution of aid post tsunami. Though much of the destruction was focused in Banda Aceh, much of the focus on conflict related reconstruction was diminished or forgotten.

5.4 Taking stock and Looking Forward

The contingents laid forth in this chapter represent only a fraction of the overall strategic selective context in which actors navigate. It can be inferred that decentralization attempts in places where bureaucratic forms of administration and control have been the norm for extended periods of time face many practical limitations. As such, decentralization projects often serve as an avenue of central authority to penetrate into local spheres, resulting in the paradoxical strengthening of central powers (Bjork 2003). These factors are implicated in actors not taking advantage of new opportunities to increase autonomy (Ibid).

Less successful schools become even more marginalized in a competitive market based climate (Amirachman et al 2009; Toi 2009). An intervention such as that implemented in Chile in 2008 may help to ameliorate growing disparities. This intervention benefits students from low SES and schools with large proportions of such students, rather than each student being weighted and equally under the current policy (OECD 2013). A similar intervention in the Netherlands weights students based on parental education level. Schools in with higher proportions of weighted students are allocated more resources accordingly (ibid). Such interventions are only two examples of ways in which the growing inequality between rural and urban, or any high and low performing schools in general, may be lessened.

Cultural attitudes regarding authority and the low socio-economic positions of some parents make it difficult to engage high status individuals that tend to compose SCs. Multiple respondents independently voiced desire for a suggestion box where parents can anonymously voice their concerns or offer suggestions. I believe it would be useful to ensure that representatives are from varying demographics of
the community, possibly including a representative 'lobbyist' for recipients of scholarships when these recipients lack the capacity to effectively engage. This representative should meet separately with the scholarship recipients and others who lack capacity to voice concerns in decision-making. An attempt to incorporate a predetermined proportion of women on the committee, given the conspicuous lack of women in dominant positions and their proportionally high involvement with the daily activities of the children and school, would increase both representativeness and theoretically broaden transitive forms of participation.
Chapter 6

Strategic Selectivities and Political Utilities in Action

As opposed to the previous chapter that focuses on the institutional, cultural and economic contingencies that together effect the overall strategically selective context, this chapter attempts to illustrate agency by means of strategic selectivities (political utilities) as described in the theoretical framework. It begins with a brief overview of the results of the World Bank sponsored study conducted by Vernez et al (2013) and an overview of the results of the survey conducted at CS1. The results of both studies are used in the forthcoming sections that directly address strategic selectivities/political utilities that may be implicit and complicit in the success or failure of participatory educational reforms in Aceh.

6.1 SBM implementation in Indonesia- Recent Studies and overview of Survey at CS1

A recent study sponsored by the World Bank has (Vernez et al 2013) provided the most comprehensive analyses yet of the state of SBM in Indonesia. This study will be particularly useful in the data analysis section as a reference point from which to compare and contextualized the findings. Carried out in 2010 and 2011 it is a national comprehensive study of the current state of SBM implementation and its effects in Indonesia. Though Aceh and Papua are conspicuously absent, the results of the findings correlate with those uncovered in Aceh, and can be the result of the political utilities described in the theoretical discussion. The results will be of use to bolster the findings in the following analyses of the findings in Aceh:
### Summary of findings - Vernez et al 2013

- Reluctance of schools to make independent decisions. Uniformity of stated goals and plans of action
- High level of influence of districts in managerial/programmatic decisions (including textbooks and curriculum)
- SC members meet rarely and are not actively involved in BOS allocation, school mission setting, and development of annual plan
- Committee chair often signs off, as per government regulation outlined in the 2003 decree, to decisions already made
- Lack of socialization of stakeholders
- Parental attitude of deference to school staff
- Meetings involving parents are rare
- Little information on BOS allocation is received by parents or SC members
- Half of SC members report that schools’ sharing of information is inadequate or non-existent
- Actual amount government funding received by schools varied greatly.
- Schools that offer opportunities for parents to file complaints and were responsive to parents’ opinions associated with greater expenditure of discretionary funds spent on instruction
- So far, the implementation of SBM may not have resulted in any major changes in school practices (Vernez et al 2013).

Though Aceh was not a part of this particular national study, the results coincide with the results of this study, as well as similar studies conducted in Aceh (see
next we will briefly examine some of the basic patterns in the responses collected via a survey of parents at CS1.

6.1a Survey Descriptives CS1

The survey administered at SC1\textsuperscript{9} was essential for providing a snapshot of parental voices toward the current state of SBM and the function of the SC in their children’s school. Responses in the survey vary widely, conflate, and contradict. The survey was informal, quick, and not highly standardized, and therefore cannot be used to make any definitive assumptions. Furthermore the sample size was too small for any meaningful statistical analysis. But, through the expressed opinions of the school parents we can discern interesting patterns in the perceptions of these particular parents in regards to their child’s school and the SC. In this section, I provide a quick overview of some of the quantitative patterns that can be discerned from the data. Qualitative analysis of these responses will be combined with the results of the semi-structured interviews in the sections below. Before a more thorough integration of survey results with the theoretical framework, a brief overview of the basic information gathered and important themes found is useful from a contextual standpoint.

The most common profession of those surveyed was that of university lecturer (4x) and teacher (3x). Other professions that show up in the survey included construction/labor (2x), civil servant (2x), housewife, student, freelance editor, and unspecified private sector/entrepreneurial employment (4x). Two respondents opted not to answer. The majority of respondents reported that they were personally acquainted with a member of the SC (10 respondents answered yes, 6 no).

Importantly, 16 out of 19 responded that there is an avenue to voice their concerns at the school. Discrepancies exist between this stated answer and the stated efficacy of the SC action regarding the aforementioned voiced concerns. For example, though

\footnote{See Figure 3 in Appendix for full survey responses}
respondent five (r5) and respondent 13 (r13) reported said that these avenues exist, they report that they have been ‘less effective’ (r5) possibly due to ‘a lack of openness’ (r13). It is interesting though the majority of parents said there is an avenue to voice concerns, only 5 reported that they felt everyone had a voice in school policy. 11 reported that they felt people don’t have a say, and another five reporting that they didn’t know. Though not the same question, both deal with the ability of parents to engage and affect the teaching learning process.

12 respondents said that the SC functioned well for a number of reasons including:

- Fulfillment of the needs of students and school improvement (r1, r3, r6)
- Achievement achieved through good cooperation and communication between students, school SC, and parents (r3, r9)
- Successful implementation of policy discussed in meetings (r8)
- School has better facilities (R11)

4 reported no and gave the following reasons:

- Lack of recognition of socioeconomic differences among parents (r5)
- Lack of socialization or openness (r12)
- Perceived lack of commitment by SC (r13)
- Failure to implement suggestions (r17)

Similarly, four more answered that they didn’t know for reasons including a lack of dissemination, socialization or openness (r2, r15) Recommendations and general comments offered by the respondents fell into three main categories: Transparency and socialization, a need for more parental involvement, and socio-economic concerns.

The purpose of these descriptives is to provide a quick basis from which to continue into the next sections. The following sections attempt to make sense of these results, combined with data gathered at CS2 and the interviews conducted with a variety of actors, and by further integrating it with the theoretical framework.
6.2 Legitimation and Control

6.2a Ambiguous Policy and Legitmation

In the sense that laws and policy are always politically motivated and benefit some party, demographic, or institution more so than others, they may be seen as overt mechanisms of strategic action. Policy and law may be either explicit or furtive in its intentions. In many cases, the primary motivations for implementation lie in either the need for control, legitimation, or both. As Weiler (1993) and Malen (1994) have mentioned, decentralization is rooted in a state’s ongoing need to legitimize itself. Decentralization is a means by which both may be accomplished simultaneously.

Government commitment to actual outcomes and breadth of true authority devolution in the SBM project can be questioned on number of fronts: the language used in the drafting of the original decree, actual authority devolved, and the commitment in practice of school supervision and training.

Firstly, the language employed in MoNE decree 044/U/2002 is ambiguous and sometimes contradictory (Sumintono et al 2012; Sumintono et al 2009; Amirrachman 2009). Sumintono (2012; 2009) applies CDA to a document analysis of the degree thoroughly and teases out the potential conflicts that may arise from such use of language.
MoNE Decree 044/U/2002

Article 1

(1) In each district is formed an Education Council, as an initiative from the society and/or the district government.

(2) In each education institution or group of education institutions is formed a School Committee as an initiative from the society, educational institution and/or the district government.

Article 2

The formation of the Education Council and School Committee can be used the guideline for formation of Education Council and School Committee as attached in the Appendix I and II of this decree.

Article 3

With effect of this decree, then the decree of Ministry of Education and Culture No0293/U/1993 of 1993 regarding the formation of Board of Education Assistance is abolished.

Article 4

This decree is effective on the date stipulated.

Though article one stipulates the formation of new institutions known as the Education Council and the School Committee, there is no explanation of their functions, role or authority (Sumintino 2009; Sumintono 2012) and no other guidelines were established about how the SC would perform such (undisclosed) functions (Vernex et al 2013). This ambiguity results in zero official authority. Vernez et al (2013) state that s similarly unclear definition of the role of the district persists. As stated, the role of the district is to validate, coordinate, and supervise school curriculum development. The authors note that MoNE seems to remain cautious about the amount of authority it intends to devolve to lower levels. At the same time, the electoral process for such institutions was unclear (Amirrachman 2009).
In article 2, the term the authors of the decree use the phrase ‘can be used,’ which Sumintono calls ‘hesitant regulation’ and one which neither party has a legal obligation to follow. Furthermore, Sumintono contends that the wording of the second article expresses the authors’ real commitment to the ideas of school autonomy and local educational governance, where ‘can be used’ implicitly provides a loophole by which SBM may be circumvented (2012). Vernez et al (2013) note ‘It appears the Ministry of National Education remains cautious about the authority it really means to devolve to schools, using language in its standards that can enable districts to continue to assert themselves over the schools’.

Furthermore, the lack of clarity may lead to multiple interpretations which has the potential to be confused, misused or implemented in superficial ways (Sumintono 2009; Amirrachman 2009). The monolithic SC endeavour denies the complexity and contexts and diverse situation. Sumintono states that the ‘decree wants to ensure that all kinds of societal participation at the school level are of a standard pattern,’ which both denies complexity and further enforces control of potential committee actions harkening to what Cooke (2001) called ‘the domestication of dissent.’ A lecturer at the local university further explained the difficulties arising from the vague and monolithic policies:

> Indonesia is first very broad. Of course in a big country like Indonesia sometimes regulation is difficult to apply because of the variation of the context, for example Papua. It is very different than compared to West Sumatra, which is very good [in regards to school outcomes]. And it’s the same in Aceh as well. Talking about SBM and the role of committee. This is very much depending on the area, the location, and the capacity of the people in that area…Unfortunately, the school committee is not working.’

Weiler (1993) describes that decentralization can be a means of acknowledging and incorporating diversity, and in this way can be ‘considered meaningful and valid,’ but can encounter different conceptions of knowledge that are antagonistic to the national and international modalities geared toward technology, communication (Ibid), and capital. These factors contribute to the hypothesis that implementation is based on
discourse and legitimating aspects of such, coinciding with neoliberal goals, rather than actual outcomes. The MPD member makes a poignant observation:

MPD1- As long as the schools are running they don’t care whether the school committee is properly elected or not. Especially the district government.
R- Do you think it may just be a way to make the parents happy?
MPD1- yes

The official directly implies that the SC exists in many cases for its symbolic value, resulting in legitimacy for the government among parents, local communities, and IO’s. Though participatory reforms can be made to make a school ostensibly more democratic, modern, and responsive, political utility via legitimation is gained regardless of the attainment of stated goals. Bjork (2003) notes that ‘the government may publicly declare that it wants to empower local actors, but education officials have not demonstrated through their actions that they are truly committed to facilitating the devolution of authority to subnational levels.’ The depth of commitment of government actors is questionable. Bjork (Ibid) further notes that the Indonesian government has undertaken decentralization in an attempt to appease critics within and above national level rather than truly empower the polity.

Furthermore, by creating new institutional bodies, the government (traditionally responsible for improvement, and failures, regarding educational quality) devolves responsibility for quality improvement to other levels while maintaining authority. The data collected during the duration of this study adds to this, as a top official in MoNE describes the responsibility of his department:

MoNE1- Though DINAS and MPD usually go to the school and explain about the function of the school committees, but the way in which they interpret their roles and function are different

This indictment by the official places blame for failures in SBM at the level of the school and SC, not on the ambiguity of policy, or the failures of his department and others to adequately socialize and train schools and SCs (effectively shifting blame
for failures downward). The process of distancing itself from failure and shifting blame for failures is politically legitimizing for government bodies.

6.2b Concertive Control and Questionable Commitment

Weiler (1993) notes that it the idea of redistribution of power is antithetical to the manifest interests of the state to maintain 'effective control and discharging some of its key functions with regard to economic production and capital accumulation.' In regard to deconcentration, power devolved is power retained.

Furthermore, due to the curriculum remains derived top-down, with parents and SC relegated to some fund raising and providing free labor (Vernez et al 2013). The primary contact at the MPD describes a conspicuous lack of commitment by the district government:

MPD1- ‘The problem is that DINAS does not have strong commitment to this school. And that’s why the determining factor is that the DINAS through the supervisor does not do his work... In terms of the two issues, managerial and academic issues how can they improve if there is no commitment from the government? And then the district government we also question their commitment.’

The research with LOGICA2 concurrs:

LOGICA2- The school supervisor is not as active as expected. For example he is supposed to go every month but only comes after 3 months.

The lack of commitment by district government further implies ‘hesitant regulations’ (Sumintono 2009) and provides further evidence of a conspicuous lack of willpower, capacity, or resources to effectively monitor and implement SBM. The LOGICA2 researcher further mentioned:

‘[If the] the quality is getting better the DINAS [will] watch, because they want to part of this as if it is their business.’

We see in this quotation both the lack of government commitment overall as well as the tendency of the government to associate with successes and distance itself from
failures, a politically legitimizing place to position oneself. As mentioned in the theoretical section, the burden of success is therefore effectively transferred from the meso-level to the micro-level, and in the process the government, or implementing organization, has distanced itself from failure (Williams 2004). In the case of schools that are failing their communities, he says they remain neglected yet beholden to traditional authorities.

### 6.3 Co-optation

Co-optation appears at multiple levels of examination and in both of the forms discussed in the theoretical framework (institutionalization of lesser organizations and adoption of top-down policy). It is interesting to note the co-optation occurring in two directions. From the adoption of decentralization policy from above that reflect the global discursive zeitgeist, and the co-optation of institutions developed locally. The most large-scale of such, described in the theoretical framework, is represented by the adoption of decentralization policy and subsequent decentralization of the education sector nationwide. The occurrence of co-optation of locally developed institutions such as the school committee model developed in Aceh in 1990 and the Education Council (MPD) upwards to the national level represents co-optation via institutionalization within the national framework. A high-ranking member of MoNE explains the origins and co-optation:

MoNe1- The first idea was from Aceh with the school council, which was different than the BP3. The school council involved all of the community around the school, including business men who want to participate in the school, and the government saw that the concept is much better than the BP3 so the government adopted it. So it came from Aceh and was adopted on the national level and they changed the name to komitee sekolar [school committee].

The MPD was similarly a particularly Acehnese creation, formed in 1990 by the decree of the Governor of Aceh no. 420/435/1990 (Mpd-aceh.org) that was adopted
by the national system in a similar fashion in the 2003 regulation. It is known in other provinces simply as an Education Council (World Bank 2011). The MPD is ostensibly a CSO, but is now one that is mandated via government policy and the extent to which its authority begins and ends (Sumintino 2009) as well as it’s embeddedness and autonomy given its place in the government structure is uncertain. The institutionalization of these organizations into the national structure means that are now bureaucratically constrained, and beholden to policy developed from non-local and more powerful actors.

6.3a Co-optation and SC authority

Perceptions regarding the implications on committee autonomy regarding the later form of co-optation (institutionalization) varied widely between respondents:

One Committee head responded:

‘With this regulation they [the SC] has more authority because the funding from the government that flows to schools they have to know where the funding is spent. So they have more authority now than before.*’

The MoNe official opined:

The concept is similar with the school council and school committee but now the Acehnese have to follow the policy of the national government...

Finally, the primary contact at the MPD offered an alternative perspective:

MPD1- (Before) there were no school committees and no BOS funding. They were called BP3, but some people say BP3 was an association of parents that’s bottom up. Bottom-up organization. They came from parent initiatives from parents instead of the current school committees. It is required by the school for instance to give approval to the new construction/renovation of classrooms etc, using BOS funding and all the teachers belonged to the central government.

R- It formed organically? And wasn’t mandated?

MPD1- Yes organically, of course...the goal was more on controlling the schools, I think they were more democratically elected because they didn’t have to be close to the principle and there was no BOS funding. The use of which the school principle has been known to
have approval from the school committee
R- Were they able to make a difference in the schools?
MPD1- Its like a school council, and the principle may not know who the members will be…they were separate from the schools…they unify themselves and they meet regularly and they elect their chairman
R-- Were they able to lobby the schools for change?
MPD1- Yes
R- So when the national policy passed, there were no longer BP3s?
MPD1 Then, after the reformasi in the early 2000s they made all this regulation about school committees and the climate of the school
R- It became institutionalized…
MPD1- Yes, it became institutionalized, and that can make the committees weak because it is part of the system. In the case of the BP3 they were self-funded. In the case of SC they have no funding except for the BOS. That’s why they need to be close to the school principles in order to get a project.

The opinion expressed by the MPD member is not without precedence. The 2007 study by Sweeting, Furaidah, and Koes supports the assertion that the role of the SC has been diminished and weakened as the SC has lost its role as a primary fundraiser. As the school committee has been absorbed into the institutional structure, its authority has been eroded along with its autonomy. Such is the tendency of co-optation from above. In many cases, the transition towards a more market based system disadvantages less powerful institutions (Amirrachman 2003) such as the schools committee. External constraints have been imposed by more powerful actors, limiting particular strategic selectivities of the less powerful.

Though the BOS grants have broadly been a success in diminishing tuition payments and broadening and stabilizing a schools capital flow, they have in some respects resulted in the erosion and of autonomy and authority of SCs. One SC member in the 2013 Vernez et al study remarked that meetings between parents and the SC no longer occur because the students do not pay tuition. Another reported that there is no SC activity without the direct consent and participation of the principle, and the data collected during the course of this study suggests this pattern is consistent with
Aceh. The new top-down nature, broadened powers bequeathed to the district and the principle, and lack of direct control of resources primarily contributing to this effect.

Through the SRA lens, we have now seen both the organic creation of a structure by agents on lower sub-national and local scales (creation of the original school committees and MPD in Aceh) and the large scale institutional agency expressed when the committees are brought into the institutional fold through a strategically-selected process of co-optation. The process at once legitimizes the co-opting institution while confining the co-opted into prescribed boundaries of agency. The opinions expressed by the MPD member imply forms of concertive control on two levels: the meso-level institutionalization and the micro (school) level oversight and control of committee actions.

Edwards and Klees (2012) related similar effects in the Latin American context. Though local actors during the Salvadoran and Hondurean decentralization process had in fact been devolved responsibilities, they had no voice in the development of policy or its adoption, and were subsequently cornered into narrow pre-defined forms of participation, as those prescribed by the current Indonesian policy. In the next section, we shall explore how the interrelationships between collusion, transparency, election, and trust effect a community’s perceptions and engagement with participatory reforms.

### 6.4 Collusion, election, transparency and trust

#### 6.4a Collusion

As mentioned in chapter 3, participatory structures have the potential to often become arenas that promote collusion among dominant groups with similar interests. Bacharach and Botwinick (1992 cited Anderson 2006) describe how these structures tend to benefit the existing holders of power- the rich over the poor, the active over the passive, and in Aceh, men over women. Sweeting et al (2009) show that males dominate committee demographics in Indonesia, are of existing authority in the community, and are often appointed. This prevalence of
males was apparent in the committee demographics of the SC at CS1, where only the principle and the secretary were females, while the remaining 22 members were males. This is an interesting finding because it is primarily mothers who are directly involved in the day to day goings on of the child’s education and due to the fact that the vast majority of teachers at the primary school level are female (Sweeting et al 2009). There is no mandate in the original decree that that guarantees the representation of particular demographics. One parent remarked that:

‘The four candidates in the election of the head of school committee are more or less from the same backgrounds and have formal educational degrees.’*

According to the vice principle of CS2, the position of committee head was reportedly passed down from the previous committee head to his son. The LOGICA2 researcher remarked about similar occurrences in his research area in a nearby province in which the principle or committee head has appointed sons to committee positions.

Other forms of collusion include frequency and lack of inclusiveness of the SC meetings. Meetings occur sporadically or not at all, and when they do occur, parents are rarely invited. The committee head of CS1 describes the frequency of meetings at his daughter’s former school:

‘In my daughters school some committees only met twice in three years of schooling. Once when she began and the other when she graduated. These are indications of not working wholeheartedly and for the sake of the school.’*

Vernez et al (2013) reported that in other areas of Indonesia, SCs met with principles on average 2.5 times a year, and by themselves 1.5 times a year. School administrators at CS2 reported that the SC (which functionally only consists of the appointed committee head and school management) meet once a year to approve budget issues. In CS1, reports of the number of meetings varied. Some committee members reported that a meeting is held every 6 months to approve budgets and school plans, but this is not an open process that includes parents, and they did not specify who was actually involved.
Though both schools publicly posted their expenditures\textsuperscript{10}, the reported closed off nature of the school committee and lack of parental input or notification for most decisions appeared regularly within the survey. 17 of the respondents provided recommendations calling for more transparency and openness in school processes. Promulgated by both Vernex et al (2013) and Pradham et al (2013), and of cited by participants in the current study, one way to promulgate a culture of transparency at the school level is the democratic election of SC members, described in a forthcoming section.

\textit{6.4b Exclusion through Collusion}

CS1 was regarded as a high-achieving and high-class. The ‘high-class’ reputation of the school caused hesitation among parents of lower classes apply for their children, a parent and lecturer at the nearby university remarked:

‘There is a lot of talk and rumors from the society this year. For example, before when they recruit [admit] new students…a lot of parents come to me about, 5 or 6 parents, come to me and ask, they complain that this school just for lecturers’ kids. I told them no… there are a lot of rumors that this school is just for high class [families].’

The rumors circulated by parents regarding this case study may not be unfounded. She explains how student admittance worked in previous years:

‘When my oldest registered at that school and then they did not conduct a test. They just select a student based on the data of parents’ occupation, address, etcetera.’

According to the respondent, her daughter was eventually accepted because of the respondent’s prominent position as a lecturer at the nearby university. She continued to press the administration to make change. Now, she says, the school has test-based admissions policy. Though this modality presents it’s own problems (working class people do not have the resources or impetus to send their children to early/pre-school

\textsuperscript{10} See Figure 4 in Appendix
education), it is one of the few direct cases where policy has been changed at the behest of a protesting parent. This issue was only solved when addressed by a highly educated university lecturer, who, by chance, found herself in the position that is typically experienced only by the poor and uneducated. The lecturer, uncharacteristically by Acehnese standards, was not afraid to ‘rock the boat.’

The exclusion of children from low-SES background via collusionary exclusion is a strategic action utilized by school management and confers a number of benefits for the school and the students fortunate enough to attend. In the free-choice model, where school funding is based strictly on a per-pupil basis, and where a proportion of school discretionary funds are contingent on parental donations, it would be advantageous to both maintain a reputation of ‘high-class,’ and recruit only students of means or academic excellence. There is never a dearth of applicants at CS1 according to one respondent. The benefits are not only economic, but families of the students typically have high standing in the community (such as lecturers at the university or local political figures) and are not only more involved in their child’s education, but provide linkages necessary for increased attention to the school’s well-being and effectiveness, and potentially the capacity of the SC. Such segregation of those with economic and social capital may lead to a feedback loop in which economic and academic disparities between schools are increased. In any case, where economic and social polarization occur, this may lead to increasingly divergent learning outcomes in the neo-liberal model.

6.4c Collusion in the Electoral Process

SBM is steeped in the rhetoric of the democracy, but as with all floating signifiers, these terms tend to have more power in discourse and policy than practice. Even in cases in which policy is firm, clear and direct (which, as previously demonstrated, is certainly not the case in Indonesian education reform policy documents), transparent and effective democratic processes can be thwarted by existing power relations that reproduce the status quo. My contact affiliated with LOGICA 2 describes how schools may practice collusion, then an MPD member describes the effect of such collusive practices:
LOGICA2-if the school is corrupt, they select their own people...They appoint people they negotiate with.

MPD1- ...the problem is, not all school committees are elected, and not all school committees are doing their work. They are supposed to control the learning process at schools which they are not doing, and they may just be providing a stamp of approval

Collusion in the selection/election process results in the form of co-optation on the school level, where committees are functioning as a rubber stamp for principle/management driven policies and budgeting. When SCs are strictly appointed by principles, they lack the proper power or capacity to check and balance the top-down policies of the school management, as is intended. This is evidenced by the fact that a SC monitored the BOS allocations just as often (typically quarterly) as the district requires the BOS plans to be reported, signifying that they meet only when a signature for approval is needed and documents are in order (Vernez et al 2013). It is the rubber stamp function of the committees and the lack of oversight by government officials that indicate that community participation may not be the primary factor for implementation, but that of cultivating legitimacy regardless of actual educational or participatory outcomes.

One step that has been taken to attempt to ameliorate this is the creation of an election committee, which is theoretically supposed to oversee the potentially collusive nature of SC appointment by acting as a non partisan electoral board to oversee the electoral process. A top MoNE official describes the process of establishing an election committee:

The have to form a team, the school may assign some people, and those people find the candidates for the school committee or head of committee. A team to select the candidates. The school may assign people from teacher and parents and they find eligible and capable committee head.

One risk in this method is that the candidates selected by the election committee are not separated from the personal relationships and existing power relations from which the
committee members themselves are a part of. An alternative method, employed by Pradham et al (2013), will be discussed shortly. In any case, the process is rarely employed (Vernex et al 2013).

In the national study (Aceh and Papua notwithstanding), Vernex et al (2013) found that only 22% of SC members were elected, while the vast majority (47%) were selected via consensus, a process in which primary stakeholders agree on a number of pre-ordained members of the community (Figure 7). The figure shows both the background and method of appointment of SC in the regions studied.

Figure 7: Proportion of elected members

Another contact within the MPD reiterated that these findings were consistent with the electoral processes in Aceh:

R- In the election process, do all the parents come together and decide?

MPD2- Its supposed to be all parents who are having a say, but in most cases only some parents make decisions… Again the better the election process is
According to the survey results of CS1, 8 out of 20 respondents reported that the SC was created through the process of consensus (reported as discussion meeting or majority vote). 12 of the 20 reported that they didn’t know (10 respondents) or left the question blank (2 respondents), while only 3 reported taking part in the election/selection process. In CS2 there was obviously no election due to the lack of a functioning committee. A number of reasons were reported by the respondents from CS1 as to why participation rates were so low:

- 5 respondents (R2, R5, R12, R14, R17) claimed to not be invited or not notified
- R11 reported that the SC was already in place.
- Respondent 15 replied that he ‘didn’t know there was a election process for that,’
- Respondent 19 falsely believed that it was the teachers who chose.
- Respondent 13, also a non-participant, blamed the ‘lack of socialization’ from the school to the parents.

Obviously, some type of consensus involving at least some parents was reached. The extent as to which the few who actually did participate were simply co-opted into agreeing to elect pre-determined candidates was uncertain.

A lack of an elected SC has the potential to create a negative feedback loop for schools. Where an election is not transparent and democratic trust and legitimacy are eroded within the community. Alternatively, when the election is democratic and transparent trust and legitimacy are then fostered within the community, which then translates into increased participation and community support. Ultimately, it is hoped that the increased support will result in better learning outcomes for students (Pradham et al 2013; Heyward et al 2011) The respondent associated with the LOGICA 2 touched on the subject:

R- So, if it is well managed there is better resource management and education…
LOGICA2: [It] all depends on transparency. It is circular. [It] begins with transparency. Its all correlated...The school without transparency becomes weaker. In SDN Matangrayeuk, subdistrict of Simpangulim, East Aceh. This is the school where the block grant is not transparent at all and the school committee is not active. This is where we found out that the head of the committee is the father of one of the teachers... The motivation is very weak because they [the community] don’t trust the school because the committee does not represent [the community] and the school is not transparent. How do they improve quality when there is no pressure? For example, if there is an improvement of the committee there is pressure through to the committee from the community to school... Where the school committee is not active, the school does whatever they like and it is continued. And it has become very bad.

The researcher recounted first hand how the process of generating trust and legitimacy ultimately translates into broader stakeholder participation in the communities involved. The following figure explicates the relationship he and others have described.

![Figure 8](image)

The more support and participation fostered, the more pressure for change is exerted by the community (Figure 8). Even should the democratic electoral process for the SC be realized, this is not necessarily the harbinger of change, as agency and opportunities are limited by more powerful actors capable of higher levels of structuralization as well as other contingencies within the strategically selective context. But, democratic expression demonstrates social organization through which collective interests may be identified and in which ‘actors may overcome their powerlessness by pooling their resources and thereby constituting themselves as strategic actors at higher levels of structuration’ (Hay 2002).
6.5 Socialization, Transparency, and Parental Participation

Lack of training and socialization was apparent throughout the research. Many parents, SCs, principles and government officials all seem to be misinformed or misinterpreting the policy and particular scopes of authority. Almost 50% of the parents in the 2013 World Bank study (Vernez et al 2013) did not know of the existence of a SC at their child’s school, as was the case for all parent respondents at CS2. The number of parents who actually participated in the SC sponsored events was much lower, at 20% (ibid). As would be expected, none of the parents interviewed in CS2 were involved. Although all parents surveyed and interviewed in SC1 knew of the existence of the school committee, much fewer actively participated.

Lack of adequate socialization of parents, SCs, and principles is a primary reason for easy co-optation. CS2 principal reported that training was provided once in 2010 for 3 days consisting of the principal, a teacher, and a committee member. None of the parents interviewed were aware of the existence of a committee. The following series of quotations taken from participants regarding socialization of stakeholders illustrate a lack of socialization on multiple scales:

MPD1- ‘Parents are unaware that theire representive of children goes to the school committee’

University Lecturer- ‘we don’t have any consulting. They should have strong consulting [about] rules, function, responsibilities and then we can make...what we call community based monitoring project. we can do that.’

MPD2/SC chairman- ‘It depends on who is appointed by the principal, or elected, even someone who is elected wouldn’t know their authorities. Maybe they have never learned about the roles that they can play in the school committee. They have not been trained, they have not been informed by the government, they don’t have a network or...peer among school
committees. ... so what they know of what a school committee is all about is just from the school principle.’

My researcher contact describes the results of such a lack of socialization:

‘Having weak committees, the principal can go with the agenda without any disturbances. A strong committee will do what its expected to do by the community.’

The MPD official comments on potential results of proper socialization:

Another factor would be their understanding of the community ff the school committees. The higher the understanding, the more participation- MPD1

It is apparent that the lack of socialization has impeded the intended purposes of SBM. Whether it is lack of commitment due to lack of resources or the reluctance to truly devolve power, it has surely affected participation rates of multiple actors. The following graphic from Vernex et al (2013) shows a substantial lack of involvement by parents regarding multiple school activities.

Figure 9: Levels of Parental Participation. Source: Vernez et al 2013
Even with the existence of school committees, there is not typically an avenue for providing parents with updates and information relating to school policy. Notice in the figure above, that 64% of parents have either never attended or attended school meetings only once. Avenues for parental concerns, input, and influence tend to be nonexistent (Vernez et al 2013). The lack of participation results in a lack of pressure from the SC, parents and the community for educational transformation and improvement. Many parent respondents in the survey at CS1 mentioned that the lack of socialization is inhibiting participation. Respondents 2, 12, 13, 17 answered with direct reference to ‘socialization’ as if keen to rhetoric surrounding SBM (other frequently mentioned terms include ‘transparency’ and ‘dissemination’). Furthermore, principles tended to lack proper training and tended to misinterpret SBM policy and goals (Vernez et al 2013) which, as previously
mentioned, can be the direct result of vague policy, lack of commitment by government, and/or the history of centralization.

The stated purpose of the school committee in SBM has been largely addressed in the literature. But the extent to which is capable, representative, and efficacious in practice is a different story altogether. In the last section of the chapter, we address a couple of the actual functions of the school committee in Indonesia, especially as we have observed them in practice in Aceh.

6.6 The Actual Role of the Committee

A number of reasons for the lack of actual authority have been mentioned before. These include the existence of vague policy and the failure to clearly outline authority and responsibilities, the existence of collusion and co-optation through lack of transparent democratic election, lack of adequate representation, cultural factors, and erosion of SC authority via institutionalization. As a result, the role of the SC in practice has been relegated to raising funds to be handed over and to provide free labor, as evidenced by both this research and Vernez et al (2013).

The research found that, in accordance with Vernez et al (2013) operational decisions at schools were found to be made by principles and a combination of stakeholders, but rarely engaged the SC. Parents in both case studies were not involved in funding decisions (even those made by the SC in CS1) and respondents from the survey conducted at CS1 consistently expressed the desire to be consulted and involved in the process, expressed independently by 17 of the 20 respondents. Concomitantly, the real decision making power primarily resides with the principle and the traditional bureaucracy, in both the election/selection process and to the extent of authority ultimately devolved to SC.

Further, SCs may act as a buffer where school administration may distance itself from parental dissent. In fact, schools in rural areas where more likely to receive direct input from parents. (Karam et al 2013; Vernez et al 2013). A teacher/treasurer from CS1 mentioned explicitly that the committee acted as a ‘buffer’ between schools and parents. The parents at CS2 reported that when school
related concerns arise, parents tend to talk directly to the teachers or the principle. The extent to which factors such as the rural context, small school size, etcetera play in the parent-teacher interactions is yet undetermined. Whether this is more or less effective is yet to be established as well, but it is clear that parents had direct access, and followed the observation that ‘schools in urban areas were less likely than schools located in rural areas to receive input from parents.’(Vernez et al 2013). The same study reported that most SC members saw their role as simply an intermediary between parents and school administrators to be utilized when something is to be communicated to parents or something is needed from them.

The opening up of a new institutionalized sphere of participation means that it is easily managed, predictable, and its boundaries and authority pre-determined, in a sense ‘domesticated.’ The SC committee can provide an avenue by which school management may not directly engage with criticisms or complaints. Despite either the effectiveness of the SC or lack thereof, the legitimizing aspect of the committees as being a responsive creation of the government has been valorized.

The picture painted to far has been rather bleak, but anecdotal evidence does exist that report of SCs galvanizing the community and asserting their authority for localized change. Pradham et al (2013) report communities establishing official ‘study times’ where all parents were expected to make sure their children dedicated the time to schoolwork. One report by the LOGICA2 researcher illustrated a major community initiative. In a community with one failing school and one successful school, the demand for enrollment at the functioning school was too much. To satisfy the demand and because of lack of commitment by the government supervisor, the community built an autonomous school where the teachers from high functioning school would teach after official hours.

6.7 Taking Stock and Looking Forward

Participation in liberal reforms provide a means to compensate for no formal participation at the macro-level and is often criticized as serving institutional needs more so than the populations they claim to serve (Edwards and Klees 2012). It
often transforms participation into something to be managed and co-opted (Ibid) but through SBM and an active SC, as well as progressive and critical insight, strategies that can be considered transformative can be created should particular contingencies be addressed.

If anything can be deduced from the survey results, it is that parents have a strong desire to participate. In democratizing country such as Indonesia, parental and community involvement aspects of SBM are valued (Heywood 2011). In the survey at SC1, all parents but 3 provided recommendations to improve the schools capacity, communication, or transparency. Unfortunately, effective avenues to address these concerns either did not exist or where not effective.

Following the suggestions of numerous respondents in the survey of SC1, there should be active attempts towards parental consultation via open meetings before making decisions. As recommended by Vernez et al (2013), SC should meet during hours convenient to members and parents. Though school administrators report informing parents of school functions and meetings through letters sent home with students, many parents report never receiving such letters. With 86% of individuals in Indonesia own cell phones, and this number must be significantly higher per household (Meiningsih and Pratiwi 2012). A parent at CS1 recommended systematic cell phone notifications through which the school could provide a quick, cheap method of informing parents of upcoming meetings and school related events.

This differed in CS2, where most parents reported that direct communication with school administration was effective. It was difficult to propose a hypothetical scenario involving a SC to these parents due to the lack of an ability to conceptualize a reasoning behind creating such an institution without proper socialization of its purposes. Socialization of parents and committee members in both contexts was necessary. This is not being done effectively by the government or existing management at the schools.

Pradham et al demonstrated through an intensive study that the fostering of social capital via institutional reforms such as democratic election of committee and
committee linkage to village councils are more cost-effective and efficacious that financial and human capital based interventions such as training and block grants to committees alone. SCs should strive for linkage with village council or other existing structures because, as so far dictated by official policy, the SC has no inherent power. This will most effectively be accomplished from the local level and catered to local contexts. Top-down regulation is ineffective and the impetus must come from local communities. Because linkage and election are the most cost effective and efficacious combination of interventions, a comprehensive study should be undertaken to ascertain the effectiveness in Aceh.

This form of linkage implies upward linkage to those with existing power, but a concerted effort to reach out to marginalized populations is just as important. As such, the issue of representation must be addressed. Inclusion of local elites, politicians, and educated professionals confers benefits for the SC, but these often become exclusionary. Women and the poor remain marginalized in the process. A formal system of representation has yet to be developed.

Furthermore, there remains the need for regulations to be clarified. Because of the ambiguity of the MONE decree, districts continue to play the ‘traditional authoritative role’ (Vernez et al 2013), exacerbated by a historically centralized society (Amirrachman et al 2009; Bjork 2003). The duties of the SC are not ‘efficient in general terms or in relation to the school principle’ (World Bank 2004 cited in Sweeting et al 2007). Secondly, the SC role in the financial aspects of school operation remain unclear (Sweeting et al 2007).

These recommendations are admittedly myopic and do not address large scale power relations, but as for now, are possibly effective tweaks in the established liberal education policy toward one that begins to move into a more progressive and authentic participation. In the final chapter, we attempt to sum up the current research and, hopefully, address the research questions adequately.
Chapter 7

Reflections on the Current Research

‘the price was high, while the promise lies, as yet, largely unfulfilled.’ – Amirrachman et al (2009)

Education decentralization has resulted in a massive restructuring of the institutional, political, and social landscape, often in ways that cause tension and conflict among and within institutions and actors at multiple levels. This institutional and political reformation in Aceh, Indonesia has led to the opening up of new arenas of participation, but the extent to which these new arrangements are democratic, inclusive, and capable of transformatory change was uncertain.
Through use of the SRA and critical theory, the research has given special consideration to how given structures and the decentralization process have privileged ‘some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, and some actions over others’ (Jessop 2004). The research questions necessitated inquiry at both the micro and meso-levels, with considerations towards power and discourse at the global level.

The research indicates that the current state of SBM and participatory reforms in Indonesia may serve to reinforce and reproduce traditional power structures: the government authority over schools, men over women, and the more fortunate over the marginalized. Though the decentralization project in Indonesia claims to based on a proposition of incorporating local communities, democratizing school decision-making, and increasing equity, the top-down nature of implementation, ambiguous language, lack of true power divulgence, and lack of commitment combined with the predisposition to respect the social order that has been ingrained by decades of centralization, often make doing this in a democratic and potentially transformatory way unlikely. As of yet, participatory reforms in Aceh may represent what Rose (2003) calls ‘pseudo-participation,’ a process where citizens are merely kept informed by a SC that acts as a consulting body at best.

In that the results of this study seemed to primarily explicate ways in which forms of participation are defined and delineated, future research may seek to further discover and describe, in more detail than is provided here, ways in which actors at lower levels of structuralizational capacity are actively engaging the traditional power structures. A focus on the agency in action of traditionally marginalized groups to organize and engage would add a much needed change in perspective; from a focus on the oppressive present contingency to a potentially progressive future. For this research, as with much that preceded it, this research contends that participatory reforms are not the panacea for problems that have historically arisen in development and education. It further maintains that such reforms certainly do not preclude major improvements, and the potential for the future is immense, though not currently realized.
Similarly, this research only addresses indirectly the ramifications of the most recent conflict in Aceh regarding education policy, implementation, and political economy. Further inquiry into this theme, so prominent in both the discourse of politics and policy as well as the collective Acehnese psyche, would be a pragmatic next step in the piecing together of a larger multifaceted picture of the current Acehnese ‘moment’ in education.

For now, the onus necessarily falls upon local communities to engage, assert authority, and to develop strategic and novel ways of establishing linkages with, or distance from, existing structures. The state of education in Aceh should not be contingent on the central or district governments to align their practice with policy related to SBM, while even properly implemented SBM as a practice cannot be regarded as a faultless and depolitical. Broad social change and community engagement cannot be mandated, and must be catalyzed at the local level. Aceh has shown that it is capable of developing such novel mechanisms such as the original school committees of the 1990’s and the MPD.

A progressive/subversive engagement of institutionalized participation, where vague policy results not in the diminishment of opportunity or authority, but one in which in new arenas are created and from which local actors may engage existing power structures. Daun (2009) writes ‘If decentralization leaves “space” for local initiatives, it is then a matter of how this is perceived and who exploits the new opportunities.’ It is in the forming of new institutions within and between schools, school committees, parents, and local society where aspects of progressive education may be infused into the liberal model to transform socio-political and material realities of all involved. Hay 2002 explains:

> By identifying a collective interest, actors may overcome their powerlessness by pooling their resources and thereby constituting themselves as strategic actors at higher levels of structuration (2002, p 383)

Proponents of education decentralization have overlooked that ‘education is not merely an administrative matter, but also socio-political,’ failing to take into account
power relations and massive variability within the global, Indonesian, and more specifically Acehnese context. Much conventional research and policy is based in ‘positivist, reductionist, and deterministic understandings based on mapping clear cause’ (Lopes Cardozo and Novelli Forthcoming). Via critical realism, we broaden the scope of analysis to how objects work in relation to their context. This research hopes to have placed education reforms in Aceh amid a larger spacio-temporal, economic, and social context of underlying mechanisms which exert and are exerted upon dialogically and tangentially. Without facing these political and social realities any substantive transformation is unlikely to occur. Encompassing reforms deny the social, political, and economic diversity of local contexts, and the sphere of global discourse from which they arise. In this research, I have attempted to accentuate and demystify these underlying mechanisms while re-politicizing these relations by restoring active and strategic subjects into focus.

To draw on the sentiments of Edwards and Klees (2012), participation is not something to be imposed or bestowed, but something that is to be fostered from below in a dialogical process. They say that progressives would argue that:

the continuing economic, political, technological and cultural globalisation will increasingly affect the day-to-day lives of the world’s population, and that, as such, the challenge is to democratise this force, and this implies fostering widespread participation (Mundy 2007). That is, given the reality of globalisation, many suggest that it is better to engage with it and transform it – preferably through participatory and democratic means – rather than to ignore it (2012, pp 61).

The authors do not deny the encroachment of the global, but provide a new framework from which to engage via a new participation, consistent with those proffered by Malen (1994) and Anderson (1998).

Though modern discourse has often reduced participation to a politically valuable five-syllable utterance it remains wrought in ambiguity. Participation in its platonic and most simple sense, by its most basic definitions, remains a potent transformatory tool as the antithesis of apathy, subversion, and domination. The purpose of this research is not to denigrate the participatory process, but to identify
the motives for and barriers to it. As development projects incorporating participation undoubtedly move forward, we must always remember ask two questions: Who participates, and towards what end?

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Appendices

Figure 1- Operationalization Table

To draw upon expand on the frameworks set forth by Williams and Anderson discussed previously, an operationalization table was produced from which interview guides, mental notes, and other research endeavors where based.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Research Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Demographics of committee</th>
<th>Under/overrepresentation of gender, age, class, religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>Who does not participate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arena for oppositional voices?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are meetings open to the public?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do time-tables make it possible for everyone to participate?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power structures</th>
<th>School-local</th>
<th>Who participates?</th>
<th>Do school committees accurately represent the community?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State-Local</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Is committee membership relegated to those with existing authority?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What changes have been implemented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the effects of such changes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Observation, questionnaire, semi-structured interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observation, questionnaire, semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observation, questionnaire, semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Utilities</td>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Past Perceptions</td>
<td>Locals’ past perceptions of educational policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Locals’ past perceptions of national policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Committee members past perceptions of past educational policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception of locals toward SBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceptions of locals national educational policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Committee member perceptions of SBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Committee members perceptions of national educational policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Current Perceptions</td>
<td>Do committee members have common interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do interests represent those of diverse members of the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the relationships between members?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-optation</td>
<td></td>
<td>What groups are represented</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary data, semi-structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy and authority</td>
<td>What plans developed at school and state level How are dissenting opinions managed (school-local and school-state)? What problems have arisen in the past and how are they mediated?</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview Semi-structured interviews, observation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means and Ends</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Has learning improved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Who benefits? Disproportionate learning gains?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Expenditures and outcomes</td>
<td>Financial improvements/allocations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Classification of School Based Management Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Somewhat strong</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited autonomy over school affairs, mainly for planning and instruction</td>
<td>School councils have been established, but serve only an advisory role</td>
<td>Councils have autonomy to hire and fire teachers and principals and to set curricula</td>
<td>and control substantial resources (for example, lump-sum funding)</td>
<td>Parental or community control of schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Czech Republic
- Mexico
- Brazil
- Canada
- Thailand
- Virginia, USA
- Florida, USA
- Chicago, USA
- New York, USA
- Spain
- United Kingdom (LM)
- Australia
- El Salvador
- Guatemala
- Ghana
- Honduras
- Hong Kong
- China
- Madagascar
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Rwanda
- Niger
- United Kingdom (GM)
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Qatar
- Benin
- Cambodia
- Indonesia
- Israel
- Kenya
- Mozambique
- Senegal
- The Gambia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of student(s)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Construction / labor</td>
<td>Private employee</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Are you a part of the SC?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Personal knowledge of SC?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Noes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Are you able to voice your concerns with the SC or administration?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>Do not have the courage</td>
<td>The school never invites me to meetings</td>
<td>Everything works well</td>
<td>Pretty effective</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it effective?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Does everyone have a voice in school policy?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is the SC effective in its goals?</td>
<td>Yes. They have fulfilled the needs of the students</td>
<td>I don't know. There is no dissemination/socialization of SC goals</td>
<td>Yes. It has been proven by the good cooperation and communication between students, school, SC and parents</td>
<td>They have worked well</td>
<td>Less because the economy [SES] of the parents is different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why/Why not?</td>
<td>Majority vote</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are members elected?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you take part in the election?</td>
<td>Every parent has a right to vote</td>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>I am busy with my job</td>
<td>I wasn't invited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to be part of the school committee?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do parent representatives come from all different backgrounds? I.e. cultural, economic, etc?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What would you recommend to make the school more inclusive/have everyone's voices heard?</td>
<td>Suggestion Box</td>
<td>Transparency in SC election</td>
<td>Invite and involve parents in school activity</td>
<td>[SC should] have a discussion with parents before making any decision</td>
<td>The school committee should be able to understand the differences in economy, culture, etc of every parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 1-10:</td>
<td>Your school</td>
<td>Effectiveness of the SC</td>
<td>How involved you are</td>
<td>How involved you would like to be</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of student(s)</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Occupation</strong></td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Are you a part of the SC?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Personal know member of SC?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Are you able to voice you concerns with the SC or administration?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have you?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why or why not?</strong></td>
<td>Because the SC has done well</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>I was not able to come</td>
<td>Too busy</td>
<td>Because I need to know how the learning and teaching system works at the school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Was it effective?</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Does everyone have a voice in school policy?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Is the SC effective in its goals?</strong></td>
<td>Yes. The school has improved a lot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes. Because the policies made in the discussion meetings are successfully implemented</td>
<td>Yes. Everyone communicates with each other</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why/Why not?</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How are members elected?</strong></td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>Through a discussion meeting</td>
<td>Agreement amongst parents</td>
<td>Discussion meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did you take part in the election?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why or why not?</strong></td>
<td>I am busy</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>I was not able to come</td>
<td>Because I am a parent</td>
<td>Because parents participate in the election too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Would you like to be part of the school committee?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do parent representatives come from all different backgrounds? i.e. cultural, economic, etc?</strong></td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What would you recommend to make the school more inclusive/have everyone’s voices heard?</strong></td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Every problem is solved well involving the SC and if necessary involving the parents</td>
<td>[It is] already good. If possible [make] a written report every 3/6 months</td>
<td>Every discussion related to needs and facilities should be made in discussion meetings</td>
<td>Parents should be involved in the discussion meetings concerning student development or learning matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 1-10:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your school</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of the SC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of student(s)</td>
<td>9, 11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Occupation</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Freelance editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Are you a part of the SC?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Personal know member of SC?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Are you able to voice you concerns with the SC or administration?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not yet</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>I do not know where to go if I have complaints or ideas, just happy to have scholarship</td>
<td>Nothing important to voice</td>
<td>A lack of openness</td>
<td>All the decisions are made through discussion meetings</td>
<td>I haven't anything important to voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it effective?</td>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not all</td>
<td>Yes, some issues reported by parents are followed up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Does everyone have a voice in school policy?</td>
<td>Yes. I am invited to meetings by letter</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No for parents, maybe for teachers</td>
<td>Yes, the school always invites parents to meet and talk when there are new policies to be socialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Is the SC effective in its goals?</td>
<td>Yes. The school has more facilities like air conditioners</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I don't think so. Maybe because people in the committee are too busy doing other things</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?/Why not?</td>
<td>The purpose of the SC is not socialized to parents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Because the activities of the committee are not well exposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are members elected?</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Through a discussion meeting</td>
<td>Discussion meeting</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you take part in the election?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>SC already in place</td>
<td>I was not invited</td>
<td>Lack of socialization maybe</td>
<td>Because there was no notification</td>
<td>I didn't know there was an election process for that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to be part of the school committee?</td>
<td>Yes but no time (7 kids. Works mon-sun, 10hr/day)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do parent representatives come from all different backgrounds? i.e. cultural, economic, etc?</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>[No]. Maybe from different educational backgrounds</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What would you recommend to make the school more inclusive/have everyone's voices heard?</td>
<td>It is good</td>
<td>School should conduct discussion/regular meeting between the school, SC, and parents once every 3-4 mo.</td>
<td>The socialization needs to be improved</td>
<td>Many. If there is a avenue for us to talk with school organizers we might come up with many ideas.</td>
<td>A suggestion box should be provided so students/parents can express their ideas anytime and freely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 1-10:</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responde():s:</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18*</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of student(s)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11, 12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Occupation</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Are you a part of the SC?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Previous secretary</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Personal know member of SC?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Are you able to voice you concerns with the SC or administration?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Committee was ineffective</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>No time</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Its good</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it effective?</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Does everyone have a voice in school policy?</td>
<td>I don’t know because I am not involved</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe, the committee and the teachers only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Is the SC effective in its goals?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why/Why not?</td>
<td>TRANSCRIPTION</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are members elected?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Discussion meeting</td>
<td>I don’t know. I think the class’ parent representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you take part in the election?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
<td>TRANSCRIPTION</td>
<td>Because teachers chose committee</td>
<td>Because my child is not in the 2nd grade</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to be part of the school committee?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do parent representatives come from all different backgrounds? i.e. cultural, economic, etc?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What would you recommend to make the school more inclusive/have everyone’s voices heard?</td>
<td>-Every parent should be given an opportunity to give their opinion orally or in text. For parents who work the whole day/fulftime, a suggestion box would be important for them. -Also, telephone numbers [should be provided] that can be contacted anytime</td>
<td>-LOOK IN TRANSCRIPTION</td>
<td>So far it is good</td>
<td>-So far it is good -Notice suggestions and implement them</td>
<td>Transparency in every program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 1-10:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your school</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Not involved yet</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4- Posted BOS expenses