Education in Emergencies: Tracing the Emergence of a Field

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Abstract
This paper explores the rise, expansion and ongoing transformation of the emerging field of research and practice known as ‘Education in Emergencies’. The paper will trace its roots in Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Refugee Education, and outline the actors and factors that have shaped its ongoing evolution from Post-Cold War UN humanitarian interventions, post-9/11 security interests and current concerns with peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity and countering radical extremism. Central to these reflections, will be an analysis of the INEE (International Network on Education in Emergencies), which emerged in the run up to the Education For All Dakar Meeting in 2000, and brings together key policy and practice actors, and remains at the centre of the global architecture of international engagement in education in contexts of humanitarian crisis, armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction.

Introduction
This paper seeks to chart the evolution of the field of research and practice known as ‘education in emergencies’ since 2000 and to hone in on one key player, the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE1). In line with the book’s overall objective we are seeking to understand how a global ‘education in emergencies’2 agenda emerged within the field of international education and development and the role of INEE within this process, as a key global governance in education actor. While much contemporary research has been done relating to the transfer of ideas and policies and the role of the World Bank, the IMF and other powerful states, from various perspectives (c.f. Cammack 2004; Cammack

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1 Formerly known as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies

2 Using the language ‘education in emergencies’ does not reflect the authors’ acceptance of the term. There have been a variety of debates and disputes over the years since INEE’s foundation over the term ‘education in emergencies’ which we believe serves to conflate issues related to education in conflict affected contexts with issues related to education in contexts affected by natural disasters. It also implies that the field – and INEE itself – works primarily in the emergency phase, while the field itself explores issues related to prevention and recovery – both short and long term – of education systems and societies affected by conflict and natural disasters. Our main focus in this paper is on conflict affected contexts, which is where our own area of expertise lies.
2007), less is written about the role of network organisations in these processes – either as catalysts for the spread of the global education agenda or as mediators.

The chapter will proceed as follows: firstly, we will reflect on the rise, expansion and ongoing transformation of the emerging field of research and practice known as ‘Education in Emergencies’. We will do this through locating it within the broader context of shifting Post-Cold War and Post 9/11 contexts. The second part of the paper will develop an analysis of the INEE (International Network on Education in Emergencies), which emerged in the run up to the Education For All Dakar Meeting in 2000, and has become a central player in the development of the field of Education in Emergencies. The network brings together key policy and practice actors, and remains at the centre of the global architecture of international engagement in education in contexts of humanitarian crisis, armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, we will reflect on the role of INEE in the global governance of education, emergencies and conflict, linking the chapter back to broader debates contained in this book.

Global Governance and Inter-Agency Actors: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections

Before mapping out the history of the emergence of the field of EIE and exploring the role of INEE therein, we want to begin by outlining some of the theoretical tools that underpin our analytical approach. These are rooted in critical (cultural) political economy approaches to understanding education which recognise the need to understand education – not within itself – but through an analysis of education in relation to the broader economic, political, cultural and social processes within which it is embedded (Robertson & Dale, 2015). What we would call a shift from ‘educationism’ to the ‘political economy of education’ or what
what Roger Dale (2005) has called a shift from ‘education politics’ to the ‘politics of education’.

Secondly, and in relation to this, we are also seeking to understand the complex relationship between agency and structure in international development and education governance and policy. That is to say we are interested in the role of the INEE, as a network actor, that draws together key agencies and individuals that work on the field of ‘Education in Emergencies’.

To what extent is INEE an agent of broader global geopolitical power relations, reproducing unequal global political relationships or acting as a buffer, mediator, and seeking to challenge these unequal relationships? Methodologically, we have found the work of Bob Jessop on the strategic relational approach, as a helpful framework through which to understand the complexities of both structures and agents (Jessop, 2005). The SRA allows us to go beyond both structuralism and the teleological arguments therein and agential idealism, which reifies agency and fails to adequately theorise the role of structures in shaping the limits of the possible:

“we can analyze .... structure as strategic in their form, content, and operation; and analyze actions, in turn, as structured, more or less context-sensitive, and structuring. This involves examining how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when choosing a course of action. In other words, one should study structures in terms of their structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and actions in terms of (differentially reflexive) structurally-oriented strategic calculation” (Jessop, 1999).

In addition, in earlier work we have aimed to adapt the SRA to analyse the “agency” of a range of actors (e.g. teachers, youth) in the specific field of education in conflict-affected contexts (see for instance Lopes Cardozo and Shah, 2016a/2016b; Lopes Cardozo et al, 2016). In this piece of work, our analysis is again informed and inspired by the SRA, yet now applied to looking at a key network actor.
Thirdly, while recognising that SRA was developed in relation to the ‘state’, in our work on International Development and Education and the ‘governing’ institutions therein, we also recognise that they possess certain types of ‘state-like’ behaviour and activities in terms of governing populations, setting up rules and regulations, delivering services etc. In many ways they go beyond the parameters of state behaviour by setting global rules, agendas, standards, which allow for transnational influence.

Fourthly, we also want to recognise the particularities of the field of international development itself, which is overwhelmingly both a Western-led ‘industry’ rooted in the decolonisation processes that took off since the 1940s and a contradictory process that expresses both the utopian idea of “the rest” catching up with “the West” and the architecture to ensure that highly unequal North-South relationships are maintained (Novelli, 2016). In the rest of the paper we endeavour to apply some of this thinking to the analysis of the emergence of the field of Education in Emergencies.

**Understanding the Rise of Interest in Conflict, Development and Education**

In this section we seek to tell the story of the rise, expansion and ongoing transformation of the field of education in emergencies. As Winthrop and Matsui (2014) note in a recent historical review of the field:

> “While a common refrain among experts is that education and fragility is a new field, the practice of providing schooling and non-formal education to children and youth affected by conflict dates back at least to World War II, when communities provided schooling for evacuee and refugee children in Europe and the United States invested heavily in rebuilding European education systems through the Marshall Plan, perhaps the largest and most successful post-conflict education program to date.”

It is in these practices of delivering education in refugee camps that the seeds of knowledge on the particularities of delivering education in contexts of conflict and insecurity begin to emerge. However, while education for refugees and displaced communities did take place,
this was often at the initiative of the affected communities themselves, whilst the international community focussed on ‘life-saving’ interventions in housing, food and health. For Winthrop and Matsui (2013) this was a period that represented a ‘proliferation’ of grassroots attempts to provide education support to communities affected by conflict.

In order to understand the shift from a ‘proliferation’ of initiatives to the emergence of a coherent field of ‘education in emergencies’, we need to hone in on the early 1990s, in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War where the foundations of contemporary geopolitics were reset. This period marked the end of US/Russia bi-polarism in international relations, which in turn resulted in a drop in overall development aid, but also a shift of focus in development policy and education policy towards the least developed countries and population groups. The removal of Cold War geopolitics produced a noticeable, albeit partial, shift away from the overwhelmingly partisan and highly political allocation of aid during the cold war (Lundborg 1998; Wang 1999; Christian Aid 2004).

These Post Cold War shifts led to an increased focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and joint donor efforts to improve the coordination of international development policy. The first evidence of this shift in education was the 1990 ‘Education for All’ commitments, that emerged out of a high profile meeting in Jomtien, Thailand. These efforts were, a decade later, integrated in the Millennium Development Goals – with aspects of the Education For All objectives as part of an overall set of development targets. As part of a global education agenda, in 2005 donors agreed in the Paris Declaration to ‘harmonise’ their aid efforts in developing contexts, for instance through mechanisms such as the Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPS) to education, ensuring ownership and alignment with aid recipients development strategies (Mundy 2002; Mundy 2006; King 2007; OECD 2005/2008). While not without both critics
and critiques, there was a feeling that the architecture of aid was becoming more coherent and being targeted towards those areas of most need (Cosgrave 2005), even if the rhetoric often outpaced the financing (GCE 2009).

On the other hand, the post-Cold War period (from 1991 onwards) also represented the rise of US hegemony and the broader consolidation of the neoliberal political project (see Harvey 2007). This had the effect in the field of education and development of globalizing a set of neoliberal inspired education policy recipes including decentralization, privatization, new public management etc. These policies were initiated in the heat of the Cold War under World Bank/IMF sponsored structural adjustment policies but continue on to the present in different forms (Robertson et al. 2007).

Parallel to these Post Cold War developments of increased donor coordination and consensus and neoliberal hegemony was also a rise in Western interventionism, often under the leadership of the United States, in high profile conflicts from the Balkans to Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Post Cold War peace dividend appeared to be ending before it had really begun. Importantly, Western interventions in these conflicts were also discursively framed as ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Fearon 2008, p. 52), drawing on issues of human security, human rights, democracy and freedom for their justification (Roberts 2000; Forsythe 2000). The previous UN gospel of non-interventionism in the sovereign affairs of member states became tempered by the right of the international community to intervene in cases where the ‘human security’ of the population were at risk. Some critics saw this new humanitarianism as a new mode of imperialism (Chomsky 1994; Chossudovsky 1997; Chomsky 1999; Chossudovsky 2002).
The fallout from the 9/11 attacks in New York also catalysed increased intervention into conflict zones. Suddenly the insecurity and conflict occurring outside of the core global powers was recognized as producing insecurity at home (Duffield 2007). This led to an increased push to merge issues of international development with national security concerns – the merging of security and development – a logic that had of course been present throughout the Cold War. Almost immediately the US and other Western powers began to prioritise concerns over ‘terrorism’ and sought to integrate all other aspects of government policy under this overarching objective of security. During the Bush administration, development and humanitarian organizations were often simplistically treated as ‘force multipliers’ (Novelli 2010), and while the language softened under the Obama administration, the central thrust of linking development aid to national security objectives has remained intact (Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission 2010).

Back in 2008, USAID released their ‘civil military cooperation policy’ (2008), explaining their 3D-approach, incorporating Defence, Diplomacy and Development and stating that: “Development is also recognized as a key element of any successful whole-of-government counterterrorism and counter-insurgency effort” (USAID 2008, p. 1). While the US was and remains the most vigorous agent in the process of merging security and development, the EU and other donors (including for instance DFID, AUSAID, Japan and the Dutch) have maintained similar policies (EU 2003, p.13). In 2015, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, Liliane Ploumen, reflected on this merging of security and development in an interview in the Guardian newspaper:

“Some worry that talking about peace and conflict prevention in the context of development will put too much emphasis on security, but I believe the opposite:
bringing a development perspective to issues of conflict prevention and peace will allow us to focus better, and earlier, on emerging conflict and instability. [...] With the adoption of the global goals, the world has turned the mutual importance of peace and development into an agenda for action. Let’s show that we are serious about leaving no one behind. We cannot allow fragile and conflict-affected areas to become the ghettoes of our world.”

While the renewed commitment of Western governments to the importance of international development might be welcomed as an expression of global solidarity, the ‘joined up’ whole-of-government 3D-approach has brought with it dangers for the development and humanitarian community of being taken over by the generally more powerful security wing of national governments. Moreover, mixing development cooperation with other policies or commercial, security or geopolitical interests undermines the possibilities of aligning overseas development assistance with internationally agreed aid effectiveness principles, like the Paris Agenda.

While the dynamics and nature of the development and conflict agenda remain hotly debated, what is less contested is the fact that conflict and emergencies are at the centre of the development policy and debate. Since the 1990’s there has been a massive increase in the number of UN peacekeeping troops and humanitarian and development actors operating in conflict situations. By 1995, humanitarian agencies were responding to a total of 28 complex emergencies around the world, increasing from just five in 1985 (Bradbury 1995; Slim 1996). By the mid 1990s emergency spending had increased by over 600% from

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its mid 1980s point to over 3.5 USD billion and has continued to rise (Fearon 2008). Personnel had increased by over 700% since 1999 to 110,000 personnel with a budget of 7 USD billion in 2008. According to the 2008 Reality of Aid Report (2008, p. 8): “aid allocations to the most severely conflict-affected countries...increased from 9.3% of total ODA in 2000 (for 12 countries) to 20.4% (for 10 countries) in 2006”. Coupled with a general increase in ODA during the same period, aid to conflict affected countries nearly tripled in real terms between 2000-2006. Since 2007, 53% of total ODA has gone to countries on the 2015 OECD Fragile State list (see OECD, 2015:22). What is also clear from the literature is that the distribution of aid among severely-conflict-affected countries was, and remains, highly unequal, reflecting geopolitical interests rather than human need. Between 2002 and 2012, 22% of all ODA to fragile states went to Iraq and Afghanistan (OECD, 2015: 23).

**Dynamics in the Evolution of Education in Emergencies**

Since the late 1990s and in tandem with the expansion of development and humanitarian intervention in conflict zones, there has been a parallel increase in interest and recognition of the importance of education delivery in emergency, protracted crisis, on-going conflict and post-conflict zones. This we believe has been the result of at least four key drivers, linked to the geopolitical shifts outlined above.

First, education, like food and shelter, has come to be seen as part of the core building blocks of human development and a necessary and vital part of humanitarian response in conflict situations in particular (Save the Children 2010). One factor often identified as a catalyst within this process, was the 1996 Machel Report on “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, which identified the damaging effects of wars on the lives of children, with a particular emphasis on the role and importance of education. The report provided the foundation for the beginnings of an important debate about the ‘life-saving’ potential of
education during and after armed conflicts, and the negative effects of depriving young people of access therein.

Since 2008, there has been a Global Education Cluster, headed by UNICEF and the International Save the Children Alliance that coordinates the educational response in emergency situations, as part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that assumes overall coordination, and develops policy involving UN and non-UN humanitarian partners operating in conflict zones. Central to the rise in prominence of education within conflict situations has been the actions of Save the Children, INEE, UNICEF and others to successfully lobby for an expansion their own mandates and activities in education – within a growing conflict and development funding regime.

Secondly, the success of these linked organizations and practitioners in placing education, emergencies and conflict firmly on the international development agenda has been aided, since 2000, by a recognition from bi-lateral donors that a large proportion of the world’s out of school children are located in conflict and post-conflict countries and thus this issue needs to be addressed if global education targets, such as the EFA goals, and now the more recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are to be achieved (Save the Children 2007; Save The Children 2008, GMR 2011). This has also led to a growing awareness of the relationship between education and conflict, and its potentially catalytic and preventative roles (Bush et al. 2000; DFID 2003), though we would argue that the technical politics of delivering education in contexts of conflict rather than its political nature continues to dominate donor engagement.

UNICEF’s Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Programme, with financial support
from the Netherlands government, between 2012-2015⁴, has instigated a new push to understand and support education’s crucial role in processes of peacebuilding. This sits at one end of a continuum of ways of thinking within the field at present, ranging from 1) a more humanitarian (Education in Emergencies) approach, to 2) a Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) approach that mainly aims to do no harm, and 3) an approach that recognises education’s role in transforming societies through processes of peacebuilding that can address the drivers of conflict and their links to education (Smith, 2014).

Thirdly, the merging of security and development outlined above has also penetrated the field of education and development. In education this emerges as a process of reinterpreting both the purposes and the practices of both education and development – as having potential ‘security benefits’. An illustration of this is the prevalence of references to the role of education in the US’s counter-terrorism strategies elaborated in their ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’.⁵ As an example, the 2007 report, in Chapter 5, ‘Terrorist Safe Havens’, sub-section 7 focuses on Basic Education in Muslim Countries. In this section it notes that:

“The Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies continued to support an increased focus on education in predominantly Muslim countries and those with significant Muslim populations. The United States’ approach stresses mobilizing public and private resources as partners to improve access, quality, and the relevance of education, with a specific emphasis on developing civic-mindedness in young people.” (US State Department 2008, p. 243).

⁴ http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/pbea/about-pbea/what-is-pbea/
⁵ see http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Similarly, as part of the US military’s counterinsurgency strategy in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan ‘humanitarian and civic assistance’ included “such non-emergency services as constructing schools, performing dental procedures, and even vaccinating the livestock of farmers” (Brigety 2008). Crucially for us, it appears that educational provision (particularly for girls) became a key discursive justification for the military intervention in Afghanistan, and educational progress as a means of demonstrating the alleged success of the occupation. The blurred lines between military and aid workers discussed above is also directly observable in the field of Education, Conflict and Emergencies through the on-going attempts to foster inter-sectoral collaboration between development workers, peace-builders and humanitarian aid workers – amongst others (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013).

Fourthly, and linked to the increasing politicisation of education in debates linked to the ‘war on terror’ there has been a rise of direct attacks on education systems and communities, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria. The Global Terrorism Database notes a significant increase in violent and extremist attacks on educational institutions since 2005. Furthermore, there has also been an increased interest on the educational links to processes of radicalisation, and a growing awareness that there is a need to better understand, and address, the root causes of violent extremism in order to prevent future violent attacks targeting learners, educators, education facilities and societies at large. This was for instance highlighted in the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which was presented to the UN General Assembly in January 2016.

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These combined reasons have led to a growing commitment to the area of education and conflict and have, not surprisingly, led to increased calls for funding to education in conflict zones. However, what should be noted is that as with the general aid disbursements to conflict and fragile states, the distribution of educational aid between countries is highly uneven with several high profile countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and Afghanistan receiving large portions of the cake (UNESCO GMR, 2011). In addition, the main players in the field hardly recognise the role of education, either positively and negatively, in relation to persistent and growing forms of urban (gang) violence (Carapic and Lopes Cardozo, 2016). While Save the Children, and several other actors have, and continue to, lobby hard to increase the volume of spending and see current spending as insufficient to meet the challenges ahead (Save the Children 2007; 2008; 2010), the funds allocated have increased significantly over the past decade. DFID in its latest development strategy paper (DFID, 2015), aspires to spend 50% of its aid budget in conflict affected contexts, and 50% of all education spending. A commitment present in their education strategy since 2010 (se DFID, 2010, Education Strategy Paper).  

The recently launched Fund for Education in Emergencies, the ‘Education Cannot Wait Fund’, is the most recent and visible attempt to “bridge the humanitarian-development divide” and aims to support coordination and collaboration between public and private actors. The *Education Cannot Wait Fund* has as its overall 5-year fundraising ambition to raise $3.85

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9 We consider ‘fragile states’ as a complicated and value-laden concept, and while emphasizing its problematic nature (what state would be willing to be called ‘failed’ by others?), we chose to use the term for this chapter in order to stay close to the discourse used in the global environment.


billion, while it aims to scale up its resource mobilization over the first five years, commencing with an aim to raise approximately $150 million in the first year and with an ambition to bring funding to a level of $1.5 billion in the fifth year. INEE writes how during the launch event in May 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul:

“donor representatives from the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, the European Union and the Netherlands stepped up and pledged $87.5 million or just over half of the $150 million needed to fully fund year one. Non-state pledges for the first year included a $2.5 million contribution from Dubai Cares to support initial set-up of the Education Cannot Wait secretariat bringing the total to more than $90 million. The Global Business Coalition for Education also committed to ‘mobilize $100 million in financial and relevant in-kind contributions.”

INEE clearly played an important role in the emergence and foundation of this latest fund, but what do we know about the major driving forces behind this attempt to create a more robust, coordinated effort to support education interventions in emergencies and conflict? How should we understand the role of INEE as a network, and/or as a player in the field? The next section develops these questions further in an attempt to sketch/explore the latest developments in the field.

In conclusion to this section, what we can say is that the rise of the education and conflict agenda has been facilitated by a range of external and internal factors: by Post Cold War and Post 9/11 geopolitical realities and intentions; by EFA, MDG and SDG goals; by the advocacy of organizations like Save the Children, UNICEF and INEE – pushing for the

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11 Donor commitments made at the May 23, 2016 launch event: US = $20 million; UK = £30 million over two years; EU = €5 million; Norway = $10 million; Netherlands = €7 million; Dubai Cares = $2.5 million, source: http://www.unicef.org/media/media_91132.html
humanitarian and human rights agenda of education; and finally also through the agency of military and security sectors that see building schools and strengthening education in certain conflict zones as part of their military strategy to win the hearts and minds of the civilian populations. Many of these issues and actors appear to clash with each other and produce unlikely bedfellows, and interestingly, many of these players come together under the INEE umbrella. To further explore this interplay, in the next section we will begin to unravel in more detail what role INEE has played in this complicated picture.

**The International Network of Education in Emergencies (INEE)**

INEE is a network created to improve inter-agency communication and collaboration within the context of education in emergencies, and has gained recognition as an effective lobbying, advocacy and policy coordination and development institution. There are some relevant prior studies undertaken that have evaluated the emergence of the network (Anderson and Mendenhall, 2006; Bromley and Andina, 2010) as well as some evaluative studies of the Minimum Standards (MS) tools (including Kirk & Cassidy (2007), a USAID study of Uganda by Sullivan-Owomoyela (2006), an INEE/UNICEF case study of Uganda by Karpinska (2008) and an OID/IIEP/INEE study by Mendizabal and Hearn (2011)). Nevertheless, there is not an extensive body of literature we can draw on for this analysis. Hence, we highlight insights from other studies where relevant, and build our further discussion on an analysis of available online resources as well as our own participation as members of the network during the past decade.

Founded in 2000, its membership has increased to about 11,000 members, and includes a mix of practitioners, students, teachers, staff from UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, donors, governments and universities from most countries around the
Drawing on INEE’s own analysis of its membership, about one-third of its members are working within NGOs, around 8% in UN organisations, and another one-fifth in educational or academic institutions. Zooming into the two organisations that ‘deliver’ most members, Save the Children (138 members) is followed closely by UNICEF (114 members) – see the figure below for more details. This is perhaps somewhat unsurprising, considering that both these organisations also co-lead the Education Cluster, which was started in 2007 by the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) to ensure education – as a basic human right - is a core element of humanitarian response.

As argued by Mendizabal and Hearn, “As a network, INEE’s structure is wholly different from that of a typical organisation” (2011).

So, how is INEE governed and what is its modus operandi? As a network organization, selected member organisations are involved in the operational structure. As part of its governance structure, the Steering Group:

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12 For more resources on the evolution of INEE as a network, see also the work of Anderson and Mendenhall (2006), Bromley and Andina (2010), Mendizabal and Hearn (2011).

13 INEE webpage, http://www.ineesite.org/en/who-we-are

14 http://educationcluster.net
“provides strategic vision and overall governance for the network. In consultation with the wider membership and in line with the INEE Strategic Plan, the INEE Steering Group sets goals and plans for the network; approves new working groups and task teams; and provides strategic guidance to the INEE Secretariat staff. Steering Group members are senior representatives of organizations actively engaged in education in emergencies.”

The INEE Secretariat consists of a director, three coordinators for the respective working groups (more below), an administrative officer and a senior communications officer. Together, the secretariat aims to ensure

“effective coordination; convene and supports the members; build linkages and connections; strengthen commitment, collaboration, and partnerships within the network; filter and share information; enhance knowledge and capacity within and beyond the membership; and provide overall project management for network activities.”

The three dedicated Working Groups “are formalized structures which help develop and promote specific work within INEE. Participation in Working Groups is on an institutional basis with individual representatives for each agency.” Within the working groups, focusing respectively on 1) Standards and Practice, 2) Education Policy and 3) Advocacy, there are specific Working Groups Task Teams in which individual members collaborate on specific areas of interest. Finally, the Language Communities facilitate access

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15 INEE webpage: http://www.ineesite.org/en/how-we-work
16 INEE webpage: http://www.ineesite.org/en/who-we-are#INEESecretariat
17 INEE webpage: http://www.ineesite.org/en/working-groups
to resources, tools, and experience in the non-English working languages of INEE (Arabic, French, Portugese and Spanish).

The recent change in leadership in 2014 went hand in hand with a process of developing a new strategic plan (2015-2017). The plan was the result of a year long process of consultation with members, both those within working groups and beyond, and has as it mains goal “To enable quality, safe, and relevant education for all in emergencies and crisis contexts through prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.” While the bi-annual INEE working group meetings were largely used to collectively draw out the main lines of the plan, the steering group played a decisive role in its final formulation as well as the new names given to the working groups, according to their main functions. As an entire network, the strategic plan established the following core functions: community-building, convening, knowledge management, amplifying, advocating, facilitating, learning, and providing.

Having established some of the foundational characteristics of the network as it functions at the moment of writing, we now turn to our discussion of the less visible, underlying mechanisms that drive decision-making and governance of this network. In other words, who is facilitating/funding, and who or what is driving specific thematic areas of focus and why?

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18 The plan included four strategic priorities, including: “Strategic Priority 1: To serve as a global advocate and thought leader, promoting education for all and in all circumstances. Strategic Priority 2: To foster the strengthening of the evidence base through partnerships that inform research, policy, and practice across humanitarian and development contexts. Strategic Priority 3: To increase the availability and accessibility of knowledge and information which builds upon and improves capacities to deliver education for all. Strategic Priority 4: To foster an engaged, inclusive and diverse membership, and build strategic partnerships to achieve all other strategic priorities.” Source: http://www.ineesite.org/en/how-we-work
To start with the first question of who is funding, resources available on INEE’s webpage illustrate how a range of institutions have provided financial and/or institutional support to the network. While current donors include Dubai cares, Education Above All, Mercy Corps, UNICEF and USAID, further support is provided by the International Rescue Committee, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the RET, and UNHCR as they hire and host INEE Secretariat staff. In addition, the INEE Steering Group member organizations provide annual financial membership contributions.\(^{19}\) As the full list of donors (between 2001-2015) on INEE’s webpage illustrates, there is a somewhat heavier involvement of institutions based in or directed from the ‘western’ part of the world, often connotated with “traditional” donor countries, as well as considerable support from UN agencies.\(^ {20}\)

While some colleagues in former studies usefully highlighted the challenge and dilemma’s of working on a “tightrope of promoting international understandings of education in emergency situations while being attentive to the local context of each crisis” (Bromley and Andina, 2010: #), instead we now turn to discuss who or what is driving specific thematic areas of focus and why?

Firstly, following our comments above on where the funding comes from, there is a connected argument to be made about where this money consequently flows. Especially when it concerns the strategic planning and activities of the working groups, there seems to be an observable connection between the priorities of institutions that deliver the funding, and the thematic focus areas these working groups mostly focus on – establishing what we could perhaps term a form of intellectual or thematic dependency (e.g. the funding

\(^ {19}\) http://www.ineesite.org/steering-group

\(^ {20}\) http://www.ineesite.org/en/donors
provided by one of the major donors, USAID, to the Education Policy Working Group, and its respective focus on CVE/PVE fits neatly with its interests).

Secondly, and coming back to our earlier historical analysis of the rise of education in emergencies, it pays off at this stage to bring back to mind the integrated approach/3D approach, adopted by major (western) donors. The fact that many of the funding agencies supporting INEE are at the same time committed to this integrated foreign policy strategy, potentially means there is limited space for a more critical inquiry or even counter-voice towards the role these same ‘western’ powers historically have played, or perhaps still play, in conflict-affected regions. In other words, is there a space for INEE (members) to question western interventionism in, for instance, the Middle East – as these same powers are also the main funders for the work that INEE aims to do to counter-balance the effects of conflict?

Thirdly, in this line of thinking, we would like to accentuate one more time a question raised earlier in this paper, of whether INEE is an agent of broader global geopolitical power relations, reproducing unequal global political relationships or acting as a buffer, mediator, seeking to challenge these unequal relationships? In attempting to formulate a possible answer, recognising that many responses are available, we return to insights from the SRA presented earlier on to shed light on the interrelations between structures and agents, as well as discursive and material realities. In a way, adapting insights from the SRA, we contend that INEE could be analysed through both the lense of a strategic selective structure, as well as seeing it as a strategic actor in the field of education and development/emergencies. So, if we consider INEE as a network-structure, it entails strategic selectivity’s in its own existence. The governance of the network, and decisions on whom is included/excluded in the active working groups, on paper aims for diversity.
Exceptions that serve this purpose left aside, due to limitations of material resources, language barriers and geographical remoteness, the active membership is largely selectively enabled only for those usually already well connected to “the field” with the institutional resources to fulfil these obligations.

When we consider INEE through the analytical lens of a strategic “agent” – following the dominantly employed discourse and activities of INEE over the past 15 years, a shift seems to have happened in the identity/character of what INEE is, and what course of action(s) it should take. Looking at INEE’s mandate, a shift seems to have emerged of INEE functioning mainly as a network, to a network-institution also dedicated to service delivery.

At the same time, from an initial focus on the role of education in emergency situations, a move was made to incorporate protracted crisis, conflict and post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding in subsequent years. These shifts can be seen as a process of (self-)identification of INEE as a strategic actor in the field it operates in. This process of identity building, of who INEE is/represents and what its roles are, is closely related to the mechanisms of governance and finances discussed above. Put simply, who is included and who pays also have the biggest say in what the networks stands for, and how it relates to the broader field of work. This then leads to the reflection that existing power relations are mostly reproduced through the ways in which the network is governed structurally, funded materially and expressed discursively by and beyond its active membership.

Conclusions:

Reflecting on the global governance of ‘Education in Emergencies’ what we can see is a field that has been catapulted to prominence through a combination of factors that have emerged out of the broader challenges of Post-Cold War geopolitics, where both
development and conflict – and within that security – have merged in complex and often contradictory ways. On the one hand, the recognition that more than half of the world’s out of school children live in conflict-affected contexts provided a rights based justification for the consolidation of a sub-field of international education and development. This sub-field focussed on technical solutions to the provision of education in complex emergencies, and served to legitimise the discourse of seeing education as life-saving, and worthy of a seat at the humanitarian table.

On the other hand, its focus on conflict and crisis-affected contexts placed it in the orbit of a range of high stakes global political processes and actors, particularly since 9/11, which have shaped its evolution in line with broader US led geopolitical priorities, which have focussed disproportionately on those zones and regions designated as part of the ‘war on terror’. These tensions between technical solutions, political priorities and security interests remain at the heart of the fields ongoing evolution.

Exploring the key role of the INEE within this emerging field, highlights the way that this network has provided a coordinating fora for a range of powerful agencies to come together, develop common projects, share experiences, develop capacity and build a common identity and purpose. The network form, and the open membership process, has also facilitated broad participation from a wide range of policy actors and practitioners, students and researchers, providing the semblance of common purpose and mission. However, its apparent horizontal network and open membership structure is tempered through mechanisms that filter whose voices get heard and whose interests and priorities are embraced. Engagement in the various working groups, which represent a higher tier of governance and agenda setting, is dependent on being both selected by the steering
committees and having an institutional backer that can cover the necessary expenses to attend the global meetings. Similarly, the funding priorities and focus of those institutions who provide resources to INEE seem to, at least partly, determine the agenda of the network and limit its openness to a wider plurality of voices and perspectives. Hence the horizontal network structure is tempered by the ‘real politik’ of power and money.

This critique is not to downplay the many excellent achievements of INEE over the last two decades in facilitating the provision of education to children in some of the most complex contexts on our planet and in facilitating a far more collegial approach and common mission by practitioners and policy actors whose institutions often operate in silos that frequently undermine inter-agency collaboration and cooperation. Nor is it to downplay the deeply felt and genuine commitment of many of its members to promoting sustainable peace and development. More so it seeks to provide an avenue for reflection on the way soft-power operates, uncover often under-represented mechanisms of geopolitics and both material (funding) and discursive (agenda-setting) hegemonies that influence the field’s development. In revealing these imbalances and inequities we can then better think through alternative, and complementary mechanisms and strategies to ensure a plurality of perspectives and interests get represented in INEE and in the field of Education in Emergencies more broadly.

Questions for Discussion

1. Can you explain what were the major geo-political events that have influenced the shift from a ‘proliferation of initiatives’ to the emergence of a coherent field of ‘education in emergencies’since the 1990s?

2. In what specific ways do you see INEE, as a key network actor within the field of EiE, as a:
a) possible reproducing force of unequal global political relationships?

b) a potential mediating force, functioning as a broker or bridge between different sectors and stakeholders?

c) and/or a potentially transformative entity seeking to challenge (unequal) relationships?

3. What are the potential strategies or mechanisms that might enable a network actor – including, yet not limited to INEE - to play a transformative role, and at what scales do you see the most important engagement of such a network actor?

Further readings

References


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